













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Cognition at the Symbolic Threshold:
The role of abductive inference in hypothesising the
meaning of novel signals
Justin William Bernard Sulik
PhD






Humans readily infer the meanings of novel symbols in communicative contexts
of varying complexity, and several researchers in the field of language evolution
have explicitly acknowledged that inference plays a key role in accounting for the
evolution of symbolic communication. However, in this field at least, there has
been very little investigation into the nature of inference in this regard. That is,
evolutionary linguists have yet to address the following questions if we are to have
a fuller picture of how humans came to communicate symbolically:
1. What kinds of inference are there? Specifically,
i Diachronically, what forms of inference are comparatively simpler in
evolutionary terms, and thus shared with a wider range of species?
What forms of inference are more complex, and limited to humans or
to us and our closest relatives?
ii Synchronically, if humans are capable of several kinds of complex in-
ference, how do we know which particular kind of inference is being
applied in solving a given problem?
2. How do symbol-learning problems vary? Specifically,
i What makes a particular symbol-learning problem more or less complex
in terms of the kind of inference needed to solve it?
ii How would the communicative context of our pre-linguistic ancestors
have been different from that of a human child learning words from its
linguistic parent?
This dissertation takes a step towards answering these questions by investi-
gating a little-known form of inference called ‘abduction’ (or insightful hypothesis
generation), which has thus far been wholly overshadowed in language evolution
by a much better understood form called ‘induction’ (or probabilistic hypothesis
evaluation). I will argue that abduction and induction are both comparatively com-
plex in the diachronic terms expressed above in 1.i, and while induction is useful in
accounting for how modern children learn words from linguistic adults, abduction
is more important in situations like those that would have faced our pre-lingistic
ancestors as they first began to use symbols. That is, I will argue on both theoret-
ical and empirical grounds that abductive inference was an evolutionary milestone
as our ancestors crossed what Deacon (1997) calls the symbolic threshold.
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Symbolic communication is a central feature of human language (Deacon,
1997; Jackendoff, 1999), purportedly distinguishing our words from the com-
municative signals produced by animals. In the terms of Deacon (1997),
people crossed the ‘symbolic threshold’ when our ancestors became able to
communicate symbolically: we infer the meaning of novel symbols with com-
parative ease, while even our closest relatives must be laboriously trained
to understand novel signs. Attempting to explain how we evolved to do
this, though, raises a host of logically prior questions. What is a symbol?
How should we characterise the cognitive faculties that allow us to learn
them? Are all symbol-learning tasks equally complex? To what extent, if
any, do we share symbolic signs and the relevant cognitive faculties with
other species? What is the process by which symbols are created? Cur-
rently, none of these prior questions have uncontroversial answers, so any
account of how we evolved to be a symbolic species is thus based on shaky
foundations or is likely to be incomplete. The aim of this thesis is to provide
theoretical and empirical support for an answer to these questions.
I outline and demonstrate the relevance to these questions of a little-
studied and poorly understood form of inference, ‘abduction’ (Peirce, 1935).
Abduction is hypothesis generation and it plays an important role in explain-
ing how humans learn in novel or unconstrained contexts (I unpack these
terms in the body of the thesis). I argue that symbols are just signs that
require abductive inference, and that communication at the symbolic thresh-
old would have involved novel or unconstrained contexts, in which case a




In this introduction, I’ll briefly describe a number of accounts address-
ing the larger issue of learning novel symbols, and show how each of them
runs into difficulty, though they each contribute something useful. I’ll then
indicate how my answer to the questions above will provide a framework
constraining these accounts, filling the gaps, and yoking them together.
Thereafter, I’ll show how this proposal is empirically testable.
Bayesian induction explains behaviour as the optimal solution to a prob-
abilistic problem, and has had marked success in explaining word learning in
laboratory conditions (Tenenbaum et al., 2006; Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007).
These laboratory conditions, however, are highly contextually constrained:
the set of possible meanings is made small and manifest by experimental de-
sign. Induction can explain why we settle on a particular hypothesis about
meaning when we are given a set of possible hypotheses, but cannot explain
where this set of hypotheses comes from in the first place: that is the role
of abduction. While word learning in modern human children is scaffolded
by linguistic parents (a child’s attention might be directed to a particular
object, for instance, constraining the space of possible hypotheses) and is
thus amenable to an inductive account, I will argue that the communica-
tive context of our pre-linguistic ancestors was less constrained, and that
abduction was thus a necessary complement to induction.
Relevance theory is a pragmatic account of how we infer what speakers
intend to communicate to us (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). It proposes a
deductive mechanism that retrieves assumptions one-by-one from our world
knowledge until a relevant interpretation is found. However, it fails to distin-
guish the task of interpreting novel gesture from the task of understanding a
conventional utterance. I will argue that novelty does in fact make a differ-
ence to how we understand speaker intention, that deduction thus cannot be
the whole answer, and that abduction therefore plays a role in understanding
communicative intentions.
These accounts of word learning and pragmatic inference appeal to in-
duction and deduction, types of inference, and I suggested that a third form
of inference, abduction, fills the gap left by context and novelty. Explaining
how it does this requires an account of insight and analogy. Insight is a dis-
tinct cognitive mechanism that involves the formation of novel connections
within our representation of a problem, and analogy involves the formation
of novel connections between representation of a novel problem and repre-
xv
sentation of a familiar problem. Both, I will argue, are well suited to novel
and unconstrained contexts. However, there seems to be no point of contact
between analogy and insight on one hand and deduction or induction on the
other. I suggest that abduction is what links these, in that analogy and in-
sight are creative mechanisms underlying abductive hypothesis generation,
while abduction provides the input to deductive and inductive mechanisms
for hypothesis evaluation, telling us which previously generated hypothesis
is the most rational solution to the problem.
The process of symbolisation describes how non-symbolic signs become
increasingly abstract with use (Garrod et al., 2007; Fay et al., 2010). These
accounts, though, focus on the sign itself and not on how we understand
the sign: they make brief reference to induction but leave the matter there.
I argue that abduction is needed in the initial stages of any such process,
though it becomes less important as signs are grounded in use, since a shared
history of use provides a constraining context for communication.
Though I provide detailed arguments for all the above points, based on
theoretical considerations and on a review of previous empirical evidence, I
then turn to provide my own empirical evidence for my claims. I unpack a
number of features of the communicative context at the symbolic threshold,
provide evidence for some measurable diagnostics, then use these diagnostics
to determine the extent to which abduction is implicated in word-learning
problems as those features are manipulated.
Chapter outlines
Part I: Theory
Chapter 1: Symbols In order to know how symbols came to be or what
makes human symbolic communication different from animal commu-
nication, we need to have a clear idea of what symbols are. This
chapter seeks to provide a definition of ‘symbol’ that is suitable for
enquiring into the question of symbol origins. It investigates common
definitions (that symbols are arbitrary signs, or conventional signs)
and rejects these as being uninformative in an evolutionary context.
It proposes, instead, that symbolic communication is special because
it requires complex forms of inference, where complexity depends on
xvi INTRODUCTION
the communicative context.
Chapter 2: An Inferential Hierarchy The question of inferential com-
plexity is addressed by positing an evolutionary hierarchy, allowing us
to compare our inferential abilities with animals. The hierarchy ranges
from the simplest forms of inference, shared with many species, to the
more complex, at which even our nearest relatives perform poorly. The
stage at which symbolic communication becomes possible is identified,
and the symbol-learning abilities of chimpanzees will be discussed.
Chapter 3: Abduction, Induction and Insight Abductive inference is
defined as novel hypothesis generation, and several key features of this
form of inference are identified, including the fact that abduction is
more insightful than induction and deduction. Abduction is shown to
be necessary, on theoretical grounds, for crossing the symbolic thresh-
old, in that it copes with novelty in unconstrained contexts. Since
induction, rather than abduction, is the focus of many current ap-
proaches to the evolution of symbols, this chapter makes explicit com-
parisons between the two, showing how both are essential for learning
symbols, and identifying what kinds of symbol-learning problems make
comparatively larger demands on each form of inference.
Part II: Empirical Data
Chapter 4: Diagnostics of Abductive Inference I examine behavioural
diagnostics of insight problem solving, and show experimentally that
these are more typical of abductive than of inductive or deductive in-
ference, and can thus be used to distinguish abductive from deductive
and inductive processes.
Chapter 5: Word Learning and Hypothesis Spaces I argue that one
crucial difference between child language learning and the symbolic
threshold is the degree to which the hypothesis space is constrained
by linguistic adults. I then present an experiment showing that ab-
duction generates hypotheses when none are given, but that when
participants are presented with a set of hypotheses, abduction plays
less of a role. I also show that as context becomes increasingly uncon-
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strained, abduction plays a larger role. Inductive accounts are thus
incomplete explanations of symbol origins.
Chapter 6: Word Learning and Predictability from Context I argue
that the communicative context of a novel symbol is more informative
for modern humans than it would have been at the symbolic thresh-
old. I then show experimentally that less informative contexts require
comparatively more abduction.
Chapter 7: Iconicity and Precedence in Word Learning I examine ac-
counts suggesting that symbols evolved from iconic signs through a
process of symbolisation. I present an experiment showing that ear-
lier stages in this process require comparatively more abduction than
later stages, so abduction would have played an important role at the
symbolic threshold. I also present a statistical analysis of the role of
precedent and iconicity in this process, and show that it is the lack
of precedence, rather than the presence of iconicity, that predicts how
abductive a particular problem will be.
Part III: Conclusions
Chapter 8: Conclusions I review the arguments made throughout, show-
ing that there are a number of reasons it is sensible to define ‘symbol’
relative to abductive inference, distinguishing abduction from other
forms of cognition in humans and non-human animals, showing that
hypothesis generation is not explicable by induction, and that abduc-
tion is implicated in novel word-learning tasks that are contextually
unconstrained, as would have been the case at the symbolic threshold.
Aims and intentions
One general requirement in what follows is that definitional or theoretical
distinctions should, at least potentially, be supportable by an empirical dif-
ferences, and that the relationship between the two should be spelled out
clearly. Most of the first three chapters will be unpacking just what the def-
inition of ‘symbol’ consists in and how we might decide objectively whether
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something is a symbol, while the following chapters provide empirical ev-
idence for the claims set out in the theoretical chapters. The theoretical
chapters are not intended to be an exhaustive account of the relevant theo-
ries (either philosophical or semiotic): the discussion may borrow ideas from
these areas, but the focus will be on examining what aspects of the theoret-
ical background could possibly be expected to make an empirical difference
to an explanation of the symbolic threshold.
In much current work, the focus has been on the nature of the sign it-
self, or on the nature of social interaction while using signs. The theoretical
background here shows what an internal or cognitive counterpart to these
external considerations might look like. The experimental side thus rep-
resents a new approach to understanding the role of inference in different
kinds of communicative problems. While abduction is a cognitive faculty,
I will identify behavioural measures that can identify the extent to which
abduction or induction are involved in various sign-learning tasks. The con-
clusion is that abduction is more likely than induction to be involved in








Only humans communicate symbolically. At least, that is the claim common
in talk of language evolution (Pinker, 1994; Deacon, 1997; Noble and David-
son, 1996; Penn et al., 2008; Ramscar et al., 2010), though dissenting voices
include Seyfarth et al. (1980), Armstrong (1993), Hurford (2004), El-Hani
et al. (2010) and Ribeiro et al. (2006). Taken at face value, the debate here
seems to be about what we do when we talk, about what animals do when
they behave in certain ways that affect conspecific behaviour, and about the
extent to which there is continuity or similarity between our behaviour and
theirs.
However, as things stand, this debate says more about what these various
authors mean by ‘symbol’ than it does about similarities or dissimilarities
in human and animal communication, because the word is used in so many
different ways. Only if we can neaten up the sense of ‘symbol’ considerably,
or at least be aware of who is using it in what way, will we be better situated
to discuss the status of communicative behaviour, whether animal, proto-
human or human, in the evolution of symbolic communication.
In this chapter, then, I will take a detailed look at some common def-
initions of the word ‘symbol’, tease out their implications, unpack how we
might decide whether any given behaviour counts as symbolic, and discuss
whether the definitions can thus be applied in a suitably scientific way to
any communicative behaviour. This is an essential step if we rely on animal
behaviour as evidence in symbol evolution, or if we want to examine just
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4 CHAPTER 1. SYMBOLS
what it was that evolved as our ancestors crossed the symbolic threshold.
Having given the background in the following section (§1.2)1, the two
most common definitions of communicative symbols (that symbols are arbi-
trary signs in §1.3 or conventional signs in §1.4) will be examined in turn and
rejected. By ‘rejected’ I do not mean that they are wholly incorrect. They
might adequately describe superficial properties of symbolic communication,
but this doesn’t necessarily mean they define what symbols really are, at
least not in a way that could be applied usefully or objectively in offering
some insights into how our ancestors evolved to use symbolic communica-
tion, or in deciding whether animal communicative behaviour is interestingly
like ours in being symbolic. I conclude in §1.5 that symbols are best treated
as requiring certain kinds of inference when they are first learned. For the
rest of this dissertation, this will allow me to focus on inference as it relates
to symbol learning.
1.2 Background to the problem
1.2.1 Basic issues
Jackendoff (1999) traces the evolution of language through a number of
stages from the most primitive logical possibility up to modern language.
He identifies stage one with a central claim in Deacon (1997): we are able
to combine expressions (sounds, gestures or other forms) with content (or
meaning) in a way that may well be unique among animals.
Usually this special combination of expression and content is called sym-
bolic, but ‘symbol’ is a notoriously complex category (Noth, 1995). A range
of definitions have been offered by psychology, informatics, philosophy, an-
thropology, ethology, linguistics, archaeology and semiotics. The problem is
that language evolution is a place where all these fields meet, and this can
make it difficult to agree what counts as symbolic communication.
Firstly, authors trained in one field may import a definition of ‘symbol’
from another field, but they (or their readers) might not be aware of subtle
differences, of whether the definition is comparatively unorthodox, or what
a definition entails. For instance, Deacon (1997) claims to have built his def-
inition of ‘symbol’ on Peircean semiotics, and it is common for other authors
1Read ‘chapter 1, section 2’.
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to highlight this Peircean substrata in Deacon’s thought (e.g. Garrod et al.,
2007; Fitch, 2010). Deacon’s usage departs in several ways from Peirce’s
(Lumsden, 2002; Sonesson, 2006), yet Fitch misattributes one of Deacon’s
innovations to Peirce. Comparable problems beset the term ‘arbitrariness’,
with Joseph (1987) conflating the definitions in Hockett (1960) and Saussure
(1959) and Seyfarth et al. (1980) conflating Saussure and Peirce.
Secondly, this surplus of academic heritage may lead to a scatter-gun
approach: tying together a number of independent approaches rather than
offering a single concise definition appropriate to the subject matter2. For
instance, Hurford (2007) says at various stages that symbols are signs that do
not involve resemblance, do not involve causation, but do involve learning.
The relationships between these criteria need exploration to see if any one
is more central than the others.
Thirdly, there are sometimes broad leaps between theory and data: it
may be unclear just how a proposed test for symbolic communication relates
to the offered definition of ‘symbol’. At certain points, Noble and Davidson
(1996) discuss symbols being conventional, but at other points they claim
animal behaviour is not symbolic in that it is not intentional. However, they
do not give an explicit account of how intentionality is related to conven-
tionality. If there is a link, we should spell it out; if not, we should consider
refocusing our definition on the empirical test rather than the theoretical
background.
I think there is a lot that is right about various authors discussed above,
but the useful threads of such claims need to be teased apart from the less
helpful elements.
1.2.2 Common definitions
The various senses of ‘symbol’ can be divided into two broad classes: the
internal or mental and the public or external. Internal symbols are men-
tal representations (such as concepts) that are manipulated by cognitive
processes (Fodor, 2001), while public symbols are communicative signs of a
certain sort (such as spoken or written words), the precise nature of which
is explored in this chapter. In what follows, I will use ‘symbol’ without
2All of what I say here is subject-specific: I am not arguing that all the above-mentioned
disciplines must agree on a definition of ‘symbol’, just that language evolution needs a
clear-cut definition to work with.
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any modifiers to refer to public symbols and will use ‘representation’ as a
shorthand for ‘mental representation’ to refer to internal symbols3.
The two most common definitions of public symbols are as follows:
(1) Symbols are arbitrary signs
(2) Symbols are conventional signs
Allowing that the following authors may add other criteria to the above,
(1) is found in Hurford (2004); Penn et al. (2008); Scott-Phillips et al.
(2009); Smith (2004); Call (2006). (2) is found in Noble and Davidson
(1996); Tomasello (1999); Zlatev (2008). A conjunction of (1) and (2)
appears in Saussure (1959)4; Peirce (1955)5; Eco (1984); Tomasello (1990).
The following sections examine each of these in turn and evaluate their
usefulness in deciding whether a human or animal behaviour is symbolic.
The most general point in chapters 3-4 will be that these definitions focus
on superficial aspects of symbolic communication, and that, at least when
accounting for symbol evolution, we should rather focus on the cognition
that underlies such communication.
1.2.3 Some semiotic background
A brief outline of some Peircean semiotic terms will allow for useful points
of comparison between what may seem like unrelated points in this chapter,
and will allow for more fine-grained descriptions than some of the accounts I
critique here. Given the nature of Peirce’s writing, it is often difficult to work
out just what he meant by certain terms, and it is thus impossible to present
any account as being definitively Peircean. Rather, it is better to talk of
3To be clear: I am using ‘representation’ here in the sense meant by cognitive science
(for instance, some information-bearing unit that plays a causal role within a mind), not in
the sense meant by semiotics, where it might be considered a loose synonym for ‘signifier’
and which would thus not be suitable here, given that I need something to refer to mental
units. The term ‘concept’ is rather more loaded than ‘representation’ because some writers
argue that concepts require language (e.g. Davidson, 1975; Dummet, 1993), but since I
am discussing the evolution of language, and since I agree with Hurford (2007) that we
need to allow for the possibility of non-linguistic representations if we want to avoid a
saltationist account of language evolution, I intend ‘representation’ to be a more general
category than ‘concept’ to avoid such issues.
4To an extent. Saussure uses ‘symbol’ to mean icon, and ‘sign’ to refer to what I am
calling a symbol. More accurately, then, his claim is that signs are arbitrary and, as
discussed below, by ‘arbitrary’ he mostly means ‘conventional’.
5Peirce speaks of habits or general laws rather than limiting it to convention.
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reconstructions of particular stages in the development of Peirce’s thought
or, charitably, to call a certain point Peircean if it is Peircean in spirit. The
outline of the Peircean sign below focuses on mature developments and is
based in part on Short (2004). The discussion of the term ‘ground’, found
in earlier writings, is based on a reconstruction in Sonesson (2006).
1.2.3.1 Signs
Peirce’s sign is irreducibly triadic: it comprises three aspects or parts (inter-
pretant, representamen and object), and the sign is the coming together of
all three, rather than any one element (despite occasional terminological in-
felicities on Peirce’s part). The representamen is that thing or event (say, a
word, gesture or signal) that stands for something else, its object, and since
smoke can stand for fire, the former is a representamen and the latter an
object6. These two on their own, however, do not make a sign. A sign exists
only when these two are connected by a third element, the interpretant.
The interpretant is the effect that perceiving the representamen has on
whoever is interpreting the sign, typically (but not always) involving the
object being brought to mind. If you perceive smoke, that might initiate
a series of consequences. First, your representation smoke is activated,
and this probably in turn activates representation fire. Depending on your
circumstances (say you’ve smelled it in the middle of the night in your apart-
ment, rather than while standing around a barbecue) this may in turn have
further effects: it may cause an emotion (fear) and may cause you to acti-
vate the fire alarm. The various effects that the representamen (perceiving
smoke) has on you (activation of smoke and fire, feeling fear, and giving
an alarm) are all interpretants, but two of the interpretants are representa-
tions, one an emotion, and one a behaviour. One of the interpretants is a
representation of the object, hence bringing it to mind (fig. 1.1 a).
It is typical of Peircean semiotics that one interpretant may lead to
others, as in this example. Some chains of interpretants may be rather
short while others may be quite long. It is also typical that one interpretant
6These are not identical to the Saussurean terms ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’. Both are
mental entities for Saussure, but Peirce distinguishes various kinds of representamen and
object, some of which are mental and some of which are external. These subtypes are not
germane to my argument, so it makes no difference whether we consider the representamen
to be your internal perception of a word on this page, or the physical printed word itself,
or the type of which that word is a token.
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(a) The smoke is unexpected indoors at 3am.
(b) The smoke is expected at a barbecue.
(c) A simplified excerpt from the representational structure stored in semantic memory
that might underlie the above interpretants.
Figure 1.1: The semiotic triangle: interpretants link smoke to fire.
1.2. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 9
(sounding the alarm) can simultaneously be a representamen in a further
sign: other people (who perhaps didn’t smell the smoke) might hear the
fire alarm and form similar interpretants. Finally, some interpretants are
potential rather than necessary: smelling smoke while you’re walking up and
down the street trying to remember the address of the place you’re supposed
to be having a barbecue would play out in a different set of interpretants such
that smelling smoke wouldn’t cause the same fear interpretant (fig. 1.1 b).
fire might be more predictably activated in both cases, presumably because
it is closely associated with smoke in semantic memory (fig. 1.1 c).
1.2.3.2 Grounds
One further step that I think pertinent is the introduction of the term
‘ground’. This is not a major feature of mature Peirce, but Sonesson (2006)
introduces it into a discussion of the symbolic threshold in Deacon (1997).
I define it here, and it will crop up again in my criticisms of arbitrariness or
convention, but its relevance to the symbolic threshold is only made explicit
in §1.5.2.3.
A weathervane indicates something about the wind to an interpreter, but
does not indicate all possible facts about the wind. Rather, the weathervane
only makes one aspect of the wind salient : its direction. An anemometer,
on the other hand, can tell us nothing about the wind’s direction, but only
has the potential to signify something about the wind’s speed. In Sonesson’s
interpretation, the ground is a relation between relevant aspects of the rep-
resentamen (the aerodynamic shape of the weathervane, but not its colour
or its looking like a rooster) and aspects of the object (the direction of the
wind, but not its speed) such that the former can potentially be interpreted
as a sign of the latter. The ground ‘is really a principle of relevance’ (Sones-
son, 2006, 170, emphasis mine). Alternatively, ‘[i]n the Ground the object
is seen in a certain respect, the attention isolates one feature’ (Eco, 1997,
61). So despite connotations associated with the word ‘ground’, what we
have here is more of a foregrounding than backgrounding. The key terms
introduced here (salience and relevance) will recur frequently throughout
what follows.
The ground is described as iconic, indexical or symbolic depending on
whether representamen and object are connected by similarity of proper-
ties; a physical relationship such as contiguity or causation; or convention
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or general law, respectively. A fire causes smoke under certain conditions,
regardless whether anyone is around to observe it. Their relationship (an
indexical ground) is thus prior to signification. It only enters into an indexi-
cal sign once someone actually interprets it as such: once the representamen
has an effect (the interpretant) on an observer, potentially bringing the ob-
ject to mind. I quite like the phrasing in Sonesson (2006): it is the causal
ground that makes smoke an ‘apt’ representamen for fire.
Figure 1.2: Indexical grounds: tracks (source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Elephant-tracks.jpg)
We must distinguish iconic/indexical/symbolic grounds from iconic/
indexical/symbolic signs. It is wrong to treat everything causal as an index-
ical sign. Rather, as an indexical ground, it merely has the potential to be
interpreted as an indexical sign. Consider the difference between a hunter
and an urban youth seeing fig. 1.2. The hunter would interpret the circular
depressions to be signs of an elephant. The urbanite might spot the tyre
tracks, yet not see any signs of an elephant here. The ground is indexical
in both cases, yet the elephant spoors are not an indexical sign of an ele-
phant — are not a sign at all, in fact — to the youth. Similarly, vervets do
not understand leopard spoor as signs of a leopard (Cheney and Seyfarth,
1990). Presumably the youth can learn to recognise spoor, though, while
the vervets are somewhat more constrained by their biology.
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1.2.4 Caveats and warning flags
Before looking at these definitions in more detail, I would like to mention a
couple of distinctions that I will not be referring to much in what follows.
Firstly, I will not have much time for exploring terms that various authors
claim are somehow more basic than ‘symbol’. Secondly, while the terms
‘icon’ and ‘index’ are frequently contrasted with ‘symbol’ in the literature,
I do not consider it profitable (for my purposes) to rely overmuch on that
distinction,
Sebeok (2001) lists various types of sign7: symptom, signal, icon, index,
symbol and name. Symptoms are physical markings such as bird plumage,
while signals are a matter of most animal communicative behaviour. How-
ever, I am more interested in seeing whether a given definition of ‘symbol’
is good enough to tell us something about language evolution than in trying
to decide whether something non-symbolic is a symptom or a signal.
Secondly, the terms ‘icon’, ‘index’ and ‘symbol’ are not mutually exclu-
sive, though Lyons (1977) misattributes this notion to Peirce. That is, a sign
can be iconic, indexical and symbolic at the same time (Noble and Davidson,
1996; Keller, 1998). The typical sign on the door of a male bathroom may
be considered reasonably iconic, but that does not prevent it from being
indexical (in that its physical location is crucial to the meaning conveyed:
it means male bathroom here, not just male bathroom in general) and sym-
bolic as well (in that the picture resembles a woman in trousers as much
as it resembles a man, and it is only convention that distinguishes this sign
from the skirted female bathroom marker).
Further, Burling (1993) claims that iconicity is peculiar to humans and
Sonesson (2006) argues that symbolicity may actually be phylogenetically
prior to iconic and indexical signs. The upshot of all this is that we should
be suspicious of negative definitions of ‘symbol’, claiming that symbols are
signs that lack certain properties of icons (such as perceptual similarity) or
indexes (such as physical contiguity), though I address this worry in more
detail in what follows.
What I am aiming for in this chapter, then, is a way of characterising
7Sebeok uses ‘sign’ in a very broad sense here. An alternative would be to use ‘sign’
just to refer to the terms from ‘icon’ rightwards on Sebeok’s list, where a interpreter
distinguishes representamen from object. This terminological difference is unimportant
for my purposes here.
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what is special about human signs, taking ‘symbol’ to be typical of human
signs. With this background in place, we can now turn to look at common
definitions of ‘symbol’.
1.3 Are symbols arbitrary?
Semiotics usually takes ‘arbitrary’ to mean ‘unmotivated’ (Saussure, 1959;
Eco, 1984), so this section explores two senses of ‘motivated’. The first sense
(§1.3.1) involves perceptual similarity, a feature of icons. A map is moti-
vated: it can be used to work out how to get somewhere because properties
of the map correspond to properties of the environment. A second sense
(§1.3.2) involves causation, a typical feature of indexes. A weathervane is
motivated: it can be used to work out the direction of the wind since there
is a physical or causal connection between the two.
But there is no similar motivation behind the symbols ‘map’ and ‘weath-
ervane’8. We will thus be dealing, throughout this section, with a negative
definition of ‘symbol’: whatever ‘motivated’ turns out to mean, symbols are
not that.
1.3.1 Motivatedness as perceptual similarity
Hockett (1960) posited a number of design features of language. One of
them, arbitrariness, requires that linguistic symbols are non-iconic9: that is,
there is usually little perceptual similarity between words and their referents,
or between representamen and object10.
First, I show that iconicity is subjective (§1.3.1.1). While this is not
a problem for many researchers in iconicity, it is a problematic base for
our definition of ‘symbol’ since we need an objective definition to account
for symbol origins. Thereafter, I compare icons based on straightforward
8‘Weathervane’ can be further broken down into ‘weather’ and ‘vane’, and since a
weathervane does have something to do with the weather, it might be claimed that ‘weath-
ervane’ is motivated in a way that ‘map’ is not. The question of this higher level arbi-
trariness (‘relative arbitrariness,’ Saussure 1959) takes us into questions of systematicity
in linguistic form, which is quite distinct from the question of arbitrariness in the semiotic
ground and which will not concern me further.
9There are divergent interpretations, but this quite a common one.
10This may sound like Saussure’s point about the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign,
but is the sort of misconception I identified in §1.2.1. Saussure eventually stated that by
‘arbitrary’ he meant ‘conventional’, and not everything non-iconic is conventional.
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perceptual similarity with those requiring more sophisticated cognition and
argue that a reliance on perception obscures an important cognitive dif-
ference, and that this cognitive difference is more important for symbol
evolution (§1.3.1.2). Finally, I look at what role iconicity usually has in lan-
guage evolution, and show this role is of secondary importance, compared
to cognition (§1.3.1.3).
1.3.1.1 Iconicity is subjective
The Old English (OE) word for cuckoo was ‘geak ’ /jæ:ak/, which appears to
be less motivated by phonological similarity than the modern form ‘cuckoo’,
a later borrowing into English from Old French cocu, derived from Latin
cuculus. However, the OE form derives from proto-Germanic *gauk-a-z
(Roger Lass, personal communication), the root of which is transparently
onomatopoeic.
The transition from *gauk- to /jæ:ak/ was gradual, so there must have
been periods when the onomatopoeic motivation of intermediate forms was
debatable: for some speakers it may have been more iconic than for others.
If symbols are a matter of arbitrariness and if arbitrariness is a matter of
lacking iconicity, we would be forced to claim that the symbolic status of
an intermediate form between *gauk- and /jæ:ak/ depended on how much
it reminded any given person of the noise of a cuckoo.
While it may be unproblematic to describe some of these forms as be-
ing more or less iconic than others, this subjectivity causes two problems
for defining ‘symbol’ as unmotivated in this sense, both of which may be
illustrated by an analogy.
Focusing on perceptual similarity in such cases is like trying to decide
whether people are related purely based on how similar they look. Siblings
may well look similar and this may well suffice for every-day purposes, but
their parentage or DNA, not their appearance, is what makes them siblings.
One implication is that the former is what someone interested in objectivity,
such as a judge or scientist, should investigate. A second is that it is the
former that explains the latter, not the other way round.
If this is our definition of a symbol, then the symbolic threshold occurred
when our ancestors evolved from understanding iconic to understanding non-
iconic signs. But since iconicity is subjective, the status of a given sign at
an intermediate pre-symbolic stage would have depended on how much it
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resembled its referent in the subjective opinion of each individual hominid.
So two hominids may have been able to communicate using the same sign
while it was symbolic for one and non-symbolic for the other. Unless we
were to investigate individual differences in this regard, we would reach a
stalemate in accounting for the evolution of symbolic communication. But
the relevant individual differences must have been cognitive. If these admit
objective measurement, then it is these cognitive differences, not perceptual
similarity, that should be central to our definition of ‘symbol’. It is also
these that would explain how an individual or a species understands either
symbolic or non-symbolic signs.
I don’t deny that icons may evolve into less motivated symbols over time,
and I examine this process in ch. 7, but I demonstrate experimentally that
iconicity does not play an explanatory role in the dynamics of the process,
though this doesn’t prevent it having an important role in how the process
begins.
1.3.1.2 Iconicity privileges perception over cognition; linguistic
meaning demands a focus on cognition
Developing this idea further, I turn to look at a range of icons which lie
along a continuum between comparatively straight-forward perception and
cases where perception is merely the input to some rather complex cognition.
If our definition of symbols is that they are arbitrary in the sense of non-
iconic, then we have no way to distinguish the following examples vis-à-vis
the symbolic threshold. I argue that this would be problematic given that
meaning is a cognitive phenomenon, and that our definition must therefore
reflect these differences.
To illustrate these concerns, consider the following. When looking at a
clear photo, it is usually easy to recognise the face of someone we know in it.
Perceptual similarity allows us to make a connection in our mind between
the photo and the person: we can see they are the same, though we do
not mistake the photo for its referent (unlike pigeons, Sonesson, 2006), so
even at this stage there may be something more sophisticated going on in
the human brain. Regardless of such a possibility, this is a comparatively
simple task and it is more a matter of perception than cognition, in so far
as there is a difference.
When looking at a well drawn caricature of that person, there are still
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Figure 1.3: A problem of perceptual similarity11 (Jung Von Matt, 2012).
Figure 1.4: A Pictionary clue from an experiment in ch. 712
properties shared by the caricature and the person: we can see they are
(somewhat) the same. But the process is not merely a matter of seeing: we
make a connection between certain (probably exaggerated, salient) features
of the caricature and the referent, and so some cognitive process draws our
perceptual attention to those features. This is not as straight-forwardly
perceptual as a clear photo.
A step further in the same direction, it can take some people quite a
while to recognise what some of the stacks of lego blocks in fig. 1.3 depict,
and out of context, one might have even less success with fig. 1.4, drawn
11Answers: The Simpsons; Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles; South Park; The Smurfs;
Asterix and Obelix; Bert and Ernie from Sesame Street; Donald Duck with Huey, Dewey
and Louie; Lucky Luke and the Dalton Gang.
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Figure 1.5: (A) ASL and (B) BSL signs for cat (Perniss et al., 2010).
in a Pictionary-like experiment from ch. 7. Some people see the answer al-
most immediately, others may feel, after staring blankly at these pictures
for a while, a sudden flash of surprise as they hit the answer. This is typi-
cally called an ‘Aha!’ moment, or a flash of insight (the presence of which
in such situations I demonstrate experimentally in ch. 5). This may also
be conceived of as a non-trivial form of analogy since the mind has to do
some work to make a connection between properties of these lego bricks and
properties of the things they represent13.
Two individuals may have similar perceptions of these figures, but differ
in how their brains retrieve the relevant memories or make connections be-
tween salient elements. Even though (it turned out) I had a visual memory
of all these referents prior to seeing this figure, I was unable to retrieve those
memories for at least two of the sets, and had to look at the answers.
Fig. 1.5 shows American Sign Language (ASL) and British Sign Lan-
guage (BSL) signs for cat. The gesture in each case shares perceptual
features with the referent, though these are stylised or abstracted some-
what: despite differing hand shapes, they resemble a cat’s whiskers and are
thus iconic (Perniss et al., 2010). Nonetheless, Perniss et al. claim that
these iconic features are often not accessible to people unfamiliar with those
particular languages and anyone who has played charades will know that
iconicity is not always cognitively accessible.
The photo, caricature and other figures are all iconic, but the presence of
12Answer: Harrison Ford.
13Gentner (2010) claims (briefly) that analogy and insight are related, and I will discuss
their relationship and their role in symbol learning in ch. 3.
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perceptual similarity in these cases is not a sufficient reason to suppose that
the same cognitive processes are applied in interpreting them all: perceptual
features are inputs to increasingly complex process of analogy, insight or
inference in fig. 1.3 and fig. 1.5, but not so in the photo. If symbols are
nothing more than arbitrary (i.e. non-iconic) signs, this causes problems for
language evolution: such a definition focuses on the perceptual dimension
at the expense of the cognitive one.
We have learnt through a number of ingenious experiments (originating
with von Frisch, 1994) that one form of bee dance involves moving in a figure
of eight, indicating the direction and distance to flowers as a source of food.
The angle between the vertical on the hive wall and the waggle run (the
crossing of paths in the middle of the figure of eight where the bee waggles
its body) corresponds to the angle between the sun and the source of nectar.
The duration of the waggle run corresponds to the distance of the source
from the hive. This similarity of properties means the ground is iconic.
Vervet monkeys emit three kinds of alarms (bark, grunt or chutter) in
response to three kinds of predators (leopards, martial eagles and pythons,
respectively, Seyfarth et al., 1980). The monkeys respond to these alarm
calls with the same avoidance behaviour they would display to signs of an
actual predator (such as a sighting, a leopard growl or an eagle shriek),
and the avoidance behaviour to both monkey alarms and predator signals is
environmentally appropriate for escaping those predators: in response to an
eagle sighting, shriek or alarm, they look upwards and run for cover in dense
bush; in response to a leopard sighting, growl or alarm, they run up trees.
‘The monkeys behaved as though each alarm call designated specific objects
or events in the external world’ (Seyfarth et al., 1980, 1090). Seyfarth et al.
note that these calls are non-iconic14.
If symbols are defined as being non-iconic, then we must class the sign
language gestures above with bee dances as being non-symbolic and vervet
alarms with words as being symbolic. But the way this divides up these
communicative behaviours is entirely counter-intuitive if we want to account
for how a non-symbolic species evolved into a symbolic one, and I take it
that this includes accounting for how humans but not other species (with few
exceptions, after laborious training by linguistic humans) can understand
14Rendall et al. (2009) point out that an aspect of the alarms is nonetheless non-
arbitrary: short bursts capture attention effectively.
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sign-language gestures and words. Sign-language gestures may be iconic,
like bee dances, but the former is linguistic and the latter not; the same
point applies, mutatis mutandis, to non-iconic alarm calls and words.
A sensible way to distinguish iconic sign-language gestures from iconic
bee dances, or arbitrary words from arbitrary alarm calls in the way required
by this evolutionary question, is by appealing to cognitive differences. Our
definition of ‘symbol’ must reflect this fact: we should define the term rela-
tive to whatever cognitive processes this perceptual information is an input
to.
On a related note, it has been established that perceptual similarity
exists in bee waggle dances, but the existence of an iconic ground does not
mean that bees always interpret that particular ground in order to find
the flowers. Grüter and Farina (2009) summarise a range of experiments
showing that different individual bees perceiving the same waggle dance
find the relevant flowers for a range of reasons. Some of these bees react to
olfactory cues given off by the dancer and then follow an odour trail, rather
than the angle of the waggle run. Other bees had visited the indicated source
the previous day and simply had their memories of the place reactivated by
olfactory cues. A focus on perception, prompted by the definition currently
on offer, risks seeing iconic signs where there may be only iconic grounds
(cf. §1.2.3.2).
1.3.1.3 Iconicity plays, at best, a supporting role in symbol evo-
lution
The previous subsections have criticised the notion that iconicity could be
the basis for a negative definition of symbols, but didn’t examine why lan-
guage evolution researchers might be interested in iconicity at all. Here I
outline one role iconicity may play. I then argue that this role is nonetheless
subordinate to cognitive considerations.
Hurford speculates about two possibilities for the first proto-linguistic
words. One possibility is that
some hominin ancestor made a random noise while attempting
to convey some idea; the hearers were able to make a good guess
from the context what idea was meant, and the random noise
became arbitrarily associated with that idea. (2010, 121)
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I examine in the next two chapters just what this ‘good guess’ might
have been. The other possibility is that
Some slight element of naturalness [read: motivatedness] in con-
nections between meanings and sounds could have been the boot-
strap needed to get such a system up and running. (2010, 127)
That is, a potential role for iconicity in language evolution is that it
could have facilitated the learning of connections between representamen
and object because this is easier to process (learn, interpret or recognise)
than is the case with arbitrary connections, for various reasons. Accounts
tend to focus either on the fact that iconicity might be more informative or
that there may be cross-modal associations supporting such learning.
As an example of the first of these, consider the Japanese mimetic verbs
in table 1.1. Kantartzis et al. (2011) show (using other examples) that
iconicity aided acquisition for English speaking children by comparing learn-
ing rates for such Japanese verbs when matched with their meanings and
learning rates for mismatched verbs.
Japanese mimetic word English translation
koro light object rolling
korokoro light object rolling repeatedly
goro heavy object rolling
gorogoro heavy object rolling repeatedly
Table 1.1: Iconicity in Japanese words (Perniss et al., 2010).
Similarly, Thompson et al. (2009) presented ASL users with ASL signs
accompanied by one of two pictures, one with the iconic ground made salient
and the other lacking such salience. For example, the ASL sign for ba-
nana involves miming peeling a banana, so the salient picture showed a
half-peeled banana while the non-salient picture showed an intact banana.
Subjects pressed keys to indicate whether a simultaneously presented ges-
ture and picture represented the same object, and the results show that
subjects reacted more quickly in the salient condition. So salient iconicity
facilitated processing. Thompson et al. (2012) show that iconicity aids child
BSL signers learn signs.
Moving to the second point, there exist several demonstrations of asso-
ciations across sensory modalities. Ramachandran and Spence (2001) inves-
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tigate the bouba-kiki effect. Subjects were presented with a rounder and a
spikier shape, and asked which they thought was called Bouba and which
Kiki. They were significantly more likely to associate Bouba with the round
shape and Kiki with the spiky one. Simner et al. (2010) had subjects move
sliders which altered phonetic properties of a vowel sound they heard. For
instance, lower F1 frequencies correspond to higher vowels. One of four ba-
sic tastes (sweet, salty, bitter, sour) were dropped on their tongues and they
were asked to manipulate the sliders to produce the sound they thought
best matched the taste. Although this seems a highly abstract and sub-
jective task, there were systematic associations. For example, sweet tastes
were associated with lower F1 frequencies than sour ones.
When the above two points (ease of processing and cross-modal associa-
tions) are applied to language evolution, researchers are often explicit about
the fact that iconicity plays a role in so far as it provides ‘scaffolding for
the cognitive system to connect linguistic form and embodied experience’
(Perniss et al., 2010, 12). Similarly, Hurford claims ‘the very first learned
meaningful expressions would have been sound-symbolically, or synaesthet-
ically, connected to their meanings, facilitating their learning and diffusion
through the community’ (2010, 127), in line with his second quotation above.
In either case, our focus should be on learning, or the cognitive system gen-
erally.
The above studies do not focus explicitly on symbols, but if symbols
are defined as arbitrary in this sense, then the same conclusion applies: we
should define symbols relative to features of cognition, not a lack of per-
ceptual similarity. In other words, iconicity and arbitrariness focus on the
ground, while accounting for how humans use linguistic meaning needs an
account of how we interpret these grounds, of how our minds handle inter-
pretants, whose role it is to connect representamen and object to produce
signification. Just to be clear: the claims here do not argue against the
possibility of iconic stage prior to the symbolic threshold. Nor am I denying
that this would have involved a change from something iconic to something
non-iconic. What I am arguing is that an explanation of this change must
make reference to cognitive differences.
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1.3.2 Motivatedness as causation
It might be argued that perceptual similarity is too literal an interpretation
of Hockett’s design feature, and that there are more abstract forms of mo-
tivatedness that are relevant, either instead of or in addition to perceptual
similarity. I examine one such option, indirect iconicity (§1.3.2.1), before
showing that we are really talking about causation here, which I relate to
mental processes in communication (§1.3.2.2). I then frame the discussion
in terms of chains of interpretants (§1.3.2.3), and conclude that this form
of motivation, like the previous, refocuses our attention on cognition. In
particular, I discuss the open-endedness of human learning when it comes
to symbols.
1.3.2.1 Direct and indirect iconicity
I shall call the literal iconicity of the previous subsection ‘direct’ and the
more abstract form of this subsection ‘indirect’. Direct iconicity involves
a representamen and its object sharing properties. The angle between the
vertical on the hive wall and the waggle rush in a bee waggle dance is the
same as the angle between the sun and the flowers; the colours in fig. 1.3 are
the same as the colours of the characters they depict.
Indirect iconicity, on the other hand, involves properties of a represen-
tamen correlating with different properties of the object, in what are called
‘graded signals’ (Wilson, 1975) or ‘analogue communication’ (Burling, 1993).
These are typical of animal communication, as well as non-linguistic aspects
of human communication. For example, Davies and Halliday (1978) show
that larger toads of the species Bufo bufo have deeper pitched croaks than
smaller con-specifics due to differences in their physiology, and that such
calls influence female mate choice by signalling the size of the male. This
is not direct iconicity, since there is no shared property; rather it is indirect
because properties of the signal (frequency) correlate with, and in this in-
stance are caused by, properties of the content (size of the male). Similarly,
the length of the second unit of a domestic chicken’s alarm call is predictable
from the angular size of an aerial object that might turn out to be a predator
(Gyger et al., 1987)15.
15Since this section intends to move the discussion away from iconicity and onto psy-
chological considerations, these terms are not intended to be permanent additions to an
already tangled lexicon. Rather, they are introduced here to highlight some vagueness
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Laughter may convey something about a person’s emotional state, and
this signal can fall on a continuum from a giggle to a guffaw (Burling, 1999):
typically, the funnier the situation, the louder or longer the laugh. These
aspects of human communication are non-linguistic in the sense that draw-
ing out the adjective in ‘how booooooring!’ may emphasise the degree of
emotion without making a semantic distinction between boredom and any
other feeling.
Indirect iconicity is relevant to language evolution because it motivates
the distinction in Burling (1993) between two systems of human communi-
cation: digital language and an analogue gesture-call system such that we
share only the latter with other animals. Burling notes that these gesture-
call signals are more difficult to control than linguistic signals, and I will
return to this question of volitional control by the end of this section.
Despite appearances, though, indirect iconicity actually takes us away
from perceptual features and bring us to another form of motivatedness:
causation. I will have to unpack this somewhat before returning to the
question of arbitrariness and symbols.
1.3.2.2 Indirect iconicity and causation
The toad calls are straightforwardly a matter of physical causation: the laws
of physics mean that larger vocal tracts produce deeper sounds, and larger
toads have larger vocal tracts. The chicken alarm calls may seem less like
physical causation, but the difference between these and the frog calls is one
or overextension in the term ‘iconicity’ in the language evolution literature. For exam-
ple, both Burling (1993) and Arbib (2012) acknowledge that there are subtle differences
among icons, but both use ‘iconic’ in a way that fails to distinguish what I call direct
and indirect icons, which draws focus away from important cognitive differences that will
be explored throughout this dissertation. It may also be worth briefly pointing out why
these terms do not reduce to established usages such as imagistic vs. diagrammatic iconic-
ity (Peirce, Collected Papers 2.277, 1903) or primary vs. secondary iconicity (Sonesson,
2006). Peirce’s images involve shared perceptual properties and thus correspond to ‘direct
icons’ here, but his diagrams involve internal structure and correspondences between such
structures. The examples of indirect iconicity above do not have any such structures and
are thus not diagrammatic icons. Sonesson’s primary icons can straightforwardly resemble
their objects, while the resemblance in secondary icons usually needs to be pointed out
before it can be appreciated. For instance, person A might not notice that a certain cloud
looks like a whale until person B labels it as such, at which point A might be able to spot
the resemblance. This is nonetheless a matter of perceptual properties and thus unlike
indirect iconicity, which does not involve shared perceptual features as discussed above.
Further, the chicken case is not indexical, though the toad case is, so ‘indirect iconicity’
is a category independent of ‘index’. See §1.3.2.3 for more details.
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of degree, not kind.
Causation is a purported relationship between sets of events, such that
some (causes) are followed by others (effects). This relationship is often
conceived of as a universal law, such that an effect follows with 100% cer-
tainty from a cause (Thagard, 2007). However, Thagard points out that we
are comfortable applying the term ‘causation’ even when causes only lead
probabilistically to their effects: ‘infection by a mycobacterium causes tuber-
culosis, but many people infected by it never develop the disease’ (Thagard,
2007, 15). So rather than stipulate that effects follow causes with 100% cer-
tainty, some philosophical positions allow degrees of probability lower than
100%: universal laws are only extreme versions of probabilistic laws, rather
than a different kind of law. In what follows, I use ‘causation’ in this broader
sense.
Not all probabilistic relationships are causal, however: Thagard notes
that the probability a patient has tuberculosis given that they take the drug
Isoniazid is higher than the probability they have tuberculosis given they do
not take this drug. But that is because Isoniazid is used in the treatment of
tuberculosis and is not a cause of that disease. As the well known chestnut
has it, correlation is not causation. In the case of tuberculosis, it is possible
to research the biochemical processes by which a mycobacterial infection
leads to the disease, while the role of Isoniazid is clear from the relative
timings of events: a patient gets sick, goes to the doctor, and then gets
treated. Though there are other gaps that may need to be filled, such
explanatory considerations are helpful in deciding that the mycobacterium
plays a causal role while Isoniazid does not.
But what are the relevant explanatory considerations in the chicken
case? That depends mostly on the level of analysis relevant to your sci-
entific field16. A neurologist might be interested in how some chicken neu-
rons related to perception of a predator cause activation in neurons related
to alarm-call behaviour, or how various brain networks interact. A biolo-
gist might be more interested in the function of alarm calls with respect
to predator avoidance in the evolutionary history of the species. Though
I will occasionally refer to neurons, brain networks and biological function
throughout this dissertation, I am more interested, on the whole, in the
psychological mechanisms linking perception to behaviour.
16I examine levels of analysis more explicitly in ch. 2.
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Simplifying for the sake of illustration, the chicken perceives a predator,
which causes activation of their representation of the predator, and in turn
this representation causes avoidance behaviour or alarm calling. That is,
there is a probabilistically causal story linking perceptual input to represen-
tations and a similarly probabilistically causal story linking representations
to behavioural output.
Millikan describes these as pushmi-pullyu representations: ‘they at the
same time tell what the case is with some part of the world and direct what
to do about it’ (2005, 20), for instance representing both the predator and
the relevant avoidance behaviour. Millikan also gives the bee dance as an
example of this, and Hurford (2007) expands this point to vervet alarm
calls. All these behaviours are thus fairly predictable given the relevant
inputs. Indirect iconicity thus cuts across animal communicative behaviours
differently from how direct iconicity did. In the case of direct iconicity,
bee dances were not symbolic and vervet alarms were, which I argued was
problematic. But in the case of indirect iconicity, both the dance and the
alarm are motivated and thus non-symbolic.
Since these communicative behaviours are comparatively predictable, we
should decide whether symbols are less predictable, or in what sense they are
less predictable. This take on arbitrariness needs an account of causation
in cognition underlying communicative behaviour, some principled way of
distinguishing comparatively causal from comparatively open-ended inter-
pretation17. I argue in the next section that interpretants play an important
role here.
1.3.2.3 Causation and interpretants
Interpretants are useful in avoiding a potential confusion. Grounds involv-
ing causation are indexical, but not everything causal presumes an indexical
ground; nor, indeed, an indexical sign. A leopard growl and the leopard
that made it are related in an indexical ground. But the fact that a growl
causes activation of a vervet monkey’s leopard representation is a matter
of the relationship between representamen and interpretant, not representa-
men and object (fig. 1.6 a). On the other hand, a chicken that reacts to an
overhead silhouette of an eagle is reacting to an iconic ground (the silhouette
17We cannot, however, distinguish clear-cut cases of causation or of arbitrariness, given
that I started with a graded notion of causation.
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shares perceptual features with the eagle predator). If this representamen
causes activation of the chicken’s predator representation, then this causal
relation between representamen and interpretant is nonetheless part of an
iconic, not indexical, sign (fig. 1.6 b). The same may be said for iconic bee
dances. Talk of resemblance or causation without this framework risks con-
fusing different aspects of the sign, and Sonesson (2006) identifies such a
conflation in Deacon (1997).
Discussing the synaesthetic and sound-symbolic accounts above, Hurford
(2010) highlighted the ‘naturalness’ of the connection across sensory modal-
ities. Applying this to the example from Simner et al. (2010), there may be
a predictable relationship between certain vowel features and tastes. This is
not a directly iconic ground (it involves different properties), nor an indexi-
cal ground, nor is it even a sign (sweetness does not signify a higher vowel).
But it is about probabilistically causal links in cognition, which is the sort
of motivatedness I’m examining here. So motivatedness can be abstracted
away from signification, as might be expected if it plays a role in getting a
signification system started, as Hurford claims.
Compare a child learning English words with an English-speaking adult.
If both hear ‘fire!’, it is fairly predictable that this will cause activation of
the adult’s interpretant representation fire (and this interpretant represen-
tation may in turn weakly or strongly cause an interpretant emotion, fear,
or interpretant response, escape), though the ground here is conventional.
If the fire is visible at the time of utterance, the child’s concept fire may be
activated at that time, but this concept is not an interpretant of the word
‘fire’ until that word is learnt.
The process of learning is the process of connecting that particular con-
cept to that particular representamen, at which point the concept becomes
an interpretant, which means that the conventional ground is now the base
for a conventional sign for that child. So while a causal link between repre-
sentamen and interpretant is provided by evolutionary history in the case of
bees, chickens, toads and vervets, it is the result of learning in human com-
munication. The conclusion is that human symbols, in being unmotivated,
are more open-ended than animal communication. If symbols are unmoti-
vated signs, then it is the learning process we need to focus on in deciding
what counts as a symbol. In particular, we eventually need to discover what
was special about learning at the symbolic threshold. I examine this in §1.5
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(a) Two causal relationships: one between object and representamen, the other between
representamen and interpretant.
(b) An iconic relationship between object and representamen, and a causal one between
representamen and interpretant.
Figure 1.6: Causation in grounds is distinct from causation in interpretants.
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and in the coming chapters.
For now, though, two sets of terms can help anchor the above discussion.
Firstly, Gärdenfors (1995) distinguishes cued and detached representations.
The former are triggered by something currently (or recently) present in
the environment; the latter are not cued in this way. That is, detached
representations allow us to think about things not currently present. Since
representations are one kind of interpretant, we can thus distinguish cued
and detached interpretants. Under the current sense of ‘motivated’, perhaps
symbols are unmotivated in that they have a detached interpretant: a word
allows us to communicate about things not currently present. The question
then becomes how interpretants ever get attached, either to representamens
or to objects, in learning.
Secondly, Sperber and Wilson (1995) distinguish central and peripheral
processes. The latter are involved in processing perceptual input or pro-
ducing behavioural output; the former are those relating representations to
other representations. The cued representations in fig. 1.6 involve only pe-
ripheral processes, for instance. The connection between smoke and smoke
in fig. 1.1 is peripheral, while the connection between smoke and fire is
central. Ignoring the fact that this was an example of an index18, a central
processes is needed to connect smoke with fire. Perhaps, then, symbols
are unmotivated in that they, too, need central, rather than peripheral, pro-
cesses, to link interpretants with objects. Since causation is a matter of
inference, this is an initial suggestion that symbolic meaning might also be
a matter of inference.
1.3.3 Conclusions about motivatedness
I have unpacked two accounts of motivatedness upon which we might base
a negative definition of symbols as being unmotivated or arbitrary. I ar-
gued that the first, iconicity, is unhelpful concerning the symbolic threshold
in that it relies on subjective and superficial criteria and yields counter-
intuitive or misleading conclusions about evolution. The second, causation,
offered more useful points about the threshold. Causation here is not about
indexicality in grounds, but rather a matter of relationships between rep-
resentamen and interpretant, or between interpretants. While it is descrip-
18After all, in fig. 1.6, the ground’s iconicity or indexicality was orthogonal to the fact
that both interpretants were cued by the representamens.
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tively accurate to claim that symbols are unmotivated in this sense, the
discussion drew our attention to cognition, particularly the open-ended na-
ture of learning, raising the question of what was special about learning at
the symbolic threshold.
I don’t think much would be gained by trying to rescue motivatedness by
claiming that symbols are not iconic, not indexical and learned. This is the
scatter-gun approach I mentioned in §1.2.1. A series of negative definitions
would fail to narrow in on positive features of symbols, leaving us unsure just
what evolved at the symbolic threshold. If just the last of this raft of ideas
is the most important, then the addition of iconicity and indexicality mud-
dies the water, especially given the potential confusion between indexes and
other causal but non-indexical processes in signification, or about differences
between direct and indirect iconicity.
There still remains the possibility, though, that symbols are just conven-
tional signs. This might obviate the need for this cognitive slant, and the
possibility must be discussed before I continue with my cognitive approach.
1.4 Are symbols conventional?
Apart from claims about cognition, the previous section drew the focus to
the open-endedness of human behaviour as opposed to comparatively more
causal animal behaviour. This section examines whether ‘conventional’ is a
good way of describing that open-endedness. That is, we shift away from
examining whether symbols are unmovitated to look at whether they are
signs motivated principally by convention.
But what precisely makes something a convention? And what objective
criteria can we apply to decide whether something is conventional? ‘Conven-
tional practices are a widely accepted feature of the social environment, but
what they are seems unclear’ (Latsis, 2005, 11). The following subsections
take a closer look two influential accounts of convention.
Lewis’s approach (§1.4.1) is based on the question of how conventions
arise and become stable by rational means, but I will give various reasons
for thinking that Lewis conventions alone cannot account for the evolution
of a symbolic species without an account of the evolution of particular kinds
of inference. Some of these concern salience, and others are quite nebulous,
prompting a need for a clearer inferential framework. Millikan’s take on
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convention (§1.4.2) is motivated more by biological than by logical concerns
and is thus potentially suitable for the evolution of language, but it centres
on imitation and raises the problem of inferences about relevance.
Incidentally, it also turns out that conventions are arbitrary in a partic-
ular sense (different to the unmotivatedness of the previous section), which
I will briefly examine before moving on to look at Lewis and Millikan.
Keller (1998) illustrates this claim, made by Lewis (1969), by imagining
a village that has two wells. An outside observer notes that all the villagers
only ever use one of the two wells and then asks himself whether the be-
haviour is conventional. If the observer discovers there is some property
of one well that provides a reason not to use it (it is too far away, or the
water does not taste nice) then he would have no reason to call the villagers’
behaviour conventional. But if both wells are equally suitable though only
one is in fact used, then the observer would be justified in hypothesising
some convention at work. Perhaps the villagers know they will have the
opportunity for gossip if they all congregate at the same well every day, but
this is preference does not relate to a property of the well itself: they could
gossip at either location, as long as they meet at the same one.
So conventional things are arbitrary in that some other action could
equally have been chosen relative to a particular purpose, such as collecting
water (Keller, 1998), and if anything motivates one choice over another in
such cases, it is something like precedence, or the solution to a coordination
problem, or an explicit agreement. That is, arbitrariness in a positive sense
(unlike the negative senses of the previous section) focuses on the availability
of choices. Convention (whatever it turns out to be) is what settles on and
perpetuates a particular choice.
While a vervet cannot choose to give anything other than a bark in
response to a leopard, de Saussure’s (1959) discussion of arbitrariness dwells
on the fact that a dog could equally well have been called ‘chien’ or ‘Hund ’,
or that some people choose to call a tree ‘arbre’ or ‘baum’. Whether ‘dog’
sounds like a dog or not is less central to Saussurean semiotics, though I think
this has been distorted somewhat by Hockett’s influence, as I discussed in
§1.2.1.
The village-well example prompts one constraint on this positive sense
of ‘arbitariness’: arbitrariness is relative to a given purpose or function19. A
19This is not a feature of Lewis’s original discussion, but rather an addition by Keller.
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coffee cup has to be capable of holding hot liquid and be useful for drinking.
Relative to this function, it is arbitrary whether the sides are straight or
curved; the colour and pattern are also arbitrary. Relative to a different goal
(matching your kitchen colour scheme), the colour would not be arbitrary.
If we are to take Saussure’s claim about arbitrariness at face value, and
if arbitrariness involves the availability of choices relative to some goal, then
his example of different words for ‘dog’ or ‘tree’ suggests that a good way to
conceive of the primary function of symbolic communication is the bringing
to mind of an interpretant representation in one’s interlocutor. Relative to
this goal, it does not matter if we say ‘tree’, ‘arbre’ or ‘Baum’ as long as
we have some basis for thinking that our interlocutor knows the convention
motivating our usage such that their representation tree is then activated.
1.4.1 Lewis conventions
.
According to a well known but early formulation, Lewis states:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P
when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention
if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P
that, in any instance of S among members of P ,
1. everyone conforms to R;
2. everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
3. everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding
all possible combinations of actions
4. everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition
that at least all but one conform to R;
5. everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R′, on con-
dition that at least all but one conform to R′;
WhereR′ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members
of P in S such that no one in any instance of S among members
of P could conform to both R′ and R. (Lewis, 1969, 78)
According to Keller, Lewis’s definition means that ‘similar behavior
among the members of a group is called “conventional” if, for every in-
dividual, the only reason for choosing exactly this kind of behavior is that
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each person thinks that the others will do the same’ (1998, 137). According
to Vanderschraaf, ‘a convention is a state in which agents coordinate their
activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expec-
tations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to
achieve coordination for mutual benefit’ (1995, 65).
As an example, consider driving on the left or right side of the road. It
does not matter which we do, as long as we do the same as others and expect
others to do the same as us. Lewis’s criteria 4 and 5 express this requirement
of arbitrariness as illustrated above in Keller’s example of the village well.
That is, Lewis treats conventions as game-theoretic coordination problems20.
Millikan notes that ‘almost no clause of Lewis’s analysis has withstood
the barrage of counterexamples over the years’ (2005, 1). I will show that
even if we accept Lewis’s definition of convention, it would not be useful to
define symbols as being conventional in this way at the symbolic threshold,
though they may be described as being conventional among modern humans.
I begin by outlining two sub-types of convention, one involving co-ordina-
tion of action and the other co-ordination of action and belief; I call the latter
symbolic convention (§1.4.1.1). I then examine the role of salience in Lewis
conventions and show that, while his account may be able to explain how
conventions are stable, it needs to complemented by an account of inferential
salience to be able to explain how symbolic conventions arise (§1.4.1.2).
Thirdly I look at some of Lewis’s alternatives to salience, and show that
these rely on forms of inference left rather vague in his discussion (§1.4.1.3).
The previous two points are concerned with how a given species reaches a
convention, but not with how that species evolved to handle convention in
the first place; so finally, I show that Lewis conventions are unsuitable for
discussing the symbolic threshold (§1.4.1.4).
1.4.1.1 Two types of Lewis convention
Though the above formulation is the most commonly discussed, Favereau
(2008) points out that Lewis later revised his definition and that this update
is usually ignored. In particular, Lewis later realised that convention is not
always just a co-ordination of action, since some types can also require co-
20In other words, the availability of choices can be rephrased as requiring that con-
ventions are arbitrary in that they require the existence of more than one strict Nash
equilibrium (Sillari, 2008; Cubitt and Sugden, 2003).
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ordination of belief (1983) and Favereau argues that these (action alone
vs action and belief) are different types of co-ordination problem and thus
different types of convention. I call the latter ‘symbolic convention’, and
will refer to ‘interpretants’ rather than ‘beliefs’.
If you drive on the left, I should drive on the left, too: we coordinate
action and I can straightforwardly see which side you are driving on. But
when it comes to symbolic conventions, I cannot see what you are doing
as straight-forwardly. If I say ‘dog’ and you say ‘dog’ then we performing
the same action, but symbols need more than this: a mynah bird could
achieve as much. As discussed in the introduction to §1.4, to achieve our
communicative goals, we must also have some expectation of co-ordinated
interpretant representations, and I cannot perceive your representations.
It wouldn’t matter whether I say ‘dog’, ‘chien’ or ‘Hund ’ except that I
have some expectations about which is most likely to activate your interpre-
tant representation dog, given that you’ve been reading this English text.
Conversely, if I’ve previously observed you speak English, then this provides
evidence allowing me to guess what interpretants lie behind particular com-
municative behaviours of yours. But in the absence of a shared language,
as at the symbolic threshold, such information is not available.
One of us could provide alternative non-linguistic evidence in the form
of gesture, such as pointing or miming. For instance, if you were unsure
just what I meant by ‘hot’, I might wave my hand in front of my mouth,
tongue out, to indicate spicy as opposed to boiling. I would be picking
out a salient feature of my representation hot to bring to your attention.
But this, while non-linguistic, is a comparatively sophisticated form of
communication. The next subsection looks at how Lewis argues that salience
originates non-symbolic conventions in the absence of any such communica-
tion, linguistic or otherwise, before returning to such invented signals in the
following subsection.
1.4.1.2 Salience and inference
Lewis’s project was to show how conventions might arise without explicit
agreement, and his answers focus on notions of salience derived from Schelling
(1960), as well as on precedent, a particular kind of salience. Schelling (1960)
asked a number of respondents where and when they would meet a friend
in New York if they had not previously agreed a time and place: this is a
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co-ordination problem with a vast multitude of possible strategies.
The majority of his respondents independently responded that they
would meet at Grand Central Station and most of these settled on noon. Of
all the possible times and places, Schelling claims that Grand Central and
noon are somehow salient, standing out from the rest, and Lewis claims that
people would expect them to be salient to others, meaning that they can
correlate their expectations about mutual behaviour without explicit prior
communication. One way in which an action might be salient is precedent:
it was previously the solution to a similar problem.
Sillari (2008) and Cubitt and Sugden (2003) interpret this to mean that
salience is what originates conventions, while precedent perpetuates them.
Lewis argues that, for salience to play this role, the agents in question must
be rational agents, by which he means that they must adhere to standards
of inductive inference and must assume others adhere to similar standards.
However, Skyrms (1996) argues that this merely pushes the problem back a
step for Lewis, in that he would have to account for how common knowledge
of the salient choice or common knowledge of standards of inductive infer-
ence arise without a great deal of prior communication. That is, Skyrms
objects that Lewis cannot claim conventions arise without language, or at
least something quite like it, since salience or inferential standards must be
common and known to be common, and Lewis has not shown how this might
occur without extensive communication.
Skyrm’s alternative is to provide a non-cognitive account, avoiding in-
duction entirely. In a model of a signalling game involving random strings,
he shows that, beginning with a state of random variation in the frequencies
with which signals are chosen, if more frequent actions are more likely to be
replicated by imitation and learning, then a conventional signalling system
is certain to emerge, though the agents in the model do not need salience,
common knowledge or common standards of inductive inference21.
Cubitt and Sugden (2003) acknowledge that Skyrms’s model produces
conventions without cognitive mechanisms for salience, but argue that this
does not mean that real-world problems can be solved without salience. In
particular, they note that Skyrms doesn’t say much about how the repli-
cation processes in his model are to be understood, and point out that
21A host of models of the emergence of signalling systems exists (for a review, see Kirby,
2002). I focus on Skyrms because he explicitly addresses Lewis conventions.
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imitation of a real behaviour requires recognition of just what pattern of
behaviour is to be imitated. They argue that mechanisms for recognising
patterns of regularity across behaviours require salience22. Anyway, Skyrm’s
suggestion relates to dynamic processes, but doesn’t explain away the role
of salience in static or once-off decisions such as Schelling’s example above.
The question of human symbol origins thus needs a framework capable
of evaluating the relationship between cognitive mechanisms for processing
salience and other processes insensitive to salience. I propose such a frame-
work in chs. 2 – 3 to show how we might tell whether salience is involved in
a particular task, and test empirically in ch. 7 whether, or to what extent,
salience-processing inference is required during the process of conventional-
isation.
Two views on salience will add key terms to this framework. Aumann
(1987) explicitly interprets the above phrase, ‘standards of inductive in-
ference,’ in Bayesian terms: probabilistic hypothesis evaluation. Postema
(2008) characterises such accounts as taking some salient feature (or set of
features) as given, directly perceivable, or otherwise cognitively obvious (he
calls this ‘natural salience’), and working out how likely it is that another
agent has settled (or will settle) on a particular naturally salient option,
given their behaviour.
On the other hand, Postema argues that in many cases salience is not
naturally manifest, and just which features in a given problem are salient
is a matter to be inferred. ‘Salience reasoning is not only reasoning from
salience detected, but also reasoning to that which is salient’ (Postema,
2008, 45). For example, an inductive account would evaluate how likely it
is that someone might meet at Grand Central Station, given that it is the
salient option. Postema’s salience reasoning, on the other hand, is interested
in working out why or how anyone would come up with the idea that the
station is a salient choice in the first place.
He claims that creativity and imagination are features of salience rea-
soning, and that it is related to analogy. So the framework just mentioned
must also involve investigating whether creative inference and analogy are
different from induction, and if they are, whether symbol origins require
them. Since the inductive approach involves reasoning from salience and is
called ‘hypothesis evaluation’, it seems that the set of salient options are the
22I explore this aspect of imitation in more detail in §1.4.2.
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hypotheses in this framework. This suggests the possibility that the creative
alternative, since it involves reasoning to salience, is a matter of hypothe-
sis generation (though this is not how Postema phrases it). I explore this
possibility in ch. 3, though for now I just distinguish inductive or natural
salience from salience-deciding inference.
1.4.1.3 Alternatives to salience
But salient co-ordination points are not the only possible source of coordi-
nated equilibrium, though they predominate in Lewis’s discussion and are
a focus of much of the literature on the subject. Almost as an aside, Lewis
also suggests that an agent could just creatively invent a signal which, once
understood, can serve as precedent for convention. It is important to exam-
ine this possibility in detail, since a number of approaches to symbol origins
(such as Garrod et al., 2007) begin with something similar; if my above
spicy example were novel, it would be an example of the sort of thing Lewis
means here.
In Lewis’s example, someone wants to warn others about a patch of
quicksand. They decide to partially submerge a scarecrow in the quicksand
in the hope that others seeing it will ‘catch on’ (1969, 158). ‘The idea,
presumably, is that a stylised representation of a human figure submerged
up to its chest will, by a natural association of ideas, prompt thoughts
about real human beings being similarly submerged’ (Cubitt and Sugden,
2003, 201). But what is the empirical upshot of Lewis’s phrase ‘catch on’ or
Cubitt and Sugden’s ‘natural association of ideas’ which ‘prompt thoughts’
about real humans? How would we know whether any communicative event
counts as an example of this? Is it entirely unrelated to salience, or are
there some connections? The quoted phrases are suggestive, but need some
unpacking.
A couple of semiotic terms will clarify just what aspects of the commu-
nicative process we’re talking about. The ‘ideas’ and ‘thoughts’ referred to
above are interpretant representations. Upon seeing the scarecrow in quick-
sand, one’s interpretant scarecrow is activated. This eventually leads,
via interpretant human, to the ultimate behavioural interpretant: a dispo-
sition to avoid the patch of quicksand. So Cubitt and Sugden’s suggestion
amounts to claiming there is a ‘natural association’ between interpretants,
not between representamen and object, so it’s not iconicity that explains
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this example.
There are a number of possible ways of understanding these ‘natural
associations’. The first is predictability (see §1.3.2.3): it could be that acti-
vation of scarecrow predictably leads to activation of human. A second
is semanticity: part of one’s world knowledge about scarecrows includes the
fact that they resemble typically humans. The last is structural similarity
(Gentner, 1983): the thought that a scarecrow is half submerged may share
structural properties with the thought that a human is half submerged. I
don’t think these are equivalent, but neither are they incompatible. They
may even be related23.
Regardless, these ‘natural associations’ cannot shoulder the explanatory
burden alone. Relationships between potential interpretants vary according
to context. If you see a scarecrow in a field, I think it less probable that
your representation human would be activated. Even if it were, it would
probably not play an explanatory role in your subsequent behaviour, unlike
the disposition to avoid the quicksand. Further, there may be similarly
natural associations between scarecrow and straw or Oz or field, but
these potential interpretants play no role in avoiding the quicksand, though
they may play a role in other contexts.
Even if there are ‘natural associations’ between all of the above interpre-
tants, naturalness alone cannot explain why the link between scarecrow
and human plays an explanatory role in this particular case, while other
‘natural associations’ do not. Just which interpretants are involved in in-
terpretation thus also depends on the particular communicative context.
Lewis’s phrase ‘catch on’ focuses attention on the interpreter, particularly
on their understanding of the communicator’s intent. So I must eventu-
ally investigate how ‘natural associations’ interact with inferences about
contextually-situated communicative intention. Just as Postema (2008) dis-
tinguished natural salience from salience reasoning, it may turn out that
we need to distinguish ‘natural associations’ from associations that are the
product of the interpretive process.
Grounds are another semiotic feature of the quicksand example. The
submerged-scarecrow representamen is not intended to signify a huge range
23When I get around to talking about accessibility and analogy in ch. 3, their interrela-
tionship will become clearer. For now, I’m just underlining why symbol origins require a
detailed cognitive background to convention.
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of facts about its object, a submerged human, just as a weather vane cannot
signify anything other than the direction of the wind. Grounds pick out or
make salient particular features of a representamen and particular features
of an object, just as my spicy gesture made salient certain features of ‘hot’.
So this purported alternative to salience hasn’t really stepped very far away
from salience.
If symbols are conventional, then symbol origins needs to investigate
possible sources of convention. The approach examined here leads to the
conclusion that inferences about communicative intent are needed to inter-
pret novel signs, and that these inferences are salience-deciding and sensitive
to semantic information or representational structure. Relevance Theory
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995) is an area deals with precisely such concerns,
for which see §1.5.2.
1.4.1.4 Salience and phylogeny
In the preceding few subsections, then, I have examined two sources of
convention, namely salient coordination points and a ‘natural association
of ideas’. Cubitt and Sugden (2003) conclude that both these ways help
Lewis explain how conventions might arise without anyone using language
to agree explicitly on a salient solution (i.e. how a linguistic species can
arrive at convention without explicit agreement), but they admit this does
not provide an answer to the question of how conventions arise without
language at all (i.e. how a non-linguistic species develops into one capable
of symbolic convention).
Regarding this particular problem, Cubitt and Sugden end with the spec-
ulation that ‘human beings are born with innate tendencies to privilege cer-
tain patterns when making inductive inferences’ (2003, 203), rather than
having to acquire such tendencies, which seems to tie together salience and
induction.
Peirce makes a similar claim:
Nature is a far vaster and less clearly arranged repertory of facts
than a census report; and if men had not come to it with special
aptitudes for guessing right, it may well be doubted whether in
the ten or twenty thousand years that they may have existed
their greatest mind would have attained the amount of knowl-
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edge which is actually possessed by the lowest idiot. (CP 2.753,
1883)24
Animals, he suggests, also have an innate tendency to privilege certain
patterns (such as con-specific signals, or signals of food or predation) over
other background information, whereas humans seem capable of learning to
do this in a wider range of situations. These claims cohere with the first
of Hurford’s two options in §1.3.1.3 above (that our ancestors were able to
make a ‘good guess’ in response to a novel signal).
While the introduction to this section glossed ‘arbitrariness’ as open-
endedness in behaviour, a detailed look at symbolic convention has raised
the question of how, given such open-endedness, we manage to co-ordinate
on anything at all. I am going to end up leading the discussion away from
induction, but for now the central point is that how we evolved across the
symbolic threshold is inextricably intertwined with how we evolved to make
certain kinds of inference. In particular, two background questions will be,
firstly, whether salience-deciding inferences differ in degree or in kind from
other types; and secondly, whether human rationality is different in degree
or in kind from animal rationality.
1.4.1.5 Conclusions about Lewis conventions
While the previous section on arbitrariness (§1.3.2) identified the open-
endedness or non-causal nature of our communicative behaviour as being
of interest, this section raised the point that settling on co-ordinated signals
in the midst of such open-endedness is itself problematic. Lewis’s main at-
tempt to solve this problem assumed natural salience and common standards
of inference, whereby the vast uncertainty of a communicative problem is
reduced to a few options that are obvious to us and that we expect oth-
ers to grasp. A subsidiary attempt involved creating a novel signal while
‘natural associations’ among ideas interpret it. Cubitt and Sugden (2003)
and Favereau (2008) argue that these are not enough to account for the
origins of language. Rather they can just account for how a species capable
of language can arrive at a convention without using that language.
24Citations to Peirce are traditionally of the form CP X.Y where CP refers to Collected
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, 1935), X to volume and Y to paragraph.
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I argued that salience-deciding inferences about communicative inten-
tion must be added to the mix, and that how we evolved to make such
inferences is central to the story. I distinguished salience reasoning from
natural salience and argued that symbolic convention needs the former; I
also showed that ‘natural associations’ need to be situated in a larger in-
ferential communicative context in order to have any explanatory weight.
A number of key points for further exploration were identified, including
induction (particularly the Bayesian kind), creativity, imagination, analogy,
hypothesis generation and evaluation, connections between interpretant rep-
resentations, and salience- and context-sensitive processes.
However, it might be that Lewis’s account is entirely incorrect, rather
than incomplete. We should thus turn to alternative characterisations of
convention.
1.4.2 Millikan conventions
Compared to Lewis, Millikan (2005) offers a greatly simplified version of
convention. Lewis’s co-ordinating conventions are merely a subtype of con-
vention as far as Millikan is concerned. For something to be conventional
in Millikan’s more general sense, it must firstly consist of patterns of be-
haviour that are reproduced; and secondly, these patterns must proliferate
mainly due to ‘weight of precedent, rather than due, for example, to their
intrinsically superior capacity to perform certain functions’ (2005, 2).
By ‘reproduced’, Millikan does not mean ‘always and in every respect’.
She points out that the background colour and texture of a photocopy de-
pends on what paper is put into the tray, rather than the background colour
and texture of the original. It is still a reproduction of that original, though
not in every respect. Further, a cat might only catch a mouse one in ten
pounces, but the cat still reproduces this pouncing behaviour even if it is
not always successful. For these and other reasons, Millikan’s characterisa-
tion is somewhat more biological than Lewis’s, which relies on reasoned and
consistent regularity.
Millikan’s second criterion, precedent, means that something must be
reproduced, not due to any functional advantage, but simply because that’s
how it was done before. For instance, she notes that although she learned
from her mother how to open jars by dipping the lids in hot water, this
behaviour was reproduced because it is better at opening jars, not merely
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because of precedent. It is thus not conventional. So to Lewis’s requirement
concerning the availability of alternatives, Millikan adds the notion of func-
tionality, something I touched on in the coffee-mug example above. Those
innate behaviours due to natural selection are not conventional, since they
would have been selected for the biological advantages they provide.
To see how we tell whether something is copied due to ‘weight of prece-
dent’ or functional advantage, I begin with a discussion of cultural trans-
mission in chimpanzee tool use, raising questions about just what counts
as imitation and why imitation is different from emulation (§1.4.2.1). This
in turn prompts a discussion of two kinds of imitation (§1.4.2.2). I identify
which kind of imitation is necessary for symbols, and argue that this requires
complex mechanisms for inference about relevance (§1.4.2.3).
1.4.2.1 Cultural transmission: imitation and emulation
There are many examples of animal behaviour that are culturally transmit-
ted (for a review of chimpanzee behaviour, see Whiten et al., 1999) and thus
seem to fit Millikan’s criteria, but cultural transmission is a broad category
and in the relevant literature there is an important distinction between im-
itation and emulation. It will turn out that Millikan conventions require
imitation. In this subsection I sketch out the difference between the two
and highlight a complication with the latter.
Typically, emulation involves the copying of a result; imitation involves
the copying of behaviour (Tomasello, 1990; Horner and Whiten, 2005). If one
animal observes a conspecific opening a box to retrieve food, and then uses
its own method to open the box, it is emulating. By observing a conspecific,
it learns something about the world: that the box contains food and that it
is possible to open the box to retrieve the food. It then discovers for itself
how to achieve the same result25, so its box-opening behaviour might not
replicate that of the model.
Imitation, on the other hand, requires the replication of conspecific be-
haviour: in the above case, the actual motions made (whether causally useful
or irrelevant) by the model conspecific in opening the box. Millikan conven-
tions thus require imitation, not just emulation, since convention requires
that patterns of behaviour be reproduced for non-functional reasons, but
25‘Results’ thus decomposing into ‘affordances’ and ‘causal relationships’ (Horner and
Whiten, 2005).
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emulation doesn’t involve replication of behaviour and does include repli-
cation of function. If symbols are conventional in this sense, they need a
species capable of imitation.
Though apes are capable of cultural transmission (Whiten et al., 1999;
Horner et al., 2006), there is a general tendency to paint humans as imitators
and apes as emulators. But Horner and Whiten (2005) and Whiten et al.
(2009) argue that this is overly simplistic. They show experimentally that
chimpanzees are more likely to emulate when they can perceive the interior
(and thus the relevant causal relationships) of a box that can be manipulated
in relevant and irrelevant ways to retrieve a reward; they are more likely to
imitate when they cannot perceive the interior. Human children, however,
imitated relevant and irrelevant actions in both conditions, despite the fact
that human understanding of causal relationships is superior to that of apes.
However, Boesch and Tomasello (1998) complicate matters by introduc-
ing the idea that imitation also involves replicating the intention of the
model, in addition to the behaviour. If a human perceives another cleaning
a window, they represent the behaviour to themselves as ‘cleaning the win-
dow’ rather than ‘moving her hand in a circular motion on the surface of the
window while holding a cloth’ (1998, 598-599). In that case, the observer
still imitates the behaviour if they clean the window, even if they do not
replicate every motion of every body part. Boesch and Tomasello thus claim
that intention plays a role in deciding which aspects of the model behaviour
are irrelevant or arbitrary.
Though this is an appealing addition, it introduces a complication, which
can be seen by decomposing ‘copying’ into the three features discussed so
far: result, intent and action. Copying each of these can be independent
of the others. If, while exploring an ancient temple, I see a colleague trip
such that they knock over one of a series of vases, smashing it to reveal gold
coins inside, I might copy this result by purposefully smashing another vase
in the series, though I do not copy their intent (it was an accident after
all) or their action (they bump into it, I pick it up and drop it). A second
colleague might copy me, swinging their machete at yet another vase. Here
they copy the result and intention of my behaviour, but not the action. A
third colleague retraces our steps to smash all vases we had previously seen.
It turns out that all other vases in the temple are not hollow, so he has
copied our intentions (with or without copying actions) but not the results
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because we have not yet discovered just what counts as a member of the
category ‘gold-containing vase’. A child accompanying the party interprets
all this as a grand game of smashing stuff and copies the pick-up-and-drop
action to make his contribution. Here, he copies action and result, but not
intention26.
If imitation were to involve the yoking together of action and inten-
tion, this would muddy the waters somewhat because intentions are related
to goals and thus, potentially, to results and thus to emulation. On the
other hand, if we keep action, intent and result distinct as suggested by the
above examples, this raises the possibility that there is more than one type
of imitation (i.e. copying of behaviour alone, or copying of behaviour and
intention) and that animals, though capable of simpler forms of imitation
and thus of conventional behaviour in Millikan’s sense, might thus not be
sufficiently like us to grant them symbols.
The window-cleaning example introduced a link between intention and
relevance. But if there are different kinds of imitation, this means there
might be different kinds of relevance. So the next subsection looks at kinds
of imitation and the role of inference, while the following one distinguishes
different kinds of inference about relevance.
1.4.2.2 Types of imitation
The claims here run parallel to Favereau’s criticisms of Lewis (§1.4.1.1):
he argued that the addition of mental considerations to our conception of
convention means that there must be two kinds of Lewis convention: co-
ordination of action alone or co-ordination of action and belief; I argued
that symbol origins need the latter kind. Replacing ‘co-ordination’ with
‘copying’ or ‘replication’ and replacing ‘belief’ with ‘intention’ yields the
same claim, mutatis mutandis, for Millikan conventions: there is replication
of action alone, or of action and intention. Humans may not need precisely
the same intentions when using a symbol, but our intentions must overlap
at least partially if we are to communicate successfully.
Zlatev (2008, 2009) distinguishes between five levels in a mimesis hier-
archy, five increasingly complex behaviours involving copying of some sort,
26Imitation of action, but not results or intent, is called overimitation in the literature
(e.g. Lyons et al., 2007; Whiten et al., 2009), though this will not be a central concern in
what follows.
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where each new layer develops upon lower levels but adds new capacities.
The third-highest level is triadic mimesis, which involves imitation of com-
municative intention. The level above that, protolanguage, is where con-
vention comes in. So Zlatev’s mimesis hierarchy implies that understanding
communicative intentions is a pre-requisite for proto-linguistic convention.
If we define ‘symbol’ as requiring conventions in the sense of requiring
imitation of action and intention, then we must consider whether animals
can read intentions, and if so, what kind. Moll and Tomasello (2007) dis-
cuss an interesting example drawn from Hare and Tomasello (2004) con-
trasting chimpanzee understanding of pointing and reaching. What Hare
and Tomasello found was that chimpanzees did not successfully interpret
a human experimenter pointing to a container with food in (i.e. they did
not search there for food), but chimpanzees did search for food in a con-
tainer when the human experimenter reached unsuccessfully for it27. The
interpretation of this by Moll and Tomasello is worth quoting in full:
[I]n the case of reaching, the chimpanzees just need to per-
ceive the goal-directedness of the human’s reaching action and
‘infer’ that there must be something desirable in the container.
This task can thus be solved with some understanding of the
individual intentionality of the reaching motion. In contrast,
to understand pointing, the subject needs to understand more
than the individual goal-directed behaviour. She needs to under-
stand that by pointing towards a location, the other attempts
to communicate to her where a desired object is located; that
the other tries to inform her about something that is relevant
for her. (2007, 644)
The authors conclude that chimpanzees are able to read intention in com-
petitive but not in co-operative situations. This means that chimpanzees
are not typically capable of symbolic communication since this requires co-
operative intention reading. But notice that Moll and Tomasello only partly
frame the issue in terms of co-operation. They also partly frame it in terms
of inference: chimpanzees are able to infer some things (the desirability of
27The visual difference in finger arrangement between reaching and pointing seems not
to be salient to chimpanzees (Leavens and Hopkins, 2005).
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whatever was in the container) but not able to infer others (the communica-
tive intention behind pointing)28.
Presumably the latter is, in some sense, more difficult, so we should
unpack what makes some inferences more difficult. The following subsection
thus examines a range of inferences about goals and intentions, and shows
that symbols involve complex inferences about relevance.
1.4.2.3 Imitation and relevance
Recall that Millikan does not require a perfect copy for convention. Rather,
[a] pattern has been reproduced if its form is derived from a pre-
vious item or items having, in certain respects the same form,
such that had the model(s) been different in these respects the
copy would have differed accordingly. A reproduction is never
determined by its model in all respects. (Millikan, 2005, 3, em-
phasis mine)
In Millikan’s photocopy example, the background colour of the copy
need not be similar to the original, but rather depends on whatever blank
paper was put in the drawer of the machine. Different patterns of ink on
the original, however, would have led to different patterns on the copy.
Relevance, here, is determined mechanically.
But how is relevance determined cognitively? I will argue that this de-
pends on interactions between types of inference and types of imitation,
though explaining this will first require a look at claims in Gergely and Csi-
bra (2003). They describe and offer evidence for a distinction between a tele-
ological stance and a mentalistic stance (fig. 1.7). These are interpretational
systems, but the former involves representations of observable things (ac-
tions, goals states resulting from those actions, and situational constraints);
the latter involves representation of non-observables (intentions, beliefs and
desires). Goals states are something like the causal relationships and affor-
dances involved in emulation, so recognising a physically perceivable goal
state does not require recognising an intention.
28Sometimes the authors use scare quotes around ‘infer’; other times not, so it is not
clear whether they would be committed to this view. These approaches (competitive/co-
operative vs inferential) focus on different dimensions and are thus not incompatible, and
the discussion of Lewis conventions provided support for the idea that inference is worth
pursuing further in this regard, in addition to the competitive/co-operative distinction.
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Figure 1.7: Teleological and mentalistic stances (Gergely and Csibra, 2003, 289).
Both stances support inferences: taking a teleological stance, from ob-
serving an action one might infer its goal; taking a mentalistic stance, one
might infer someone’s intention from their desires. The chimpanzees’ un-
derstanding of reaching in Moll and Tomasello (2007) is an example of a
teleological stance: from the reaching behaviour, they can make inferences
about the affordances (desirability) of the goal (something in the container).
Gergely and Csibra (2003, 2006) review other cases to show that some ani-
mals are indeed capable of such inference. They also provide experimental
evidence that even one-year-old children can make teleological inferences,
though apes’ teleological understanding is very limited compared to human
infants’.
As humans develop, we eventually become capable of taking a mentalistic
stance, which Gergely and Csibra (2003) claim is built on or overlays the ear-
lier teleological stance (hence the concentric circles in fig. 1.7). Humans can
make inferences from a teleological stance to a mentalistic stance, while the
chimpanzees’ failure to understand pointing in Moll and Tomasello (2007)
is due to their inability to reach infer the communicative intent motivating
the pointing action.
A ‘principle of rationality’ warrants inferences within each stance (the
innermost circle in fig. 1.7), and this underpins how relevance is decided
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cognitively. In the teleological case, rationality boils down to efficiency:
beings operating under the teleological stance presuppose, when making in-
ferences, that others’ actions lead efficiently to goal states, given situational
constraints (Gergely and Csibra, 2003).
As an example, Gergely et al. (2002) had preverbal (14 month old) chil-
dren observe a demonstrator turn on a light-box by bringing her forehead
into contact with the switch. In one condition (hands occupied), the demon-
strator pretended to be cold and used her hands to keep a blanket wrapped
around herself. In the other condition (hands free), the demonstrator’s
hands remained on the table.
When asked to copy the behaviour, infants could either imitate by us-
ing their heads or emulate by using their hands. They were significantly
more likely to imitate in the hands-free condition and emulate in the hands-
occupied condition. Since the reason the demonstrator used her head was
perceivable in the hands-occupied condition, children could see that the use
of her head was irrelevant in turning on the light, and most were able to
rationally emulate the behaviour with their hands. In the hands-free con-
dition, however, ‘if infants noticed that the demonstrator declined to use
her hands despite the fact that they were free, they may have inferred that
the head action must offer some advantage in turning on the light. They
therefore used the same action themselves in the same situation’ (Gergely
et al., 2002, 755).
Gergely and Csibra (2006) claim that relevance is ‘cognitively transpar-
ent’ in the teleological stance, since decisions about efficiency are derivable
from observation of physical means-ends relationships in a given situational
context. Assuming the demonstrator to be rational is a matter of perceived
efficiency, not mental attribution in this case. On the other hand, relevance
in the mentalistic stance is ‘cognitively opaque’, not derivable from these
observables without further inferences about intention, desire or belief. In
that case, imitation of action plus intention (and thus symbolic convention)
requires something more, cognitively, than imitation of action alone.
The final step in this subsection is to show that some inferences about
intention are more difficult than others in terms of relevance. Returning
to the mimesis hierarchy (Zlatev, 2008, 2009, mentioned in §1.4.2.2 above),
the level below triadic mimesis is dyadic mimesis. Triadic mimesis involves
understanding communicative intention, ‘where the subject intends the act
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to stand for some action, object or event for an addressee (and for the
addressee to recognize this intention)’ (Zlatev, 2008, 138); dyadic mimesis
is imitation without communicative intention.
Starting with dyadic mimesis, recall the window-cleaning example above
(§1.4.2.1). If you observe someone deliberately performing an action you
recognise, going from a teleological stance (the goal state of their action is
a clean window) to a mentalistic stance (they intend to clean the window)
requires a very simple premise schema: ‘if someone is performing action x,
then they intend to perform action x’. But what counts as relevant imita-
tion is independent of this inference: it won’t matter if you move your cloth
clockwise while the model wipes anticlockwise as long as you both get the
window clean, and you will be able to see whether it is getting clean. Rele-
vance (and thus imitation) here is determined by the principle of efficiency,
without moving beyond the teleological stance: it is not cognitively opaque
here, since it does not depend on a mentalistic inference.
Moving onto triadic mimesis, if I already understand the word ‘tree’, I
know why it can refer to a syntax diagram but not a flower because I know
that the relevant feature is the prototypical tree’s branching, rather than
its being a plant. Knowing a symbolic convention means knowing (to some
extent) what counts as relevant in replicating that convention. So learning
the convention requires figuring out what is relevant.
But this differs in two ways from the dyadic example. First, while rel-
evance was independent of the mentalistic inference there, it cannot be so
here. Secondly, important parts of the mentalistic inference cannot be cap-
tured by anything as simplistic as the above premise schema. If you don’t
know the word, you could still infer that by saying [tri:] they intended to say
[tri:], but you will not have discovered anything about the meaning of the
word, or about their communicative intention in using it. Working out what
is relevant depends on a complex inference relating one non-observable (the
communicative intent) with another non-observable (the semantic content)
in a particular context.
Csibra (2003) and Gergely and Csibra (2006) state explicitly that this
is the sort of pragmatic inference described by Sperber and Wilson (1995)
which I have already mentioned in §1.4.1.3, and which I will look at in the
next section.
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1.4.2.4 Conclusions about Millikan Conventions
I argued that, if symbols are conventions in Millikan’s sense, they require
imitation, not emulation. I distinguished imitation of action alone from
imitation of action and intention, and argued that the latter, in cases of
triadic mimesis, requires inferences about relevance as part-and-parcel of
inferring speaker intention and word meaning, both of which require a men-
talistic, rather than teleological stance. Since relevance is cognitively opaque
in the mentalistic stance, we need to shift our attention from properties of
the sign (such as whether it is replicated by precedence) to properties of
inference. While the distinction between co-operative and competitive be-
haviour has been discussed in language evolution, I have argued that an
as-yet-unexplored dimension worth considering is what kinds of inference
are involved in various kinds of interpretation (teleological vs mentalistic;
dyadic vs triadic; known vs novel; cognitively transparent relevance vs cog-
nitively opaque relevance).
1.4.3 Summary on symbols as conventional signs
Since symbols are comparatively unmotivated, open-ended behaviour, the
previous two sections have examined the question of whether ‘conventional’
is a good way to describe how that open-endedness is constrained. Lewis
and Millikan offer two approaches to this based on rational co-ordination
and imitation, respectively. In both cases, I showed that while these may
be accurate descriptions, neither can account for symbol origins without
sophisticated forms of inference about salience or relevance, two concepts I
will eventually show to be related. The two consequences of this are that
we must look at just how symbols should be defined inferentially (the next
section) and that we need to distinguish complex, highly evolved forms of
inference from more basic forms (the next chapter).
1.5 Symbols are inferential
Compared to the more common definitions of ‘symbol’ above, what follows
is rather a minority approach, but some sources do focus on inference as
opposed to arbitrariness or convention. These sources do not always refer
explicitly to inference, but may phrase their claims in terms of ‘judgement’ or
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‘interpretation’, which I take to be terms inextricably bound up in questions
of inference. Firth, for example, claims that
in the interpretation of a symbol the conditions of its presenta-
tion are such that the interpreter ordinarily has much scope for
exercising his own judgement . . . hence one way of distinguishing
broadly between signal and symbol may be to class as symbols
those presentations where there is much greater lack of fit —
even perhaps intentionally — in the attribution of the fabricator
and interpreter. (1975, 66)
Similary, Deacon (1997) suggests that what distinguishes our under-
standing of reference from, say, a dog’s, is something additional produced
in our heads when we interpret an utterance. Deacon explicitly identifies
this ‘something additional’ as a Peircean interpretant, which he glosses as
‘whatever enables one to infer the reference from some sign or signs and their
context’ (1997, 63). Finally, Eco (1978, 1986) stresses that any semiotic phe-
nomenon (not only symbols, but signs more generally) is characterised by
the necessity for inference in its interpretation and Ramscar et al. (2010)
argue, based on computational models and experimental data that symbol
learning is inherently inferential.
In the following subsections, I will first outline some cognitive/theoretical
background that discusses the role of inferential interpretation in symbol-
hood (§1.5.1). Then, a look at an account rooted in pragmatics will support
this shift in focus from the nature of the sign to the nature of interpretation
(§1.5.2). Finally, I will tie together a number of threads discussed throughout
this chapter to provide a definition of ‘symbol’ (§1.5.3).
1.5.1 Cognitive/theoretical background
Throughout the following, I will keep exposition of technical terms quite
brief so as not to hold up the discussion, but key ideas introduced here will
be discussed in more detail in coming chapters.
1.5.1.1 Fitch on The Evolution of Language
Fitch (2010) contrasts two broad approaches to meaning: the realist and the
cognitive. These, he says, focus on different aspects of the semiotic triangle
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(fig. 1.1 above). Fitch claims that it is not at all unusual in philosophy
and formal semantics to treat word and sentence reference as a real, direct
mapping between linguistic units (semiotic representamens) and the world
(semiotic objects). Counter to this, the cognitive model allows no direct
relationship between such signals and the world. Rather, this relationship
is indirect in that it is mediated by the mind (semiotic interpretants). Fitch
argues that data from cognitive science (human and animal) leave only the
latter model a feasible option and my outline of the Peircean sign (§1.2.3.1)
make the same point.
The previous sections about arbitrariness and convention can thus be
summarised as arguing that these, as descriptions of an indirect relationship,
are rather superficial and fail to capture with much clarity what a symbol
is or how we might investigate symbol origins. And since these indirect
relationships are mediated by the mind, I have been aiming at a refocus on
cognition.
Fitch goes on to say it is pre-linguistic concepts that allow for mean-
ing. Hurford (2007) argues for the existence of pre-linguistic concepts in a
wide range of animals, and states explicitly that these are evolutionary pre-
conditions for language. For both Fitch and Hurford, the problem of the
earliest origins of meaning is one that has been partially solved by evolution:
our ancestors and various relations evolved to have pre-linguistic concepts
of certain kinds, and evolved cognitive mechanisms that allow such concepts
to connect signals on one hand with reality on the other. Two pertinent
questions, then, are what kinds of cognitive mechanisms these were, and
what kinds of cognitive mechanisms are unique to human language.
Fitch lists biases or constraints on inference; biases or constraints on
concept formation; ToM; higher-order intentionality29; and cooperation in
information sharing. Of these, he says the last three are uniquely human,
while many animals are capable of concept formation and inference, to a
certain extent. I will shortly make a few comments on his view of inference,
but first some illustration might help.
He contrasts what we know of child language learning with Quine’s gava-
gai problem (Quine, 1960). An anthropologist observes a tribesman speak-
ing an unknown language say ‘gavagai ’ as a rabbit runs past. An inde-
terminate multitude of hypotheses are possible concerning the meaning of
29Here in the sense of ‘aboutness’, rather than ‘volition’.
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‘gavagai ’: it is likely to mean ‘rabbit’, but could also mean ‘food’, ‘Let’s
go hunting’, or a host of odder things: ‘There will be a storm tonight’, ‘A
momentary rabbit stage’ or ‘An undetached rabbit part’. But despite these
theoretical possibilities, children in fact tend to generate a much more tightly
constrained set of hypotheses:
The child obviously does not unconsciously process all of Quine’s
various logical possibilities. Rather, the hypothesis space ap-
pears constrained in certain ways, and the child simply fails to
consider many of these possible meanings. (Fitch, 2010, 126)
These constraints are often, in cognitive or linguistic sciences, framed as
a problem of inductive inference (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007), where talk is
common of inductive biases: (typically innate) cognitive mechanisms that
constrain hypothesis generation. For instance, studies show that children
have a whole-object bias (Markman, 1991): they tend to assume novel la-
bels refer to whole objects like rabbits rather than parts or properties like
fluffiness or rabbit limbs. Another example is the basic-level bias (Rosch
et al., 1976; Markman, 1989): people are more likely to assume a word
refers to an intermediate level in a taxonomic system (like rabbit) rather
than superordinate (mammal) or subordinate (Angora) categories.
Fitch draws a connection between such biases and evolutionary salience:
The child doesn’t induce such [Quinean] wacky concepts, for
the same reason that a dog does not conceptualize “rabbit” in
these ways, but rather as a medium-sizeed, fleet-footed potential
prey item. This constraint thus may reflect what the child finds
salient in the environment (namely whole objects) and conceives
of, prelinguistically as a thing. (2010, 127)
So Fitch claims that inductive biases are what constrain the hypothe-
sis space of possible meanings of a new symbol, or make certain meanings
salient, but one problem is that these inductive biases are rather context-
dependant. In a novel word-learning task, Christie and Gentner (2010) pre-
sented two groups of children with two sets of visual stimuli (e.g. standard 1
and standard 2 in fig. 1.8). In one condition, the children were presented with
standard 1 and standard 2 one after the other (consecutive condition); in the
other condition, both standards were presented simultaneously (concurrent
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condition). Both standards were labelled with a novel word embedded in a
syntactic context suggesting it was a noun. The children were then asked
to choose between two possible matches for the same label: the relational
match showed previously unseen animals in the same spatial arrangement
as the standards; the object match showed both previously seen animals
without the spatial relationship seen in the standards. In the consecutive
condition, children were more likely to chose the object match; in the con-
current condition, the relational match.
favored relational commonalities such as ‘ ‘both can be ridden’ ’ and ‘ ‘both are used
outside ’ ’—consistent with the idea that comparison induces a focus on common relational
structure.
Further evidence that comparison highlights relational commonalties comes from res-
earch in transfer of learning. Comparing two scenarios dramatically increases the likelihood
that a principle common to two exemplars will be transferred to a future item (relative to
seeing just one exemplar, or even the same two items without encouragement to compare)
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gentner, Anggoro, & K libanoff, in press; G ick & Holyoak,
1983). For example, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner (1999) found that business
school students who compared two negotiation scenarios were over twice as likely to trans-
fer the negotiation strategy to an analogous test negotiation as were those who studied the
same two scenarios separately.
3.1. Structural alignment supports learning new relational patterns
Taking advantage of this highlighting effect, Stella Christie and I have used comparison
to teach children novel spatial configurations (Christie & Gentner, in press). Christie and
Gentner used the Comparison-versus-Solo word-extension task developed by Gentner and
Namy (1999) to est whethe structural alignment woul help young hildren learn novel
spatial configurations, such as ‘ ‘s all thing above big thing, otherwise identical ’ ’ (F ig. 3).
F ig. 3. Sample set from Christie and Gentner (in press). In the Solo condition, children saw one of the standards
and were given a novel label (e.g., blicket) for it. In the Comparison condition, children saw both standards
together, were told they were both blickets, and were encouraged to compare them. Both groups were then asked
which alternative was also a blicket.
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Figure 1.8: Stimuli from Christie and Gentner (2010).
Although this particular experimental design precludes a non-ambiguous
object match30, presumably those who chose the object match thought the
label had something to do with either of the objects, while presumably
those who chose the relational match thought it has something to do with
the relationship between objects. That is, the object bias dominated in the
30That is, in the case of the object match, the label’s meaning is presumably disjunctive:
‘cow or turtle’ rather than just ‘cow’ or just ‘turtle’. Or possibly those who chose the
object match despite seeing both standards with the same label just ignored one of them.
Repeating the experiment with participants old enough to provide such feedback is the
only way to know for sure. The participants in Christie and Gentner (2010) ranged from
3;6 to 5;1 in age, and Fitch (2010) warns against treating children’s guesses about meaning
like adults’ guesses.
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consecutive condition, but not the concurrent condition. The object bias
may thus operate within a particular communicative context, but there ex-
ist cognitive mechanisms (described by Christie and Gentner as analogy, or
relational insight) that evaluate the relationships between contexts or decide
whether a bias applies to a particular case. In other words, there exist not
only context-based inductive inferences of the type described by Fitch, but
also context-deciding inferences that may be of a higher order (inferences
about inferential context), or more complex, or open-ended, or even of a dif-
ferent nature (requiring analogy or insight). Christie and Gentner explicitly
link these terms to hypothesis generation.
It might be possible to avoid this problem by suggesting an increase in
the number of biases, such that one bias operates in Christie and Genter’s
consecutive condition and another in their concurrent condition. But if we
have to suppose either an indefinite number of biases or indeterminacy in
the application of biases, then we are scarcely in a better position than we
would be with Quine’s indefinite number of hypotheses. Rather, it makes
more sense to allow a limited set of biases, but to suppose their application
may depend in turn on more open-ended, context-sensitive inference, or
even different kinds of inference, for whose existence we must then search
for independent, empirical proof. I provide evidence for the existence of such
inference in this dissertation.
Thus far, then, I have been agreeing with Fitch by extending his criticism
of the realist model to apply it to a definition of the word ‘symbol’. But
he simply says that animals, like us, can perform inference and that the
distinguishing features of human cognition must thus lie elsewhere (ToM,
cooperative communication, higher-order intentionality). I am diverging
from his account by suggesting that we need to look at different kinds of, or
levels of complexity in, inference as well.
Fitch frames his discussion of two of the above mechanisms (ToM, coop-
erative communication) in terms of the third (higher-order intentionality) by
positing an intentional hierarchy. Objects, plants and simple animals lack
intentionality altogether: they do not represent the external world in any
way. Some animals, especially vertebrates, exhibit first-order intentionality:
they have representations of things (such as prey or predator), and may have
beliefs, desires and goals31. This, Fitch says, allows us to think that dogs
31There are philosophers who disagree with such a claim (e.g. Davidson, 1982), but
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have minds, but not a ToM. For that, he says, one requires second-order
intentionality: representations of representations32. Second-order intention-
ality is also a requirement for cooperative communication. Finally, prag-
matic interpretation requires (at least) third-order intentionality (Sperber
and Wilson, 1995).
Fitch’s take-home message is that ‘it is a deep mistake to treat “theory
of mind” as a monolithic whole that you either have or don’t... A “divide-
and-conquer” strategy must be adopted towards the intentional stance and
ToM’ (2010, 136). By ‘divide-and-conquer strategy’, he means the above
intentional hierarchy: a series of increasingly complex cognitive mechanisms,
each building on a lower one, such that the lowest level is evolutionarily the
oldest and thus shared with the widest range of species.
I have argued that co-operative information sharing and a ToM are in-
sufficient for dealing with the full range of relevance-deciding inferences in
imitation (§1.4.2.2–1.4.2.3). So while Fitch is correct in ascribing inference
to animals and in highlighting human uniqueness in terms of higher-order in-
tentionality, I am merely extending his warning against ‘monolithic wholes’
to inference: there are different levels of inferential complexity that separate
different animals, or that separate animals from us, and I will explore this
hierarchy in the next chapter. I have also extended his argument against a
realist model of the semiotic triangle to argue against ‘arbitrary signs’ and
‘conventional signs’ as definitions of symbols, since they focus on indirect
signal-world relationships.
1.5.1.2 Tomasello on The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition
The discussion of word learning in Tomasello (1999) shows some similarities
to Fitch, but focuses more particularly on social aspects of cognition such
as ToM and joint attentionality, and is unimpressed by inductive biases.
However, a number of terms he uses when talking about word learning are
informative.
Our primate relatives are capable of sophisticated cognition, as Fitch
admits. However, Tomasello considers humans to be capable of certain
kinds of inferences that animals are not. While animals may be capable of
defending Fitch’s position would be too tangential just now.
32Crockford et al. (2012) argue that chimpanzees have some degree of representation of
conspecific knowledge. Once more, it would be too tangential to get into this now.
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associating a physical consequent with a physical antecedent, humans can
go a step further by making inferences about ‘intermediate and often hidden
“forces,” the underlying [physical] causes and intentional/mental states that
are so important to human thinking,’ (1999, 19) where these states include
things like the intentions of a conspecific.
Tomasello’s point, I think, is that animals can infer that something might
happen, while humans can infer why it happens, and the explanatory ‘why’
is usually cognitively opaque. Though not explicit about whether this is a
qualitatively different kind of inference or merely quantitatively different,
Tomasello describes it as going beyond purely physical imitation in ‘some
creative leap’ (1999, 52, emphasis mine).
Fitch had described the difference between animals and humans in terms
of higher-order intentionality; Tomasello agrees that humans are capable of
higher-order intentionality and that this plays a role here, but also hints at
this difference in inferential ability, which is what I was arguing for above.
At any rate, from claims in both Tomasello and Fitch, we can derive the
conclusion that symbols operate inferentially. My above call for an infer-
ential hierarchy must eventually also include a look at just what Tomasello
might mean by this ‘creative leap’.
Tomasello is also sceptical about the role of inductive biases. Like Fitch,
he believes that we have ways of avoiding Quine’s problem by narrowing
down the hypothesis space, but rather than innate biases, he looks instead
to replicable joint attentional scenes. A scene is a routine social interaction
that might be recognisable to a participant, and that foregrounds certain
aspects of the environment for participants in the scene.
He gives the example of an American in an Hungarian train station
buying a ticket. The American understands about buying train tickets but
doesn’t know Hungarian, so upon hearing a novel word while the ticket seller
reaches for his cash or offers change, the American makes an inference of
the following type: ‘if that unknown expression meant X, then it would be
relevant to the ticketseller’s goal in this joint attentional scene’ (Tomasello,
1999, 99).
So this involves the generation of an explanatory hypothesis about speaker
intention. While limitless Quinean hypotheses are possible, the traveller is
likely to generate only that subset relevant to the activity of buying train
tickets that he and the Hungarian are jointly attending to. This is more
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flexible than an approach based on inductive biases because, once again,
‘relevance’ is understood in terms of Sperber and Wilson (1995).
This section has concluded, yet again, that we must shift our focus to
inference. In particular, it offered initial reasons for thinking that induc-
tion is an incomplete account of what goes on in learning new symbols and
for considering the relationship between induction, explanatory hypothesis
generation, insight, analogy and Tomasello’s ‘creative leap’.
1.5.2 Pragmatic background
The following outlines an account of pragmatics in Sperber and Wilson
(1995), highlighting, among other things, their distinction between context-
deciding and context-bound inference (§1.5.2.1). They focus almost exclu-
sively on deductive inference, but admit the existence of more nebulous
forms of non-demonstrative (i.e. non-deductive or ampliative) inference. I
consider a couple of criticisms suggesting that pragmatic inference is not
as deductive as they suppose (§1.5.2.2). I then argue that the question of
symbol origins is inherently pragmatic, but that the non-deductive aspects
of interpretation come to the fore at the symbolic threshold (§1.5.2.3).
1.5.2.1 Sperber and Wilson on Relevance
A core text in modern pragmatics is Sperber and Wilson (1995) on Relevance
Theory. The authors contrast an inferential theory of pragmatics with an
older code theory33. On the code-based account, communicative units are
coded and decoded according to pre-existing correspondences: if you hear
signal a, then interpret it to mean a. The code theory, then, rests rather
heavily on conventionalised (or otherwise law-like) correspondences and ex-
pects close matches between speaker meaning and hearer understanding.
Much animal communication is coded (Sperber and Wilson, 2002), though
this is more in the sense of ‘law-like’ (cf. §1.3.2) than ‘conventional’.
In contrast, the inferential theory claims that communication is ‘achieved
by producing and interpreting evidence’ (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 2): a
speaker produces evidence for his intended meaning in a particular con-
33The authors claim that a code theory is typical of a semiotic account, which unfor-
tunately shows very narrow knowledge of the semiotic literature. I think Peirce himself
would have agreed with many of their basic assumptions, though he would have been more
interested than they are in exploring categories of non-demonstrative inference.
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text and an interpreter formulates and evaluates hypotheses about what the
speaker’s intended meaning was, based both on conventional codes and on
more open-ended inferential principles that process world knowledge, lexical
information and environmental information in the interlocutors’ surround-
ings, finding interpretations relevant to their representation of the world and
the discourse. Both inference and codes are required for language, though
relevance-based theories such as this construe pragmatics as predominantly
inferential. Unlike the code model, there is lots of room for error: many hy-
potheses are possible, and the hearer may, despite their best efforts, generate
one quite different from the speaker’s intention.
Sperber and Wilson argue that an utterance or any ostensive (broadly,
explicitly communicative) act carries a presumption of its own relevance:
hearers assume that things addressed to them are of benefit to them. The
benefit of relevance is the positive cognitive effect that accompanies hearers’
process of interpretation: they may be able to infer new conclusions that
were inaccessible to them before, or they may become more certain or less
certain about beliefs they have. They phrase this change in certainty as
a change in the strength of the beliefs resulting from the process of inter-
pretation. Counteracting this payoff is a processing cost: longer sentences;
utterances which require a great deal more inference to understand; or less
accessible assumptions require more cognitive effort.
A central claim is that humans are geared towards maximising relevance,
achieving the highest cognitive benefit for the least effort. This means that
we will not generate all possible hypotheses about an utterance’s meaning.
Rather, we will unconsciously generate the relevant hypothesis that is the
most accessible. Accessibility (or salience, as they sometimes call it) is
essentially ease of retrieval from memory.
A set of examples (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 133-135) will help illustrate
these points. In each case, take it as assumed that Peter is implying that
he’s too tired to cook, and that he thus wishes Mary to make the meal, and
that Mary is aware of this.
(1.1) Peter: I’m tired.
Mary: I’ll make the meal.
(1.2) Peter: I’m tired.
Mary: The dessert is ready. I’ll make the main.
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(1.3) Peter: I’m tired.
Mary: The dessert is ready. I’ll make an osso-bucco [sic.]
(1.4) Peter: I’m tired.
Mary: The dessert is ready. I’ll make the speciality of the Capri
restaurant.
In (1), the relevance of Mary’s utterance to Peter’s implication that he’d
like her to cook the meal is obvious. In the other cases, though, he would
have to go further, retrieving information related to her utterances from
his store of encyclopaedic memory. These are ‘assumptions’. But which
assumptions must he retrieve? How broad is the context? Sperber and
Wilson (1995) consider (but eventually reject) the possibility that there is
some way of specifying the context prior to interpretation. The most basic
way of doing this would be to specify the context as including implications
of previous utterances, and this is what Mary does when she understands
that he’d like her to make the meal.
In (2), however, Peter would have to go beyond such implications for
Mary’s response to be relevant. In order to achieve the same cognitive benefit
as in (1), Peter would have to access encyclopaedic information associated
with representation meal, such as the fact that it may consist of a dessert
and a main course. Once he has retrieved this information, it is clear that
she is offering to make the meal, so he understands the relevance of her
utterance. This has involved slightly higher cognitive cost than (1), though.
So far, then, we might attempt to specify the relevant context as consisting
of the set of implications of utterances and the assumptions associated with
concepts those utterances and implications.
In (3) and (4), however, we have to go still further. If the speciality
of the Capri restaurant is osso buco and if osso buco is a main course,
then for Mary’s responses to be relevant, Peter must access assumptions
related to assumptions related to assumptions related to concepts in Mary’s
utterance. This could extend indefinitely, so if the context is pre-defined,
it would have to be one’s entire encyclopaedic memory. This, they say,
is absurdly unrealistic: we cannot possibly search our entire memory in
the short time it usually takes us to understand each other. Rather, they
argue, the context is decided as part of the process of interpretation, and
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accessibility (or salience, or ease of retrieval from memory) is a key feature
of this process, which they say is deductive, on the whole.
Let’s look in more detail at how the context is limited in (4). Peter’s un-
conscious interpretive process retrieves assumptions about the Capri restau-
rant from encyclopaedic memory, but rather than retrieving all the facts he
knows about it, the interpretive device retrieves only the most accessible
or salient. Just which is most accessible depends on the structure of Pe-
ter’s memory, so let’s assume for now that it is the assumption that their
speciality is osso buco. The information that their friend John lives next
to the restaurant, being less accessible, will not be retrieved and it would
thus not be available to the deductive process. At each such step, previous
assumptions can be strengthened or new assumptions can be derived. Each
such strengthened or derived assumption is maintained in the memory of the
interpretive module, while others are deleted from that particular memory
store.
Failing at this stage to find the relevance of Mary’s utterance to the con-
cept meal in his implication, the process continues, retrieving information
associated with osso buco. Let’s say that the most accessible piece of in-
formation is that osso buco is made from veal, the second that it comes from
Milan and the third most accessible piece of information is that it is a main
course. The interpretive process does not access all of these simultaneously.
Rather, it retrieves them one-by-one in order of accessibility. The informa-
tion retrieved first (that it is made from veal) fails to achieve relevance (and
presumably information associated with the concept veal fails similarly),
so this assumption is abandoned and the next examined. Information about
Milan similarly fails, so the process returns to osso buco and retrieves the
next accessible assumption, that it is a main course, which allows further
retrieval of the fact that a main course is part of a meal, and thus relevance
is achieved: Peter understands that Mary will make a meal, which is what
he implied he wanted (fig. 1.9).
Since this depends on the structure of an individual’s memories, if Pe-
ter’s encyclopaedic information about veal included the accessible fact that
it is often used to make a main course, then the interpretive process would
have played out differently. Alternatively, the information that osso buco
is a main course could have been the most accessible piece of information
rather than the third, in which case he would have reached the same conclu-
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Capri restaurant
osso buco next to John
made of veal from Milan main course
Figure 1.9: The structure of Peter’s representations. Darker, thicker lines indicate higher
levels of accessibility.
sion with less effort. At any rate, because people have different representa-
tional structures, such interpretive processes are not guaranteed to succeed
in producing an interpretation that matches what the speaker intended. The
authors thus speak of the process being successful or efficient rather than
deductively valid. Because of its reliance on accessibility which varies from
individual to individual, the process is non-demonstrative on the whole, even
though it operates on each step deductively.
So the three main features of all this, then, are that it involves mental-
istic inferences about speaker communicative intention, that it is context-
deciding rather than context-dependent, and that much depends on acces-
sibility (the ease of retrieval or strength of associations between representa-
tions).
I aim to show that the cognitive mechanisms underlying pragmatic infer-
ence cannot be as deductive as Sperber and Wilson claim, especially when
it comes to the symbolic threshold. This leaves us with only their mention
of some poorly understood non-deductive inference to do most of the work.
Over the next two chapters I’ll unpack what I think this would be like, but
for now, a couple of criticisms will give shape to that discussion.
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1.5.2.2 Criticisms
The issue here concerns the cognitive mechanisms that are supposed to
implement this interpretive process: I argue that the proposed deductive
mechanism fails to shoulder the explanatory burden they require from it
and conclude that some other type of inference must be responsible. In the
next subsection, I look at why the symbolic threshold is especially unlikely
to be deductive.
While Sperber and Wilson allow the process to be open-ended, it is open-
ended in a stronger or more problematic way than they might be willing to
accept. Assume that for Peter, a piece of information that would go on
to achieve relevance (that osso buco is a main course) just happened to be
less accessible than another, irrelevant piece of information (that osso buco
comes from Milan). Since pragmatic interpretation is supposed to proceed
stepwise in order of accessibility, Milan will be retrieved first. Since it fails
to achieve relevance, assumptions associated with Milan will then be re-
trieved, such as its being in Northern Italy, its being a fashion capital, or
its being home to La Scala. But how does the process decide to abandon
further pursuit of any such thread of encyclopaedic information? How does
it decide when to abandon any subroutine or subsubroutine or subsubsub-
routine originating with Milan and return to osso buco to retrieve the
assumption (its being a main course) that turned out to be pragmatically
relevant?
Sperber and Wilson’s proposed control mechanism is this: there is lots
of stuff in the environment competing for one’s attention (and thus for one’s
cognitive resources) and because we, as a pragmatic species, try get the most
cognitive benefit for the least cognitive effort, we would eventually cease to
attend to something that costs too much effort. So an interpretive process
that drags out in the above way would simply loose out in this competition.
Note, however, that this control mechanism determines the fate of the inter-
pretive process as a whole: one would simply stop trying to interpret Mary’s
utterance if led down the garden path in this manner and if something else
in the environment seemed to warrant our attention more. Possibly one
would just ask her what she meant. This cannot, however, control any
subroutines within the interpretive process: it cannot account for why an
accessible but ultimately irrelevant assumption is eventually abandoned to
return to an earlier step with a less accessible but ultimately more relevant
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assumption. Fodor (1987) calls this Hamlet’s problem: the problem of when
to stop thinking. In particular, it is the deductive part of interpretation that
runs into Hamlet’s problem.
If there are two parallel processes, one exploring Milan while the other
explores osso bucco, then the latter will achieve relevance sooner or later
and the former can terminate whenever that happens. But if we allow two
parallel searches, there’s no reason there shouldn’t be multiple such pro-
cesses. These could begin with concepts contained in the utterance being
interpreted, and earlier activations could influence the course of later activa-
tions via some priming effect. That is, rather than proceeding in a deductive
linear fashion, it is at least plausible (and, more importantly, testable) that
such pragmatic problems are explained by activation spreading from multi-
ple points, depending on the strength of association between representations.
I will show empirically in the next chapter that this is in fact what hap-
pens. For now, though, it seems that their blind deductive process founders
somewhat against the backdrop of open-ended cognition and if it is this
open-ended, non-linear process that explains how a relevant interpretation
is eventually found, then deduction cannot always play a dominant role. I
am willing to accept that the balance between the two may shift, and that
some cases are comparatively deductive, but it will turn out that the above
criticisms are particularly problematic at the symbolic threshold. It will
also turn out that key terms we’ve already encountered, such as insight and
creative leaps, are often used to describe these cognitive processes.
1.5.2.3 Pragmatics and the symbolic threshold
Sperber and Wilson claim that this pragmatic process interprets not only
modern human language, but also non-linguistic signs like novel gesture.
Their example of a novel gesture is my holding up a full glass of wine to
indicate to you that you needn’t open another bottle on my account. They
don’t actually unpack how deductive interpretation of this would proceed,
but I will argue that this wine-glass example is significantly different from
symbolic language, though similar to pre-symbolic communication. This
still requires pragmatic inference, but I will argue that such cases cannot be
deductive.
Consider the gavagai example again, and compare it both to a situation
where the tribesman in fact says ‘rabbit’, and also to one where he holds
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up a rabbit in the anthropologist’s line of sight without saying anything.
The latter is like the wine-glass example, while I take the gavagai exam-
ple to be a proxy for the symbolic threshold (their being modern humans
notwithstanding) since the participants do not share a code.
In the ‘rabbit’ case, a rough distinction can be drawn between semantic
and pragmatic aspects of interpretation. On the semantic side, hearing
‘rabbit’ predictably activates the anthropologist’s general rabbit concept.
But thinking about rabbits in general cannot be the end of the process.
On the pragmatic side, the anthopologist must still infer the tribesman’s
communicative intent in drawing his attention to this rabbit on this occasion.
Pragmatic inference will (probably) settle on a relevant interpretation. It is
relevant if it provides some cognitive benefit for the anthropologist, and it is
pragmatic in that it produces relevance through a context-deciding inference
about speaker intention based in part on the accessibility of assumptions that
are associated, however distantly, with the concept rabbit. This is the part
that Sperber and Wilson claim is principally deductive in modern language.
While in the ‘rabbit’ case the anthropologist’s rabbit representation
was predictably activated by a conventional sign, in the silent case it might
be activated by joint attentional mechanisms, but these cannot possibly be
as effective as a conventional sign when it comes to reliably bringing specific,
intended interpretants to mind in one’s interlocutors. One way of unpacking
this is to exlore how the two cases differ greatly in terms of semiotic ground
(§1.2.3.2): the ground is given in the symbolic case, but must be inferred in
the silent case.
That is, ‘rabbit’ will predictably activate rabbit. This may in turn
lead to activation of related representations, but it is rabbitness that is fore-
grounded compared to these other representations, and knowing the con-
vention means knowing that this is the case. On the other hand, if the
tribesman had said ‘fluffy’, then the fluffiness of the animal would have been
made salient for the anthropologist since ‘fluffy’ would predictably activate
fluffy.
In the silent case, attentional focus on the animal may well lead to ac-
tivation of rabbit. But it might (in addition or instead) lead to activation
of Flopsy, Angora, lagomorph, pet or fluffy. Rabbit is not fore-
grounded to the same extent as in the symbolic case since one or more of
these other representations could have been activated prior to rabbit, or
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might have been as strongly activated as rabbit.
Activation of rabbit might be a statistically more likely outcome than
the others and it might thus be argued that the two cases are not very
different. But that argument cannot work in general because the intended
meaning is not always the whole-object basic-level label (see §1.5.1.1 for sim-
ilar comments on inductive biases). If rabbit is more likely to be activated,
this can’t explain explain cases where the intended meaning is a perceptu-
ally less salient feature such as fluffiness, or a subordinate or superordinate
category such as Angora or mammal: the ostensive gesture doesn’t allow
as fine-grained direction of attention or manipulation of salience as a sym-
bolic ground does, so this is an example of salience reasoning, rather than
natural salience (§1.4.1.2). The ground must be inferred from the context,
but the context on this occasion includes the communicative intent of the
tribesman, which itself is something requiring pragmatic inference.
So while activation of the appropriate interpretant was the semantic
starting point for pragmatic inference in the ‘rabbit’ case, it is part of or
the result of pragmatic inference in the silent case. In the former case, a
coded signal provides access to a particular address in the anthropologist’s
representational network, from which point pragmatic inference can proceed;
in the latter case, working out the salient aspect of the animal cannot be
disentangled from working out the tribesman’s communicative intention in
holding it up. There are thus some respects in which interpreting novel
gesture is unlike interpreting language.
I now turn to argue that one such respect is the extent to which the
relevance cognitive mechanisms can be deductive: Sperber and Wilson focus
on deductive inference in modern language, but this cannot work for cases
completely lacking linguistic scaffolding such as novel gesture or the ‘gavagai ’
case. Like the former, working out a novel ground in the latter requires
an inference about the speaker’s communicative intention. Consider the
following framing inference, though I am not claiming that such premises
are explicitly represented in such propositional form, or that the interpreter
is aware of any of this.
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(1.5) The tribesman has said ‘gavagai ’.
I assume he has a rational/relevant34 reason for doing so.
If ‘gavagai ’ means rabbit, then his behaviour would be rational/relevant.
Possibly, then, ‘gavagai ’ means rabbit.
I will focus on the first clause of the third premise, which is an hypothesis
about the meaning of the word. It is the generation of this hypothesis
that, though part of a pragmatic inference about speaker meaning, is non-
deductive.
I talked through an example of how Peter reasoned from Mary’s offer to
make the speciality of the Capri restaurant to the conclusion that she was
offering to make a meal. Each step was based on a proposition he believed
to be true: the speciality of the Capri restaurant is osso buco; osso buco
is a main course; a main course is part of a meal. So each step allowed
for deductive inference: if Mary offers to make the speciality of the Capri
restaurant, then she necessarily is offering to make part of a meal.
However, a belief of his might turn out to be untrue, or an unintended
assumption could nonetheless have been more accessible and relevant, so he
could still be wrong on the whole. This, I think, is what Sperber and Wilson
mean when they say that interpretation is non-deductive overall, but the
interpretive module operates deductively. But even if Sperber and Wilson
are correct about each step of Peter’s inference being deductive (though I
questioned the cognitive mechanisms underlying this in §1.5.2.2), the same
cannot be true for the gavagai case since one clause contains an hypothesis,
not a known fact.
To explore why this step is non-deductive, recall that the hypothe-
sis above is similar to Tomasello’s schema in the Hungarian train station
(§1.5.1.2). Tomasello claimed humans are more able than any other species
to take a creative or insightful leap to infer unobservable or hidden forces
(whether physical causes or mentalistic intentions). In (1.5), the hypothesis
about the meaning of the word is just the sort of creative leap Tomasello
describes because it involves hypothesising an unobservable explanation for
observable behaviour and he calls such things creative because the infor-
mation contained in that hypothesis is not deductively derivable from any
34I’ve included both ‘rational’ and ‘relevant’ since this harks back to the discussion
about rational imitation (§1.4.2.3).
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observables. However, once someone comes to believe it, then assumptions
can be deductively derived from it as per the osso buco example.
Sperber and Wilson consider creative inference but ultimately reject the
notion that this plays an important role in pragmatic inference. They say
that such inference is more typical of scientific discovery, and that this is
too sporadic and slow a process to explain our quick, common-place prag-
matic inferences. But if one posits a continuum between quick inferences
that pretty much everyone is capable of as in (1.5) and large-scale scientific
insights that are available only to a few geniuses and that involve a total
reworking of our understanding of the universe, then Sperber and Wilson’s
claim could be rephrased as involving a difference of degree, not of kind.
That is, hypothesis generation in (1.5) could still involve a (small, easy) cre-
ative leap and thus be non-deductive. I take this to be an empirical matter,
and will provide experimental support for this claim in part II.
Sperber and Wilson try to avoid the need for these inferential creative
leaps by claiming that, while the universe is full of complex facts and sifting
through them to form an hypothesis is a complex task, in communication our
interlocutors simplify the problem for us by trying to be relevant, scaffolding
the task for us. I accept that this could achieve quite a lot in the case
of symbolic communication, but it cannot do so for crossing the symbolic
threshold. In a pre-symbolic species, conventional forms of scaffolding are
unavailable because they are conventional. Indeed, Tomasello (1999) defines
‘symbol’ to be a conventional way of directing attention. The alternative is
using novel gesture to direct attention but, as I argued above, novel gesture
is different because it is less able to make the relevant aspect of the semiotic
object salient to the observer: the ground must be inferred pragmatically.
Again, I will show empirically in ch. 6 that manipulating the amount of
scaffolding (or how informative the context is) affects the extent to which a
pragmatic inference involves a creative or insightful leap.
1.5.2.4 Conclusions about pragmatic inference
I outlined Sperber and Wilson’s theory of pragmatic inference because sym-
bol origins are really a pragmatic (as opposed to purely semantic) problem.
I highlighted how pragmatic inference is context-deciding and relevance-
deciding unlike situations where context is constrained prior to inference or
where relevance is determined teleologically rather than mentalistically. The
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need for this was prefigured in sections on convention (§1.4.1.3, §1.4.2.3).
I argued above that the symbolic threshold also requires salience-deciding
inference given that it involves pragmatic inferences about grounds. This
is supported by the discussion about natural salience in Lewis conven-
tions (§1.4.1.2). In what follows, ‘pragmatic inference’ will mean context-,
salience- and relevance-deciding inference about speaker communicative in-
tention.
However, a number of sections above also suggested a role for insightful
inference or creative leaps, especially in hypothesis generation. Sperber and
Wilson downplay this in favour of deductive inference, but I argued above
that novel symbols and gestures are problematic in this regard, and that we
thus need to look more closely at these non-deductive kinds of inference.
1.5.3 A definition of ‘symbol’ suitable for discussing the sym-
bolic threshold
I’ll set the definition out first, then explain certain key points, though the
justification for each of those points has already been set out somewhere
above. This definition is not intended to be general (i.e. applicable to every-
one who has ever talked about symbols). Nor does it derive from semiotic
theory. Rather, it is a definition that will help me make some sense, in the
rest of this dissertation, of the evolution of symbolic communication in the
human species.
I propose that a symbol is an ostensive sign that requires a specific kind
of interpretant if it is to be understood the first time it is encountered. An
interpretant is the effect that perceiving a representamen has on whoever is
interpreting it, and in the case of a symbol, that effect is a spontaneous hy-
pothesis about the semiotic ground, i.e. a salience-deciding inference yielding
an hypothesis about which aspect of the object the speaker is directing one’s
attention to in using the representamen. The hypothesis about the semi-
otic ground is part of a larger context- and relevance-deciding pragmatic
inference about speaker intention.
I focus here on the first encounter with the sign. If you were in a Robinson
Crusoe-like situation and heard Friday utter two words, one a word in his
language and one a nonce word, it would make no difference which is the
word and which the invention: at this stage, it is not necessary for a symbol
to be conventional in order for you to work it out. On the other hand, if you
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and he continued to use the nonce word once you’d worked out its meaning,
then it would then become conventional. So ‘conventional’ is a description
of a symbol already in use, but not a crucial aspect of crossing the symbolic
threshold.
On encountering an ostensive sign humans spontaneously form an in-
terpretant. In the case of a known word, that will be the appropriate rep-
resentation; in the case of a novel word, it is an hypothesis. I set out
in ch. 3 just what this entails. For animals, interpretant representations
may spontaneously activate in response to innate signals, but they typically
do not spontaneously form hypotheses about the grounds of novel signals,
though a novel signal may attract or direct their attention to some degree.
Animal interpretants are typically also peripheral, while humans interpre-
tant representations or hypotheses may engage in further central processes.
Chimpanzees have been taught novel symbols, but this typically involves la-
borious training by a human, and so typically doesn’t involve a spontaneous
hypothesis.
The hypothesis concerns an inference about a ground, but I do not claim
that this ground cannot be iconic or indexical; just that it must be inferred.
I discussed how these terms are not mutually incompatible (§1.2.4) and also
how there is a continuum from purely perceptual icons to icons that require
a great deal of cognitive effort to understand (§1.3.1.2). The latter are more
symbolic in my terms because they require inference; the former are not
because they are more purely perceptual. Figure 1.4 is an example of an
iconic ground that requires salience-deciding inference. It does not convey
all possible facts about Harrison Ford, such as his height or age. Rather it
selectively portrays him as the actor who played Indiana Jones. Presum-
ably seeing the picture activates (in a way not relevant to my discussion just
now) representations whip and hat, among others. These in turn activate
Indiana Jones, which activates Harrison Ford. This process is an ex-
ample of pragmatic inference, like when Peter interpreted the relevance of
Mary’s mentioning the Capri restaurant. You can (typically) see what a
photo resembles and feel quite confident about it, so that doesn’t involve an
hypothesis, but the same is not true of icons like fig. 1.4. Caricatures may be
an intermediate case closer to purely perceptual icons; iconic sign language
gestures are an intermediate case closer to non-iconic words.
Finally, the formation of the hypothesis is part of a pragmatic infer-
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ence about the speaker’s communicative intention. That means it will be
context-, salience- and relevance-deciding. It is possible for a linguistic hu-
man to scaffold a word learning task for someone else in order to limit
context, emphasise salience, or be more transparent about relevance, but
there will again be a continuum between highly constrained and highly un-
constrained cases. Holding up my wine glass to indicate you don’t need to
open another bottle provides a comparatively small amount of constraining
information because the same gesture was involved in holding up a rabbit
above. Holding up my wine glass, pointing at the place where the wine is
close to the rim, and shaking my head while glancing at the bottle provides
somewhat more constraining information. Saying ‘gavagai ’ while a rabbit
runs past in the distance is less constrained than saying it while holding an
illustration of mammalian taxonomy in front of your audience’s eyes and
touching your finger to the rabbit. Even quite constrained cases need not
be deductive, though.
There can still be, to an extent, a distinction between inference about
ground and inference about speaker intention. If I know what ‘rabbit’ means,
I must still make an inference about what you’re conveying about it on a
particular occasion, so I must infer your intention. In a game of Pictionary,
understanding the game means knowing that the drawer’s intention is to
produce a picture that will make you say the word on her cue card, but you
must still make an inference about semiotic ground. But both are required
at the symbolic threshold.
So the upshot is that evolving the ability to form spontaneous hypothe-
ses about grounds is part of what took our ancestors over the symbolic
threshold, and this meant evolving the ability to make salience-, context-,
and relevance-deciding inferences about speaker intention. Since inference
is a poorly explored part of language evolution, this dissertation will focus
on the evolution of this particular kind of inference rather than on speaker
intention.
1.5.4 Conclusions
This section has drawn the focus of the debate to hypothesis generation.
Having provided a number of reasons drawn from cognitive science (Fitch
and Tomasello) and pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson) why symbols origins
should be considered inherently inferential, I highlighted a number of fea-
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tures of this inference. The main feature is that it is open-ended. It is
context-, relevance- and salience-deciding, as is true of pragmatic inference
in general, though I argued that Sperber and Wilson’s claims about de-
duction in this regard would not extend to the symbolic threshold. Other
features, mentioned but not fully explored yet, include creativity, analogy
and insight.
The key task for inference about novel symbols is deciding the ground as
part-and-parcel of deciding speaker intention. It is only by generating hy-
potheses about speaker intention that one comes to understand the symbolic
ground, though modern children in carefully scaffolded joint-attentional lin-
guistic environments may have this task dramatically simplified for them.
Once a symbol’s ground has been established, the role of inference may be
downplayed in further encounters with that symbol. These various simpli-
fications have allowed researchers in language evolution to gloss over the
nature of hypothesis generation, whereas I propose to examine it in detail.
The following two chapters will explore the relationships between these
ideas in more detail. Ch. 2 posits an inferential hierarchy (like Fitch’s in-
tentional one) such that we can evaluate to what extent certain groups of
animals are capable of complex forms of inference, allowing us to consider
what our ancestors may have been capable of.
Ch. 3 looks at the most complex level of inference in more detail, which is
where questions about hypothesis generation and evaluation are discussed.
That chapter will examine Peirce’s theory of abduction, which is his par-
ticular take on hypothesis generation. Key terms from this chapter will
be related to hypothesis generation, such as insight, creativity and anal-
ogy. This will allow for a clearer contrast with induction and for testable




Humans and animals perceive their environment and produce behaviour.
Between these two interfaces with the external world, various processes will
be going on in the brain or mind. ‘Rationality’, ‘inference’ and ‘reasoning’
are among the terms applied to types of these internal processes. It may be
uncontroversial to claim that humans are capable of reasoning or inference,
or that animals are capable of rational behaviour, but whether animals dis-
play inference is unclear (Allen, 2006). How we evolved these abilities is
thus unclear. Further, the distinction between inference and reasoning is
currently rather vague, and subdivisions in these nebulous categories tend
to be painted with rather broad strokes: people talk of deductive and non-
deductive reasoning, or of deductive and inductive reasoning, or of Bayesian
induction, but not in terms much more detailed than that.
Since the previous chapter argued that the evolution of symbols is best
explained in inferential terms, a description of the symbolic threshold will
inherit any lack of clarity found in our theories of inference. This chapter
will thus outline an evolutionary hierarchy with rationality at the base,
inference as an intermediate term, and reasoning at the top (fig. 2.1). That
is, minimal rationality is the simplest, oldest ability, shared with the most
other species. Inference is more complex, is a more recent development,
and is shared with fewer species. Reasoning is the most complex, the most
recent, and is probably limited to humans.
Having set out some basic terms relevant to these distinctions, I will then
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Figure 2.1: An inferential hierarchy ranging from the most basic to the most sophisticated
capacity. The level corresponding to reasoning is very narrow (it is limited to just humans)
and very shallow (it is comparatively recent). The vast width and depth of the lowest
level indicate that it is a great deal more widespread and older. Inference is intermediate.
turn to a closer examination of inference, distinguishing minimal inference
from more complex forms, and identifying the level at which symbol learn-
ing becomes possible. It will turn out that identifying minimal rationality
and reasoning at either extreme of the spectrum is comparatively straight-
forward, whereas inference seems to be a large gap of the here-be-dragons
variety in the middle.
The basic premise here should not be read as supporting a saltationist
account of evolution: these divisions are not intended to represent sudden,
large jumps in ability. Rather, I assume that gradual increases in complexity
occurred, and am simply aiming to identify points of interest along that
continuum. Nor are these divisions mutually exclusive. A human may be
capable of simultaneously bringing all three processes to bear on a given
problem or may shift from one process to another on depending on context.
That is, the hierarchy is more properly called a ‘layered model’ (Zlatev,
2008) because each stage does not represent a total replacement of what
came before.
Throughout, a major concern will be aligning theoretical distinctions
with those supported by empirical evidence: claiming that there is a dis-
tinction between rationality and inference is only really sensible if it turns
out that this distinction lines up with behavioural or neurological differ-
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ences. At times, these links may be suggestive rather than conclusive, but
since this is somewhat of a terra incognita, my claims are intended to be en-
couraging first steps, rather than anything stronger. Apart from my overall
aims with regard to symbol evolution, one subsidiary aim in this chapter is
to identify a stalemate in empirical approaches to animal inference and to
propose a way out of this. Another is to show the limits of a computational
theory of mind in discussing the evolution of mind. A third is to make good
on my criticisms of Sperber and Wilson (1995) from ch. 1.
2.2 Some Key Concepts
2.2.1 Dual-process models
Dual-process theories are a disparate set of approaches that assume the mind
simultaneously operates in at least two distinct ways called ‘system 1’ and
‘system 2’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Since a vast range of researchers
have been interested in this topic, characterisations of each system have at
best family resemblance. Evans (2008) distinguishes four clusters of char-
acterisations in the literature (fig. 2.2) based on attributes of consciousness,
evolution, function, and individual differences. Mercier and Sperber (2009)
tentatively call system 1 ‘inference’ and system 2 ‘reasoning’, since they fo-
cus on the ‘consciousness’ and ‘evolution’ clusters: reasoning is reflective,
linked to language, and uniquely human. This is a distinction I support.
This does not imply, however, that this is the only dual-process distinc-
tion worth attending to, or that all other descriptions of system 1 and 2
processes reduce to this. In fact, other descriptions do not even have to
align with this. In what follows I will make a second, orthogonal distinc-
tion between two systems based on functional characteristics (associative vs.
rule-based or syntactic architectures, and pragmatic descriptions vs. logical
norms). In fact, since I am focusing on the evolution of language, and since
reasoning requires language, I will not discuss reasoning much in what fol-
lows. While I referred to the distinction in Mercier and Sperber (2009) above
to constrast inference and reasoning, their distinction will not inform the fo-
cus of this chapter, which is an examination of different kinds of inference.
When I mention ‘dual-systems’ in what follows, then, I will be referring to
inference and to the just-mentioned functional characterisation rather than
that of Mercier and Sperber.
74 CHAPTER 2. AN INFERENTIAL HIERARCHY
Figure 2.2: Clusters of attributes associated with dual systems of thinking (Evans, 2008). I
have highlighted in pink the focal attributes which distinguish inference from reasoning. In
blue are the attributes that will inform my discussion of minimal rationality and inference.
Naturally, highlighted terms may entail others: if reasoning is limited to humans, for
instance, it is also evolutionarily recent.
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2.2.2 Approaches to rationality and levels of analysis
Kacelnik (2006) distinguishes a number of approaches to rationality: PP-
rationality is that which is typical of philosophy and psychology; E-rationality
that which is typical of economics and B-rationality of biology. PP-rationality
focuses on reasoning and inference and their role in behaviour and is thus
concerned with cognitive or internal processes: a behaviour or belief is ratio-
nal in this sense if it is the result of inference or reasoning. E-rationality is
not concerned with internal processes, but rather with the expected utility
of a behaviour: an action is rational if it can be expected to maximise util-
ity for an animal in a certain environment, regardless of whatever internal
processes led to the behaviour. B-rationality is related to E-rationality but
narrower: it replaces the vague notion of utility with biological fitness.
Bayesian inductive inference (with which I will contrast my claims about
hypothesis generation) is the default tool of the rational analysis approach
(Anderson 1991; Chater and Oaksford 2008), which assumes E-rationality
since it explains behaviour in terms of the structure of the environment by
providing an analysis of what would be the optimal behaviour by a creature
in that environment, given certain goals.
On the other hand, since I am presenting a psychological account of the
role of inference in symbol evolution, I will be concerned with PP-rationality.
However, Kacelnik admits that this definition is difficult to apply to animals
since they don’t seem capable of reasoning. Since I distinguish inference
and reasoning, I suggest the following as a less anthropocentric definition:
PP-rationality focuses on the explanatory role of internal processes linking
perception to behaviour and, by extension, on the content associated with
those processes.
Given that cognition is such a complex phenomenon to investigate, sev-
eral researchers have tried to simplify the task by positing a number of levels
of analysis (most commonly, three), each focusing on different aspects of the
whole, or different degrees of abstraction. The following table is not in-
tended to suggest that the terms in each row are equivalent, for there are
differences1; nor does it suggest that I am committed to the asumptions or
implications they bring with them. Rather, I present these here because
some aspect of each aligns roughly with the others, and various subsets may
1For instance, the three rightmost columns focus on semanticity at the most abstract
level, while Marr’s computational level focuses on function, hence the double lines.
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be familiar to readers from different backgrounds, so they merely act as an







Most abstract computational semantic intentional content
Intermediate algorithmic syntactic design form
Most conrete physical medium
Table 2.1: Levels of Analysis.
The lowest level, the physical, is a matter of concrete implementation.
A calculator and human may both be capable of adding two numbers, but
a calculator’s processes are implemented in electronic circuits, a human’s
in neurons, and are thus different at the physical level. The level variously
called ‘algorithmic’, ‘syntactic’, ‘design’ or ‘form’ is more abstract. A calcu-
lator, unlike a human, represents numbers in binary in order to add them
up: one feature of discussions about this level thus concerns the units of
cognition. Another feature is the processes that apply to these units: how
a calculator performs addition is different from how a human brain does.
In contrast, the highest level is where cognitive processes interact with the
world, and the different terms above focus on different aspects of this inter-
action. Marr’s label ‘computational’ focuses on the inputs and outputs of
the cognitive process and the function of that process. Despite algorithmic-
level differences between calculators and humans, we nonetheless perform
the same computational function when we add up two numbers. In what fol-
lows, I’ll mostly be concerned with interactions between the computational
and algorithmic levels, though occasionally I’ll refer to physical differences.
2.2.3 Problematic terms
Some ambiguous or similar-sounding terms have unfortunately cropped up
in the literature. There is an ambiguity in the term ‘computational’, and an
important difference between ‘rational’ and ‘rationalist’. These ambiguities
and differences are intertwined, however, so this requires a little exposition.
It is possible to give a computational-level analysis of a problem and remain
agnostic about the kind of processes at the algorithmic level, but it is also
common to argue for specific kinds of process. Fodor (2001) outlines two
candidates by distinguishing two kinds of mental causation.
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(I) Suppose we believe the proposition ‘John is bald’ and that believing
this proposition involves the existence in our minds of a particular mental
representation bald(john), which has the logical form Fa in Fodor’s nota-
tion, where F expresses a property and a an individual. Take Ga to represent
the proposition that ‘John is in need of a haircut’, so FaÐ→¬Ga corresponds
to the conditional ‘If John is bald, then he isn’t in need of a haircut’. The
argument Fa; FaÐ→¬Ga ∴ ¬Ga is logically valid, but validity here is a formal
notion: it has nothing to do with the meaning of baldness, haircuts or who
John is, but rather has to do with the syntax of the propositions in which
they find themselves. A syntactic process mechanically derives that conclu-
sion from those premises by virtue of their logical form, and if the second
premise were FaÐ→Ga, then the conclusion would be Ga, even though it’s
semantically implausible that, if John is bald, he is in need of a haircut.
In this example, the relevant syntactic properties are local: the validity
of the argument depends on the syntax of the propositions in the argu-
ment, and not on anything outside that argument, much as the spelling of a
word depends only on the arrangement of letters within that word (Fodor,
2001). Processes that rely only on local properties are thus contextually
constrained. If some inferences rely on nonlocal properties, then they may
be contextually unconstrained. I highlighted the importance of context for
pragmatic inference (§1.5.2) and a major thread running throughout this
chapter is the evolution of contextually unconstrained inference. In the
next chapter, this will be related to hypothesis generation (contextually un-
constrained) and evaluation (contextually constrained).
(II) Now suppose in addition that when you think of John, this some-
times causes the representation bald to become activated, but when I think
of John, this always causes bald to become activated: possibly baldness is
less central to your representation of him than it is for me, or my represen-
tation John activates bald more strongly than yours does. This associative
relation is not a formal property of these representations: whereas one could
substitute any well-formed proposition for Fa and Ga without affecting the
validity of the above argument, the relationship between John and bald is a
property of just that pair. Substituting representation of another individual
or another property would result in a different casual relationship. Further,
while the validity of the argument doesn’t depend on who is evaluating it,
this associative relationship is an accidental feature of particular minds.
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Based on these two kinds of mental causation, Fodor distinguishes two
approaches to the algorithmic level in human cognition. An empiricist psy-
chology maintains that the structure of a thought and the role it plays in
cognition are exhaustively described by the associative relationships of (II).
A rationalist psychology maintains that the structure of a thought and the
role it plays in cognition depend on the formal properties of (I), and that
these are not reducible to associative relationships. The terms ‘empiricist’
and ‘rationalist’ have alternative meanings in philosophy, but I intend them
here in the specific sense of Fodor (2001).
One benefit of a rationalist psychology is that it explains how cognition
is truth-preserving (Fodor, 2001): if the premises are true, then truthful
conclusions can be ensured by a suitable mechanical process sensitive to
formal features. Call this the logical or normative feature of a rationalist
psychology. In order to explain how a rationalist psychology achieves this
aim, an influential theory in cognitive science assumes that the mind is in-
terestingly like a Turing-style computer. This is the Computational Theory
of Mind (CTM Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker, 1997; Fodor, 2001). The
term ‘computational’ is thus ambiguous, referring either to the computa-
tional level of analysis or to the CTM thesis that the mind is computational
at the algorithmic level. A computational-level analysis needn’t suppose a
CTM, though. In order to avoid confusion, I’ll use ‘syntactic’ to mean ‘com-
putational in the CTM sense’. Other terms for this in the literature include
‘rule-based’, ‘classical’, or ‘symbolic2’.
In this chapter and the next, I will argue for a dual-process model that
distinguishes a rationalist psychology (system 2) which makes normative
and syntactic assumptions about cognition from an empiricist psychology
(system 1) which assumes cognition is associationist (or subsymbolic or
non-classical) and does not assume normativity. It simply describes what
happens, not what ought to happen and is thus called ‘pragmatic’ or ‘de-
scriptive’. The term ‘rationalist’ thus carries with it specific assumptions,
unlike the general term ‘rational’, but because I will argue something can be
minimally rational without being rationalist, this distinction is important.
Danks (2008) argues that there is no reason to suppose just one algorith-
mic level. Instead, a process at a higher level algorithmic level can handle
the inputs and outputs for a processes at a lower level algorithmic level. If
2‘Symbolic’ here meant in the private, not public sense (cf. §1.2.2).
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that’s the case, I don’t see why some algorithmic levels can’t be empiricist
and others rationalist.
2.2.4 Content
Since I have argued that inference was necessary for symbolic language, I am
committed to the claim that there are some kinds of inference that do not
make use of content or processes that require language. The previous subsec-
tion focused on cognitive processes, whereas this subsection focuses on con-
tent. Millikan (2006) argues that reasoning requires propositional content.
Since inference is simpler than reasoning, an investigation of whether animals
have inference thus involves investigating whether animals have something
like propositions, but simpler. Let’s call these proto-propositions (Hurford,
2007). The question of whether animals have proto-propositions demands a
discussion of whether they have proto-concepts.
Hurford states that a necessary (but not sufficient) criterion for deciding
whether an animal has a proto-concept of something is that the animal
display ‘regular and systematic behaviour in connection with that thing’
(2007, 16). He posits a representational continuum from proto-concepts to
full, linguistic concepts and identifies generality and volitional control as
two dimensions along which the complexity of a representation can vary. He
reviews a range of evidence, some of which follows below, suggesting that
some animals display sufficient generality or volition in their behaviour to
be granted proto-concepts.
Zuberbühler et al. (1999) show that Diana monkeys display a degree of
generality. Like related vervet monkeys, Diana monkeys give alarm calls
in response to predators. A Diana alarm in response to a leopard doesn’t
sound like a leopard growl, but both indicate the presence of a leopard. Zu-
berbühler et al. played recordings of predator signals and of monkey alarm
calls and found that monkeys became habituated to different signals if they
had the same functional referent, despite sounding different. They conclude
that this is best explained if behaviour is mediated by a representation of
that predator. Hurford claims that because this representation is some-
what general, activated in response to different signals of a predator, it is
a proto-concept. Vervet monkeys also have a small degree of control over
whether they sound an alarm or not (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990), so their
representations are thus also somewhat volitional.
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Concepts can be conjoined to form propositions consisting of a predicate
which has a varying number of arguments. Minimally, there must be at least
one argument: a subject. Saying ‘Socrates’ is not, on its own, true or false;
neither is saying ‘was snub-nosed’. A proposition combining these, ‘Socrates
was snub-nosed,’ is true.
Hurford (2007) thus discusses the possibility that some animals have
proto-propositions where, instead of the subject being conceptually repre-
sented, an attentional index (a sort of variable standing for whatever is the
focus of the animal’s attention) attaches to the predicate proto-concept. So
if x represents whatever is in the animal’s visual focus, then rabbit(x ) is
a proto-proposition roughly equivalent to the proposition ‘that’s a rabbit’.
The possibility of a single representation being in some way like a sentence
is an idea that has some philosophical pedigree, since Quine (1992) admits
the possibility that observational sentences (such as the proposition ‘that’s
a rabbit’) could just as well be represented by a single noun ‘rabbit!’ in
certain cases.
I can now turn to look at rationality and inference as intuitive or subper-
sonal system 1 processes not requiring propositions or linguistic concepts.
This step is an important part of investigating symbol origins because our
ancestors would have had to have been capable of inference to cross the sym-
bolic threshold. But it is by no means clear that non-human animals can
infer anything. If I can provide an objective way of distinguishing minimal
rationality (§2.3) and inference (§2.4), then we will be better situated to use
information about the inferential ability of our relatives to speculate about
the inferential abilities of our pre-linguistic ancestors. The final part of the
puzzle will be providing empirically justifiable distinctions between simpler
and more complex forms of inference (§2.5), such that we share the former
with our relatives, but the latter only with our ancestors. This will explain
why chimpanzees can be taught laboriously to use symbols, while humans
do so spontaneously.
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2.3 Minimal rationality
The lowest level in the inferential hierarchy will be based on the account of
minimal rationality in Dretske (2006)3. Dretske is interested in contrasting
the rational behaviour of some animals with the mechanical behaviour of, for
instance, a thermometer or a plant: in the former case, internal representa-
tions play an explanatory role; in the latter cases, not. Minimal rationality
describes behaviour that is ‘not only under the causal control of thought,
but . . . explained by the content of these thoughts’ (2006, 107, emphasis
mine).
He provides an analogy to distinguish causation from explanatory con-
tent. If I say ‘vibrate rapidly’ into a microphone, the microphone’s di-
aphragm will vibrate rapidly. This vibration is caused by what I say, but
it is not explained by the content of what I say: it would still vibrate if
I had said ‘do not vibrate rapidly’. Thus, when discussing how an animal
can be minimally rational but a thermometer cannot, we are not merely
interested in the causal chain from perceptual input to behavioural output,
but also with the content of any intermediate internal states and the role of
this content in explaining behaviour. Dretske goes on to illustrate this by
contrasting comparatively mechanical behaviour in a plant with minimally
rational behaviour in a bird.
The scarlet gilia is a plant that changes from red to white in the middle of
July each year. Early in the flowering season, humming birds are their chief
pollinator and hummingbirds are more attracted to red blooms; later, hawk-
moths are the main pollinators and they apparently prefer white. Dretske
allows that this counts as B-rationality in the terms outlined above (§2.2.2),
but not as minimally rational in his terms. There are internal states of the
plant that have a mechanistic relationship with the environment at the rel-
evant time of year. Dretske allows that such internal states represent the
environment and that these states cause the change in colour, acting like a
biological clock. However, he denies that the content of these internal states
has anything to do with the colour-changing behaviour and he bases this
claim on how we explain the colour change. He argues that the explanation
for the plant’s behaviour is not its internal state, but rather, the internal
3He contrasts minimal rationality with full rationality, and it seems that full rationality
corresponds to my terms ‘inference’ and ‘reasoning’, so the discussion here is not about
rationality in general.
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states of its ancestors in the context of some selectional process.
In contrast, Dretske imagines a bird that had eaten a poisonous monarch
butterfly, making the bird ill. If the bird then avoids not only monarchs, but
also similar looking viceroys (which are not poisonous), then the content of
its representations plays some role in explaining this avoidance behaviour.
Like the case with the scarlet gilia, the bird’s internal state is a cause of its
behaviour. Unlike the plant, however, Dretske claims that the content of this
representation explains the bird’s behaviour: the bird ‘avoids something not
because it tastes bad (the viceroy doesn’t taste bad), but because it “thinks”
it tastes bad’ (2006, 114). Because the content of the representation has this
explanatory value, the behaviour is minimally rational.
While the plant’s behaviour, then, was explained by something in its
species’ phylogeny, the bird’s behaviour is explained by something in its own
ontogeny. That is, Dretske seems to base the matter of minimal rationality
on whether some representation is evolved or learned: the latter behaviour
is more flexible and the former more mechanical4.
However, minimal rationality will not extend to more complex situations.
It is designed to distinguish minimally rational from mechanical behaviour,
but not to distinguish more sophisticated behaviour from either of these.
But what if much of a category is innate, but its application depends on
learning? Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) showed that vervet infants initially
react to a range of overhead stimuli, including falling leaves, as they would
to eagles. They gradually learn, however, to limit this behaviour to eagles.
Some aspects of the behaviour are thus innate while others are learnt, so
it is unclear where we stand with regard to Dretske’s criteria. Further, I
reviewed evidence suggesting that the vervets’ representations are proto-
concepts and thus contentful (§2.2.4). However, it is a proto-concept of a
biologically salient category and thus principally explicable by the animals’
phylogeny. Intuitively, the sophistication of the behaviour seems to be at
least as rational as the bird’s avoidance of certain butterflies. The criteria for
minimal rationality, however, do not decide the matter one way or the other,
and ‘seems’ isn’t good enough: we need a more principled way of evaluating
the explanatory balance between evolutionary history and representational
content. The following section thus offers a definition of ‘inference’ that
4Naturally there is a sense of ‘rational’ that encompasses both, but that sense is broader
than what Dretske is aiming for here.
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solves the problem by building on Dretske’s definition rather than abandon-
ing it.
Figure 2.3: Minimal rationality requires nothing more than an empiricist psychology.
Before moving on to inference, though, I want to be clear where we stand
relative to the problematic or ambiguous terms in §2.2.3. Assuming that the
bird has a representation monarch, it’s probably the case that perception
of both viceroys and monarchs activates the representation which in turn
activates avoidance behaviour, and that this all occurs through associative
processes (fig. 2.3). Further, if this is descriptively accurate, there is no indi-
cation that the bird’s cognitive system is truth-preserving (though we might
make claims about truth from outside that system), because the represen-
tation doesn’t distinguish these butterfly categories. The causal role of the
representation is explained by some of the butterflies (but not others) being
poisonous, but we cannot assume normativity in a system relative to cat-
egories that are simply not represented by that system. Alternatively and
more straightforwardly, if there are no propositions, there is no truth of the
matter. Because this process is associationist and doesn’t assume normativ-
ity, minimal rationality assumes an empiricist, not a rationalist psychology.
It is unfortunate that the terms share a morphemic root, but the collocations
should help distinguish them in what follows.
This will have implications for inference at the symbolic threshold. Many
accounts of sophisticated human cognition focus on similarities between
inference and reasoning, and thus frame inference in normative terms5.
5For instance, normativity is assumed by the rational analysis approach (Anderson,
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Counter to this trend, I wish to emphasise similarities between (some kinds
of) inference and minimal rationality. Since minimal rationality is empiricist
and thus non-normative and associationist, I will argue that some kinds of
inference are non-normative and associationist.
In particular, I will argue that context-, salience- and relevance-deciding
inference needs an empiricist psychology, so it’s worth explaining now why
it doesn’t matter that minimal rationality is empiricist, even though Fodor
(2001) is dismissive of the value of an empiricist psychology. He argues
that only a rationalist psychology can explain laws of thought (i.e. the way
normative processes underlie and explain core features of human cognition
such as productivity, systematicity and compositionality6). We have no ev-
idence, though, that cognition at the minimally rational level is productive,
systematic or compositional, so there is no reason to preclude an empiricist
psychology on these grounds: monarch(x) is never going to have to enter
into a modus ponens for this bird.
I think it makes sense of the evolutionary trajectory to see how inference
develops out of minimal rationality and to wait until some cognitive process
demonstrably needs normativity or compositionality before worrying about
the appropriateness an empiricist psychology. Premature comparisons with
reasoning risk making procrustean assumptions and setting the bar too high.
2.4 Minimal Inference
In this section, I will first outline and unpack a definition of minimal infer-
ence (§2.4.1). This is intended to be just one small step more complex than
Dretske’s minimal rationality so it will not look as sophisticated as some
complex inferences. I will apply the definition of minimal inference to the
puzzling case of transitive inference in animals and show how it points the
way to resolving a methodological stalemate (§2.4.2). Finally, I discuss some
neurological evidence for my claims (§2.4.3).
1991), and Bayesianism is how human cognition is supposed to achieve this (Griffiths
et al., 2008). However, this replaces ‘truth’ with an ecological notion of optimality. As
a result, its processes involve probability rather than deductive necessity. I thus extend
Fodor’s narrow sense of ‘normative’ to mean ‘truth-preserving or optimal’.
6Chalmers (1990) argues connectionism can provide compositionality. But since I don’t
need compositionality here, I won’t get into it.
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2.4.1 Definition
For a cognitive process to be inferential, I propose that
1. It must be minimally rational, but
2. Deciding whether it is minimally rational requires contextual informa-
tion
By ‘contextual information’, I mean this: for something to be minimally
rational as per point 1, some representational content must play an explana-
tory role in accounting for behaviour. Contextual information refers to other
representational content activated at roughly the same time but activated
by different stimuli. So if a vervet or Diana monkey has a representation of
whether kin are present while its leopard representation is active, then the
former counts as contextual information since the stimulus kin is distinct
from the stimulus leopard. Per point 2, if contextual information is needed
to decide whether something is rational, then the process is minimally in-
ferential (fig. 2.4). It turns out that it wouldn’t be rational for the vervet to
attract the predator’s attention unless kin are present (Cheney and Seyfarth,
1990).
Figure 2.4: Minimal inference requires contextual representational information: if no kin
are present, it is not rational for a monkey to draw a predator’s attention to itself by
sounding an alarm.
The problem previously was that Dretske distinguished the bird’s ra-
tionality from the scarlet gilia’s mechanical behaviour because phylogeny
explained the latter while ontogenetically acquired content explained the
former. The causal link between vervets’ leopard representations and sub-
sequent alarm or avoidance behaviour seems explicable by both. The pro-
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posed definition makes a small but important difference in deciding just what
is explained by each. Even if we allow that vervet phylogeny (rather than
representational content) is the ultimate explanation for why the leopard
representation causes alarm call and avoidance behaviour, this is about the
existence of the behaviour in the species in general. On its own it does
not explain whether or not a particular vervet gives an alarm on a par-
ticular occasion. That is (at least partially) explained by whether its kin
representation is active at roughly the same time as its leopard representa-
tion7. Since deciding whether instances of behaviour are minimally rational
requires this contextual information, the process is minimally inferential.
Paraphrasing, a minimally rational process involves a comparatively lin-
ear causal chain relating representations to peripheral information (i.e. per-
ceptual input or behavioural output, fig. 2.3). An inferential process involves
cognition that additionally relates representations to non-peripheral contex-
tual information: other representations (fig. 2.4). I’ve already discussed the
importance of non-peripheral processes (§1.3.2): this is a fairly basic exam-
ple of one.
It might be argued that, instead, vervets are sensitive to complex stimuli
as in fig. 2.5. This seems more like fig. 2.3. I admit that I have no evidence
that kin presence should be considered a distinct representation so I cannot
make any claim stronger than this: by the above definition for inference,
vervet avoidance behaviour would count as minimally inferential if my de-
scription is accurate. The next subsection, however, will provide stronger
empirical support for a difference between rationality and inference in the
case of transitive inference.
2.4.2 The test case: Transitive Inference
I give an outline of transitive inference (TI) and contrast two explanations of
animal behaviour that is functionally similar to TI. I examine why current
attempts to choose between these explanations struggle to settle the matter
definitively, and then show why my definition of inference can do so. The
point here is to show that my definition is empirically useful.
If we know that Alice is faster than Barbara and that Barbara is faster
7Representations of contextual information do not have to be very sophisticated. I
don’t claim that a vervet must have a proto-concept of kin: we lack evidence for this,
unlike the leopard proto-concept.
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Figure 2.5: A possible interpretation that would be minimally rational, not minimally
inferential, since the contextual information is perceptual, not representational.
than Cathy, we can infer that Alice is faster than Cathy despite never having
seen them run together because the relationship faster-than is transitive
(in a logical, rather than grammatical sense). If an animal is trained on pairs
of arbitrary stimuli a, b, c, such that choosing a is rewarded when presented
with the pair a and b while choosing b is rewarded when presented with the
pair b and c, then a number of vertebrates, including chimpanzees (Gillan,
1991), monkeys (McGonigle and Chalmers, 1977), rats (Dusek and Eichen-
baum, 1997), pigeons (von Fersen et al., 1991) and even fish (Vasconcelos,
2008)8, are able to choose a over c despite not having seen them together9.
So some animals are capable of behaviour that is functionally or descrip-
tively similar to TI, but animal behaviour researchers disagree on which of
the following is the best explanation for how a given species actually pro-
duces this behaviour (Allen, 2006, though he describes these as loose families
of approaches, rather than anything more unified):
Cognitive: The animals explicitly represent the relevant transitive rela-
tionships a>b>c and cognitive processes use these representations to
produce the behaviour
Associative: The animals have no representations of the transitive re-
8Though the demonstration for fish involved social dominance relations, not arbitrary
stimuli.
9The reward values of the series can be represented as a>b>c and each training pair as
a+b− and b+c−. Testing a against c is represented a?c.
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lationships, and produce the behaviour through simpler associative
mechanisms
O’Doherty (2004) claims that, for human and non-human primates, brain
regions including the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala and ventral striatum
have neurons that fire in response to reward, firing faster for higher reward.
In an associative account of basic TI, stimulus a might come to be associated
with high levels of reward-neuron firing, b with medium levels and c with
low-levels or none. This is associative in the sense that choosing a over
c could be explained only by the higher reward value associated with a,
without requiring explicit representation of a relation between a and c.
In order to address this problem, the training series can be extended
to a>b>c>d>e. Now, both b and d are rewarded 50% of the time and not
rewarded 50% of the time, so an animal’s choosing b over d in this situation
seems to be better evidence for the cognitive accounts. However, Value
Transfer Theory (von Fersen et al., 1991) argues that, because b is seen with
highly-rewarded a half the time while d is seen with sometimes-rewarded c,
higher reward-neuron firing due to a can transfer to simultaneously perceived
b; less transfer happens from c to d.
Such an interpretation is borne out by an experiment in Zentall and
Sherburne (1994). Here, pigeons were trained on pairs a+b− and c±d−, but
not on b+c−. Neither b nor d were ever rewarded, but a was always re-
warded and c was rewarded only half the time. Neither b nor d would have
any reward value on their own, but according to Value Transfer Theory, b
could derive some reward value from its perceptual association with always-
rewarded a while d would derive less reward value from its association with
sometimes-rewarded c. When tested with b?d, the pigeons chose b signifi-
cantly more often. There was no relationship between b and c in training,
so no inference about the relationship between b and d is possible. The
associative account is thus a potential explanation of TI in pigeons, since
TI-like behaviour can be produced without any representation of the series
as a whole. However, since the pigeons in Zentall and Sherburne (1994)
didn’t choose b at test as often as those in a straightforward five-item task
did (von Fersen et al., 1991) — 64.6% vs 87.5%, respectively — a cognitive
explanation cannot be ruled out entirely.
The length of the series could be increased still further to decide the
matter, but training animals on series of arbitrary stimuli is extremely dif-
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ficult, so this has its limits. Allen (2006) argues that such limitations in
methodology have brought the question of whether TI is associative or cog-
nitive to an impasse. This is problematic for my project since I argue that
the evolution of symbols is intimately connected with the evolution of in-
ference. If the best data currently available cannot provide uncontroversial
answers about the evolution of inference, given this impasse, then how we
crossed the symbolic threshold is obscured. However, I believe my definition
of inference, based in turn on Dretske’s minimal rationality, offers a way
out by making a somewhat counter-intuitive prediction about what should
happen at various points along the series a>b>c>d>e.
Assume, per an associative account, that a is associated with high levels
of reward-neuron firing. Choosing a is always rational, no matter what other
stimuli are present. Choosing e is never rational. No similar claim can be
made about b, though: the rationality of choosing b depends on whether
it’s perceived with a or c. That is, deciding the rationality of choosing b
needs contextual information, unlike a or e. Thus, I would have to claim
that choosing a and not-choosing e is minimally rational, but choosing b, c
or d is inferential. Dusek and Eichenbaum (1997) and Greene et al. (2006)
acknowledge a distinction between terminal and non-terminal pairs, though
they call the former ‘associative’ and the latter ‘inferential’ while I call the
former ‘minimally rational’. The difference is that I base my definition of the
latter on the former, while they seem to treat them as distinct phenomena.
If some kind of cognitive account is true, we would thus expect qualitative
behavioural or neurological differences between terminal and non-terminal
elements of the series according to my definition of inference. If the asso-
ciative account is true, on the other hand, we would merely expect graded
quantitative differences.
2.4.3 Neurological and behavioural evidence in humans and
rats
Greene et al. (2006) trained human subjects on a 5-element TI task. Most
subjects managed to learn the pair-wise relationships, though pairs involving
a terminal element (a+b−, d+e−) were easier (involving lower error rates and
latencies) than inner pairs (b+c−, c+d−), so some subjects failed to learn
one of the latter. Subjects were then tested on novel inference pair b?d and
novel non-inference pair a?e. Subjects were much more successful at the
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latter than the former. Those who managed to respond correctly to the
former are called BD-performers.
The authors found that the hippocampus was more active during the
testing phase for central (i.e. inferential) pairs than for terminal (i.e. ra-
tional) ones. Further, hippocampus activity at training was an accurate
predictor of who would probably turn out to be BD-performers at test and
who wouldn’t. There are thus both behavioural and neurological differences
between tasks that I have labelled ‘inferential’ and those that are merely
‘minimally rational’, suggesting that they are qualitatively different cogni-
tive processes.
Dusek and Eichenbaum (1997) conducted an experiment with rats where,
instead of arbitrary visual stimuli, a 5-element TI series involved scents arbi-
trarily grouped into reward/no-reward pairs such that, for example, paprika
was rewarded over coffee but coffee was rewarded over basil. Their con-
trol group was neurologically intact, while their experimental groups had
various types of surgery disconnecting the hippocampus from its surround-
ings. Both groups succeeded at trained-pair discrimination tasks and at
novel terminal-pair (i.e. minimally rational) discrimination tasks, but only
the control group succeeded above chance at novel non-terminal-pair (i.e.
inferential) discrimination tasks.
So if we shift the focus from testing whether the whole series is rep-
resented (which is how Allen, 2006, described it above) to testing whether
there are cognitive differences between terminal and non-terminal pairs, we
may be able to support a cognitive over the associative account of TI for
rats. Greene et al. (2006) skirt around this issue by noting with interest that
the hippocampus seems to have a dual role, being involved in both contex-
tual tasks and inferential tasks. They go as far as saying that these types of
task (contextual and inferential) are related, but stop short of claiming that
inferential tasks are just tasks where the representation of contextual infor-
mation must play a role in explaining behaviour10, whereas I argue that the
one is based on the other, and my definition of inference is thus supported
by neurological evidence.
Apart from suggesting one way out of the experimental stalemate iden-
10Their definition of inference is this: ‘the capacity to make novel decisions on the basis
of relevant prior experience, whether by syllogism (e.g., chaining) or by comparative value
(e.g., taller, further east)’ (Greene et al., 2006, 1157).
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tified by Allen (2006), the discussion here is intended to show that context
is central to the notion of inference. Traditionally, when it comes to human
inference about symbols, the focus has been on features such as ToM, higher-
order cognition, joint attention or co-operation (Tomasello, 1999; Hurford,
2007; Fitch, 2010), and I simply wish to add context to the mix. In that
case, the nature of this context should be a centrally important way of evalu-
ating inferential complexity and thus differences between human and animal
inference, relative to symbolic communication. I had earlier emphasised the
distinction between context-bound inference and context-deciding inference
in my definition of ‘symbol’ (§1.5.3), and now turn to look more closely at
this distinction.
2.5 Complex Inference
TI is a comparatively simple form of inference, and inference could be made
more complex in a number of ways. I first look at a couple of these ways by
discussing examples of animal behaviour that seem to require more complex
inference (§2.5.1). I then narrow in on the question of whether the context
is given prior to inference or decided as part of the inference (§2.5.2).
2.5.1 Examples of complex behaviour
In the context of language evolution and inference, one focus of the dis-
cussion of cognitive complexity in Hurford (2007) and the central focus
in Penn et al. (2008) is higher-order representations and the relations be-
tween them. Some animals can make similarity judgements (Premack and
Premack, 1983), responding to stimulus a by picking a further a instead of
b (a same/different or S/D task). Chimpanzees can perform a higher-order
S/D task (Premack and Premack, 1983): if presented with a pair of stimuli
a/a they can pick out another pair with the same relationship b/b over a
pair with a different relationship c/d. If presented with differing stimuli
e/f, they can pick out differing pair g/h rather than same pair i/i11.
A study with macaques (Washburn et al., 1997) found that, though they
could respond this way to trained pairs, they could not generalise this be-
haviour to new pairs. D’Amato and Colombo (1985) showed that capuchins
11Hurford notes, though, that these chimpanzee subjects, though not language trained,
had been previously trained on the concepts same and different.
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can generalise to a limited extent. Even more pessimistically, Penn et al.
(2008) are dismissive of claims of higher-order relational cognition in other
animals, claiming that apparent evidence of higher-order S/D behaviour can
be explained by non-relational cognition, such as evaluating the degree of in-
formational entropy in same and different pairs. They extend this criticism
to other forms of higher-order relational thinking, such as analogy.
So human are exceptionally good at higher-order relations and either an-
imals are less successful at these tasks (the optimistic interpretation) or they
do not solve the tasks with anything like higher-order relational cognition
(the pessimistic interpretation)12.
But proficiency at higher-order relationships is not the only difference
between humans and other animals, so this is not necessarily the best way
of distinguishing human from animal inference with respect to symbol learn-
ing. Chimpanzees can be taught higher-order relations and can be taught
symbols, but just how they must be trained is itself interesting. I will
look briefly at the interpretation in Deacon (1997) of symbol learning ex-
periments in Savage-Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh (1978); Savage-Rumbaugh
et al. (1978); and Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). After presenting his dis-
cussion of these experiments, I will highlight the role that context plays in
addition to higher-order relationships. Context has not been a focus in the
literature on language evolution.
Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues performed a series of experiments in-
volving chimpanzees Lana, Austin and Sherman, among others. All the
chimpanzees were trained on paired associations between objects or events
and lexigrams, which might be described by a human as arbitrary symbols
on a keyboard, though a central question in the above articles is whether
they were in fact symbolic for the chimps. Fig. 2.6, for instance, is the lexi-
gram representing Sue Savage-Rumbaugh. Because they count as stimuli, I
will use typewriter style to distinguish lexigrams from their referents.
While Lana’s training focused on these paired associations, Sherman
and Austin’s training was different from hers in two important ways. In
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978), Sherman and Austin were trained on com-
municative tasks with one ape using lexigrams to inform the other of the
12I should hope that an optimistic interpretation makes room for the occasional animal
genius. One such oddity is the ability of a parrot, Alex, to make sophisticated higher-order
judgements, not only about sameness and difference, but also whether it is the colour or
shape of a set of objects that is same or different (Pepperberg, 2000).
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Figure 2.6: Lexigram representing Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sue Savage-Rumbaugh).
contents of a food-baited closed container, while the second chimp then used
the same lexigrams to request the appropriate food from the experimenter,
who opened the container and shared out the food if the second chimp was
correct.
In Savage-Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh (1978), Sherman and Austin were
trained to concatenate lexigrams (including give, pour, banana and juice)
into verb-object pairs: in training, give preceded solid foods and pour pre-
ceded liquids. However, they were not reliably able to use give to request
a banana or pour to request juice. Despite their training they would some-
times type incorrect strings such as pour banana or give banana juice, or
would just use a previously trained string regardless of the current situation.
They were then trained on particular associations and cross-associations:
they were allowed to type give banana, give juice, pour banana and pour
juice, but only the semantically coherent pairs (e.g. pour juice) were re-
warded. The others (e.g. pour banana) were explicitly not rewarded: the
foods were in different dispensers and if they typed an incorrect string, a
buzzer drew their attention to the appropriate dispenser so they could see
it operating but failing to produce the incorrectly requested item. That is,
the lack of a reward was made salient to them.
After this explicit negative cross-associative training, the chimps were
then able to use these pairs correctly, disregarding the other possible ordered
pairs. They were also able to produce correct strings to request novel items,
whose lexigrams they were familiar with, but which were not used in the
above training. While the initial training took a long time, once they had
become successful at these tasks, they quickly responded to these novel items
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correctly.
The difference this made to the symbolic abilities of Sherman and Austin
(as opposed to Lana, who hadn’t undergone this training) was demonstrated
in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). All three chimpanzees were trained to
put three food items into one box and three tools (i.e. inedible things) into
another. Lana was then able to generalise by putting novel food items
and tools into the appropriate boxes but she failed at a further task where
Sherman and Austin succeeded. The three chimps were trained to press
lexigrams food and tool in response to the original sets of three items and
all three succeeded. But while Sherman and Austin were then quickly able
to generalise these lexigrams to novel tools and food items, Lana was not.
Deacon’s interpretation of these successes and failures (which he admits
is speculative) is as follows. He argues that Sherman’s and Austin’s training
with verb-object pairs of lexigrams caused them to reorganise their rep-
resentations of the events. The explicit positive and negative feedback in
associational and cross-associational training led them to discover relation-
ships between representations (call these R-R relationships) in addition to
the previously trained associations between representations and the world
(R-W relationships). Subsequently, he claims that these R-R relationships
came to dominate the R-W associations from earlier training13. Once R-R
relationships dominate (i.e. once the chimpanzees’ understanding of events
and lexigrams are recoded in R-R rather than R-W terms), Deacon claims
Sherman and Austin are using the lexigrams symbolically. He argues it
is because they have crossed the symbolic threshold that they are able to
succeed where Lana failed at the novel food vs tool task described above.
He points out that this restructuring is not due to anything directly
perceivable; nor is it explicitly learned. Rather, he says, it is discovered in
a moment of insight. He mentions anecdotal evidence from Köhler (1927)
of insight problem solving in chimpanzees. For instance, Köhler describes
a chimpanzee trying to get at a banana suspended from the ceiling. A
number of boxes were available, and the chimpanzee tried stacking them at
random places in the room and climbing on them, but apparently didn’t
see how the boxes would help it achieve its goal. At a later stage, however,
an R-R connection was formed (consistent with much insight research, for
13He suggests that this step happens because it offers an effective and efficient structure
for further learning since it saves effort and storage capacity.
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which see §3.5.2) between the chimpanzee’s representations of the boxes
and its banana-retrieving goal, at which point it stacked the boxes up in the
appropriate place, climbed them, and retrieved its reward.
Returning to the features that prompted this detour (higher-order rela-
tional cognition and context), Deacon describes Sherman and Austin’s for-
mation of R-R relationships as involving higher-order inference: they solved
the problem by forming an explicit connection between representation give
and representation banana and by disassociating give from juice. This
feature makes their behaviour similar to the higher-order S/D task described
above. Penn et al. (2008) explicitly frame the difference between human and
animal cognition in terms of such higher-order R-R relationships.
But another feature underlying animal success in inference is the extent
to which experimenters constrain the context in training or make relevant in-
formation salient. In Savage-Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh (1978), for instance,
a buzzer was used to draw the chimps’ attention to a dispenser failing to
produce an item requested with an incorrect string. The negative effects of
their actions were thus made salient to them. Further, the lexigrams were
positioned on a 3 × 8 matrix, but only the subset of these 24 relevant to a
particular task were backlit in training. Indeed, in earlier training of the
R-W relationships, just one lexigram was backlit for a round of training,
then two, then three, etc. The experimenters note ‘[t]he chimpanzees do not
necessarily attend to the dimensions of the environment which the experi-
menter deems salient’ (1978, 289), so this constraint plays an important role
in the chimpanzee symbol learning, whereas I argued that human symbol
learning requires salience-deciding inference (§1.5.3).
Inference can involve higher-order relationships, but just which relation-
ships turn out to be relevant (i.e. the context) is something that can be
constrained or made salient by experimenters or by evolution. Sherman and
Austin were unable to solve the R-R task until the relevant relationships
were made salient (or the context was constrained) by experimenters. On
the other hand, evolution made kin part of the relevant context of leop-
ard for vervet monkeys. While the pitch of a male toad’s call is salient to
a female toad, the pitch of a leopard’s growl isn’t salient to a vervet mon-
key. In other words, evolution has solved the problem of relevance in vervet
alarm calls. Penn et al. (2008) similarly emphasise that evolution constrains
salience. While it seems that corvids such as rooks are capable of flexible
96 CHAPTER 2. AN INFERENTIAL HIERARCHY
behaviour in novel situations, they argue that:
Rooks, like other nonhuman animals, appear to solve tool-use
problems based on evolved, domain-specific expectations about
what perceptual features are likely to be most salient in a given
context and a general ability to reason about the causal relation
between observable contingencies in a flexible, goal-directed but
task-specific fashion. (Penn et al., 2008, 119)
In situations such as symbolic communication, on the other hand, the rel-
evant context is often left comparatively unconstrained or lacking in salience.
Since I argued that unconstrained contexts are typical of pragmatic infer-
ence in §1.5.2, and given that context is built into my definition of inference
above, I propose that minimal inference involves highly constrained contexts
while more complex forms of inference involve comparatively unconstrained
contexts. As mentioned in §2.1, I am not arguing for a saltationist view,
though, so I assume there is a continuum between highly constrained and
comparatively unconstrained inferences (fig. 2.7).
Figure 2.7: The inferential hierarchy updated to reflect the fact that comparatively more
species are capable of contextually simple inference and very few capable of contextually
complex inference (perhaps, just our pre-linguistic ancestors). Compared to minimal
rationality, very few species are capable of inference at all.
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2.5.2 Contextually unconstrained inference
This is going to be a difficult section: it’s not a question that anybody has
addressed directly with regard to the evolution of cognition, as far as I can
tell. I do provide empirical support for the basic claim here in chs. 5 and 6,
but the discussion for now will be more a matter of sketching out the corners
of the ballpark. First, I will compare our starting point (TI) with our end-
point (pragmatic inference) to spell out how context is constrained in the
former and unconstrained in the latter (§2.5.2.1). Secondly, I will support my
claims by looking at a range of experimental designs and animal behaviours,
focusing on the extent to which constraint makes a problem easier and lack
of constraint makes it harder, suggesting that the latter inferences are more
complex (§2.5.2.2).
However, since I have admitted that this is why I set up the definition of
inference in the first place (though I did provide support for it at the time),
I have to provide independent reasons for making such a claim. So the third
tactic will be to look (briefly) at the frame problem, which underscores the
computational problem of unconstrained contexts, but which hasn’t (again,
as far as I know) been used to distinguish between stages in the evolution of
inference (§2.5.2.3). Just to repeat: I claimed in ch. 1 that context, salience
and relevance are all interrelated, so I will occasional switch from one to the
other.
2.5.2.1 Starting points and end points: transitive and pragmatic
inference
In the TI examples discussed above, choosing non-terminal elements (b,
c and d) at test depended on contextual information, but this contextual
constraint was provided by the training: b was only paired with a and
c. Choosing b over d at test involves expanding this context by one step,
determined at training by presentation of c with d. So context is limited in
a number of ways here:
1. Size of series: 5
2. Maximum distance between non-terminal elements: 3
3. Maximum elements associated with each element in training: 2
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4. Increase in context size by advancing one algorithmic step: 1
Regardless which of these is the best measure of context size, they are all
quite small, so this is quite simple contextually. I would like to focus briefly
on (4), though. In order to provide a clear comparison with pragmatic
inference, let’s treat b and d like utterances in a dialogue, as between Peter
and Mary in ch. 1. Peter says b and then wants to understand how Mary’s
response d is relevant to b. According to Relevance Theory, the interpretive
module (IM) first derives implications from the initial utterance b, which
would load two assumptions (a+b− and b+c−) into its memory.
The next step is for the IM to retrieve assumptions related to either a
or c, but just which one depends is retrieved first depends on accessibility.
I have no idea just how that would be evaluated in this case, but let’s
say that whichever was seen most recently with b in training is the most
accessible, since they would both have been seen an equal number of times.
So it could be either, but let’s imagine a turns out to be more accessible.
If the IM unpacks assumptions connected to a, it finds nothing of relevance
since stimulus a is terminal and representation a only includes redundant
information a+b−, which is already in working memory.
This subroutine terminates at this point and returns to the previous
step to retrieve assumptions from the only other alternative: c. Unpacking
this involves retrieving whichever is most accessible of the two assumptions
associated with c: b+c− or c+d−. The former is redundant and does not
count as a cognitive benefit; the latter achieves relevance, and the process
terminates14.
This highlights two important differences between transitive and prag-
matic inference. First, the TI context only increases linearly: at each step,
the IM has two contextual assumptions that could potentially be added to
its memory, but one of these is redundant, so only one new assumption is
added to the IM’s memory. The process repeats, adding one new assumption
at each step, until it achieves relevance or reaches a terminal element.
To compare this with pragmatic inference, assume for the sake of sim-
plicity that, in an imaginary language, each retrieved assumption uniformly
14I am not suggesting that this is how anyone solves a TI task, but I think one positive
feature is that this doesn’t require a single representation of the entire series a>b>c>d>e.
I was never particularly attached to that aspect of the cognitive account anyway: my
definition of inference did not require such a unified representation for a cognitive account
to be true.
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allows access to α further non-redundant assumptions15. So for instance, if
α = 3, assumptions associated with b include b+c′−, b+c′′− and b+c′′′−;
assumptions for c′ include c′+d′−, c′+d′′− and c′+d′′′− (as well as redun-
dant b+c′−). Then, if s represents the number of algorithmic steps taken
and C the amount by which the context size increases at time step s, then
C = αs. The TI context increases linearly, then, because in that case α = 1,
while pragmatic inference involves an exponential expansion, which is clearly
more complex, and in the long-run may even be computationally intractable
(Blokpoel et al., 2011).
The second important difference is that TI has a stopping mechanism
apart from the achievement of relevance: terminal elements. If reached,
these will terminate any subsearch, returning to the previous step to search
for other, less accessible assumptions. In the TI example above, this hap-
pened when it turned out that a didn’t achieve relevance. It thus does not
suffer from Fodor’s Hamlet problem (§1.5.2.2). Further, because of these
terminal elements, s ≤ 3, which could potentially keep even an exponen-
tially increasing series constrained, but no such check exists in pragmatic
inference.
True, C is the maximum size of the increase in context. If the inter-
preter’s representations happened to be arranged such that, at each step,
the most accessible assumption was the one guaranteed to lead towards rel-
evance, then the problem becomes greatly simplified. However, this is not
guaranteed, and even if it were, the IM as described by Sperber and Wil-
son (1995) wouldn’t know this ahead of time: it is the nature of pragmatic
inference to be context-deciding rather than context-constrained. Anyway,
I review evidence in §2.6 below and present experimental evidence in ch. 6
showing that there is in fact a cognitive difference between situations where
the relevant interpretation just happens to be the most accessible, and those
where relevance is less predictable.
So, though I have shown that inference is needed for symbol evolution
and that some animals are capable of transitive inference, we cannot simply
claim that some animals are capable of inference and leave it there. My
point here is that the degree of contextual constraint is a major difference
15This is meant to parallel how ossobuco above could lead to retrieval of assumptions
such as ossobuco is from Milan, ossobuco is made from veal, ossobuco is a
main-course (ch. 1 fig. 1.9). If these are the only three assumptions, then α = 3.
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between simpler and more complex forms of inference, in addition to higher-
order relational cognition. For the remainder of this section, then, I will look
in more detail at just how and to what degree some other animal and human
inferences are constrained in this way (§2.5.2.2), and whether a lack of such
constraint makes the problem more complex computationally (§2.5.2.3).
2.5.2.2 Context constrained by experimental design
In the first-order S/D tasks, subjects are required to evaluate relationships
between one sample and just two visually distinct possible matches, one of
which was perceptually identical to the target and the other perceptually
quite different. As with TI, then, experimental design is one way of lim-
iting the context. In this case it not only constrains the context to two
alternatives, but also makes the relevant features perceptually salient.
Compare the S/D task with a more open-ended similarity task. Would
you say that George Clooney and Chuck Norris are similar? The answer,
surely, is, ‘Well, sort of, I guess. It depends, but not really.’ If the context
includes Alice Walker and Toni Morrison, then I imagine you would consider
Clooney and Norris quite similar in that they are both white male actors.
On the other hand, if the context was Jean-Claude Van Damme and Steven
Seagal, you might be less inclined to consider the first pair similar (they
are all white male actors, but Clooney is the only one who doesn’t star in
martial arts films).
It probably wouldn’t occur to you, unless you were forced to sit down
and write extensive lists, that American is not a relevant feature (they are
all American) or that intellectual could be: I think I would be more
likely to represent award-winning writers as being intellectual, compared to
martial-arts film stars. In the TI case, there was only one relevant feature:
the rewarded-more-than property. In the S/D task, there was only the
question of perceptual similarity. But here, just which feature counts as
relevant is itself context-dependant. This detour is intended to illustrate the
fact that context size is not merely a matter of counting entities: just which
features count as relevant is left rather open-ended here, while experimental
design tends to make these salient to some degree.
Back to the question of experimental design, then. Savage-Rumbaugh
and Rumbaugh (1978) used a buzzer to draw chimpanzees’ attention to a
vending machine failing to produce a reward. They also backlit a small sub-
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set of possible lexigrams so that specific pairs of just four keys (give, pour,
banana and juice) could be trained. In semiotic terms, both representa-
mens and objects were made salient by the experiment design. That the
chimpanzees managed to form higher-order relations between the relevant
representations is impressive, but just which representations were the rele-
vant ones was decided and indicated by the experiment design. In this case,
the problem turned out to be unsolvable by chimps without this limitation,
so contextual constraint may underlie those few cases were animals achieve
higher-order relational cognition.
Moving to a non-linguistic context, Roberts et al. (2000) manipulate vi-
sual salience in tests of inference. Their central question is the extent to
which inferential processes are domain-free or domain-specific, but their ex-
periment involves comparing success at inference problems that are logically
equivalent, but couched in differing visual stimuli. I will assume here that
lower success rates are an indicator of inferential complexity.
Their experiment is a response to Richardson (1991), who compared
low rates of success at comparatively abstract tasks called Raven’s Progres-
sive Matrices (fig. 2.8) with higher rates of success at less abstract, socio-
cognitive16 versions of the same tasks (fig. 2.9). Richardson (1991) had found
that children performed better at the socio-cognitive tasks, despite their log-
ical equivalence to the abstract original. He concluded, therefore, that the
children had access to domain-specific schema-supported forms of inference
in the socio-cognitive tests, while these were lacking in the abstract ones.
Roberts et al. (2000) argued, however, that Richardson’s tests are not
simply domain-free and domain-specific versions of the same task. Rather,
Richardson’s socio-cognitive condition made certain features of the task
more salient in two ways: it manipulated visual salience and provided ver-
bal direction of attention. The instructions in the socio-cognitive tasks, for
instance, involved a commentary that framed the pictures with a recognised
schema such as, in this case, people departing. The original pictures, on
the other hand, involved novel figures superimposed on one another, so that
it was not necessarily clear just what counted as an element. Further, no
identifying schema was prompted by the instructions in this condition.
Consequently, Roberts et al. (2000) replicated these tests with a fur-
ther variation: an abstract task, but with a particular feature made salient
16‘Socio-cognitive’ is Richardson’s term for the more real-life example in fig. 2.9.
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Figure 2.8: Raven’s task E5. The 3-by-3 matrix at the top is the test: fill in the lower
right gap; the eight options below are possible answers. In this case, the third element of
a row or column is what remains after the features in the second element are subtracted
from those in the first so the answer is 1 (Roberts et al., 2000).
Figure 2.9: Socio-cognitive adaptation of Raven’s task E5: the problem here is framed in
terms of people leaving and others remaining behind (Richardson, 1991).
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(fig. 2.10). They found that children did as well at the salient abstract tasks
as they did at the socio-cognitive one, meaning that the results in Richardson
(1991) were not due to domain-specific inference. More importantly for my
purposes, their experiment demonstrates that manipulating visual salience
in experimental design (making it clearer which features are relevant) has
an effect on the complexity of the inference. All these tasks involve higher-
order relational cognition, so that cannot be the sole criterion for inferential
complexity.
Figure 2.10: Abstract, salient version of task E5: the only difference between elements is
colour (Roberts et al., 2000).
Perceptual salience is not the only common way in which experiment
design constrains context, though. The following example does not address
the question of how complex an inferential problem is, but demonstrates a
way of constraining context non-perceptualy.
Lee and Holyoak (2008) investigated the relationship between causal in-
ference and analogy by presenting subjects with a source (a description of
an animal with three properties and a possible effect caused by or prevented
by those properties) and a target (a description of another animal sharing
all or some of the same properties). The experiment tested subjects’ abil-
ity to make causal inferences about the target based on analogies between
source and target. Unlike the open-ended Clooney-Norris example, here
the relevant features involved in cause and effect relationships are explicitly
given.
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A source animal might be described as having enzyme aliesterase, neu-
rotransmitter tyrosine, hormone TSH and exceptional hearing. The par-
ticipants are also told that aliesterase and tyrosine cause exceptional hear-
ing while TSH prevents it. A target animal might be described as having
aliesterase and TSH, leaving subjects to infer how likely it is that the target
has exceptional hearing. The analogy part of this experiment is a bit like
asking, ‘To what extent are George Clooney and Chuck Norris similar, in as
far as they are both white, male, actors?’ The subsequent, causal-inference
part of the experiment is thus limited to a small set of features made rel-
evant by the experimental design. This experiment is typical of a large
family of what might be called inductive accounts, and other examples will
be explored in ch. 3 where I highlight the distinction between unconstrained
hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation.
But to address the question of complexity and to return to language,
let’s consider claims by Medina et al. (2011), who contrast contexts for re-
alistic language learning with approaches typical of inductive experiments
(fig. 2.11 a and b, respectively). They highlight the fact that realistic lan-
guage learning involves contextual uncertainty while experimental approaches
often involve small contexts with objects salient against neutral backgrounds
(the shoe in fig. 2.11 b is hardly visible in a: it is directly in front of the baby).
They stress that larger contexts (or hypothesis spaces) place immense bur-
dens on cognition and show experimentally that subjects are less successful
at word learning in larger contexts, noting that statistical models tend to be
successful only because they involve artificially constrained contexts. This
supports my central claim here that context is a major factor in evaluating
inferential complexity.
Medina et al. speculate that ‘learners may have implicit means for dis-
tinguishing between more and less useful contexts, discarding some input
without its entering into the search for meaning’ (Medina et al., 2011, 2).
That is, context-deciding inference may play a role in generating a reduced
hypothesis space before statistical hypothesis evaluation mechanisms can
function effectively, which again turns our focus to hypothesis generation. I
offer a concrete proposal concerning this speculation in ch. 3.
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Figure 2.11: a — realistic language learning task; b — typical inductive language learning
task (Medina et al., 2011).
2.5.2.3 Computation
Since I purposefully built context into my definition of inference, I should
also provide some independent justification for the claim that context mat-
ters. It turns out it matters hugely to computational theories of mind. The
Frame Problem (FP) is actually a set of problems with, at best, family
resemblance. It originated as a problem in AI but has since expanded to
include various philosophical and cognitive mysteries. This is not the place
to give a history or full description, so just a rough outline will have to do.
The original FP was a computational problem: how to formally specify
what is and what is not affected by a change to some part of a description
of a system of entities and events (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969). One might
assume that moving an object does not change its colour, but as soon as
one attempts to formalise this assumption, one runs into the problem of
having to formalise all assumptions about the various features not changed
by movement. If there are many assumptions, or many features that might
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change, this quickly becomes a difficult computation. And what happens if
the object is moved into a bucket of paint? Exceptions to the assumptions
would then have to be formally represented, adding up to an awful lot of
representation. The original problem is a matter of how such assumptions
are represented and what formal logics handle them, then.
But the FP was taken over by philosophers as indicative of deeper issues
in cognition more generally. Dennett (1978), for instance, phrased it in
terms of how an organism comes to update (some) beliefs it has about the
world so that its representations remain accurate descriptions of the world.
That is, how are these processes truth-preserving? Or what degree of belief
in something would be optimally rational? In particular, how does cognition
determine which beliefs should be updated when new information is learned,
without having to check the status of all beliefs in memory? This is where
we run into the Hamlet problem (when to stop thinking, Fodor, 1987). It
is also where we run into features invoked in attempts to avoid or simplify
the FP. These include relevance (Shanahan, 2009; Xu and Wang, 2012). If
the system included specifications of just which beliefs are relevant to an
update, then the FP would go away. But this would provoke a regress:
how would the system know what’s relevant? Relevance turns out to be
context-dependant (Shanahan, 2009).
My central claim in this section is that degree of contextual constraint
distinguishes minimal inference from more complex sorts, such as the prag-
matic kind needed to cross the symbolic threshold. The central claim of
this subsection, then, is simple: the fact that contextually unconstrained
inference potentially engages the FP means that it is more complex than
minimal inference. Chiappe and Kukla (1996) apply these Fodorian wor-
ries to pragmatic inference, arguing that it runs into the FP because it is
context-deciding. So a secondary point in this subsection is to explore the
source of the disagreement, and suggest a particular kind of compromise be-
tween these Fodorian worries and Sperber and Wilson’s version of pragmatic
inference.
Recall the distinction between a rationalist and empiricist psychology
(§2.2.3, §2.3). A rationalist psychology maintains that cognition is norma-
tive (either truth-preserving, or at least able to estimate what degree of
belief in a proposition would be optimally rational) and syntactic (sensi-
tive to formal or logical features of a representation, not its content). An
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empiricist psychology maintains that cognition is associationist, but makes
no assumption of normativity. The problem arises because Sperber and
Wilson’s description of pragmatic inference, if taken as an algorithmic-level
account, blends features from both a rationalist and empiricist psychology
in a particular way that engages the Frame Problem. I mentioned the pos-
sibility of dual-process models (§2.2.3), but the intention was to allow that
both processes operate in a complementary fashion, not that a single hybrid
process combine aspects of both. The solution I’ll end up proposing is that
Sperber and Wilson should abandon the idea that pragmatic inference is
deductive.
The FP is a matter for a rationalist psychology because it concerns nor-
mativity. I grant that many cognitive processes are normative, but Sperber
and Wilson (1996) explicitly state that pragmatic inference is not one of
them: its conclusions are not justified or valid, but must rather be judged by
their success or efficiency. Accessibility plays an important role in pragmatic
inference: the more accessible an assumption, the sooner it is retrieved. Rel-
evance is not directly represented in their account: it is the outcome of the
interpretive process, not a value to be computed by that process. Rele-
vance in their terms involves maximising cognitive benefit while minimising
cost. Accessibility is a matter of processing cost, which means it is built
into the foundations of relevance. Accessibility is a matter of an empiricist
psychology, so the same must be true of relevance in so far as it rests on
accessibility. Though Fodor considers it a major failing to have recourse to
an empiricist psychology, I gave reasons why most of his objections do not
extend to minimal rationality and thus to inference in my terms (§2.3, see
also ch. 3 below). It would seem that there is no problem, then: claiming
that relevance theory runs afoul of the FP simply misunderstands the nature
of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1996).
However, there is a hole in this defence of pragmatic inference. Sperber
and Wilson allow it to be non-deductive overall, and do mention that there
are some mysterious, creative kinds of inference out there, but they still
want the core of interpretation to be deductive. Deduction is a prototyp-
ically syntactic process. While they reject the normative assumption of a
rationalist psychology, they thus retain the syntactic assumption. Depend-
ing on just how much explanatory burden is shouldered by deduction, this
may still allow the FP to sneak in. My criticism of the ossobuco example in
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§1.5.2.2 centred on just this point. Their description of overall relevance can
decide whether an utterance was going to be attended to or not (i.e. whether
cognitive resources were going to be spent on interpreting an utterance or
not), so it can control whether interpretation as a whole proceeds or stops.
But then they shift to deduction and describe the actual process of retriev-
ing assumptions as happening in a formally rigorous, sequential, mechanical
fashion. Allott (2013) highlights the mechanical nature of hypothesis gen-
eration in their account and stresses that they assume a CTM. In §1.5.2.2
I pointed out that this is what ran into the Hamlet problem: it couldn’t
control the algorithmic flow of that process, and thus couldn’t explain why
exploration of assumptions associated with Milan could ever be abandoned
to return to less accessibly assumptions associated with ossobuco.
If deduction bears any explanatory weight in pragmatic inference at the
algorithmic level (that is, if the deductive process is what explains how Peter
ended up understanding Mary) then pragmatic inference still succumbs to
the FP. If on the other hand, Sperber and Wilson accept that their deductive
account is a computational-level, simplified model of the process and that
there must be some non-deductive inference at the algorithmic level17, then
pragmatic inference can avoid the FP. I’ll go on to argue that this inferential
process should take seriously the commitment to an empiricist psychology
brought in by basing relevance on accessibility. In other words, rather than
a non-normative yet syntactic process, I’ll argue that relevance is handled by
a non-normative associationist process, and thus an empiricist psychology.
This will make sense of a number of terms introduced previously, such as
insight or creativity.
As previously suggested, Sperber and Wilson’s tactic of claiming that
our interlocutors are helpful and that they try to be relevant may work to
avoid the FP in certain cases where context is artificially constrained and
may occasionally work by chance in unconstrained contexts, but this won’t
help at the symbolic threshold, where all attempts to direct attention (or
make features of the object salient, or otherwise constrain context) are not
conventional and are thus themselves matters to be inferred. Sperber and
Wilson (2002) eventually abandon the idea of a global (i.e. non-modular)
17They make vague allowances for the existence of these in general, but manage to
avoid them entirely in all worked examples of interpretation. I’m simply saying that non-
deductive inference should be in the spotlight, or at least share the spotlight, particularly
at the symbolic threshold.
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interpretive process (which it had been in Sperber and Wilson, 1995) and
propose a submodule within a Theory of Mind module that carries out
pragmatic inference. This move was partly motivated by the above Fodorian
problems since modules are one way of constricting context (Fodor, 2001),
but again this won’t help with evolution. A module, the purpose of which is
to interpret language, cannot explain how a pre-linguistic species managed
to infer the meaning of the first symbols, given that these required pragmatic
inference (§1.5.2.3).
Fodor (2001) is sceptical about the whole idea that appealing to modules
can solve the FP because some processes are inherently global. His tactic
is to say that such contextually unconstrained problems simply cannot be
computed, that they are thus not explicable by a CTM, and that he doesn’t
know what to do about all this since he doesn’t like the alternative (an
empiricist psychology). Which at least is honest. Anyhow, my response to
the disagreement between Fodor and Sperber and Wilson has suggested that
pragmatic inference should be rendered an empiricist process, though other
cognitive processes can still be rationalist. Minimal rationality is empiricist,
reasoning is rationalist (probably, but reasoning falls outside of the scope
of this dissertation), but inference is mixed. Just how this mixed approach
is supposed to work depends on the relationship between abduction and
induction in the following chapter.
For now, though, I should point out that such a mixed design is not
unusual for those cognitive scientists interested in the origins of human in-
telligence or in comparisons between human and non-human intelligence.
Harnad (1990) argues that it is needed to solve the symbol grounding prob-
lem18. Penn et al. (2008) argue that a purely connectionist account can-
not explain humans’ advanced higher-order relational cognition, but that a
purely syntactic account cannot account for animals’ failure to make sys-
tematic inferences, and that a mixed system is thus needed19.
The main conclusion here was that a distinction between contextually
constrained and unconstrained inference is justified by a consideration of the
Frame Problem. A secondary conclusion was that, regardless of whether one
18This is a matter of private, not public symbols, though, which is why I haven’t explored
it here.
19Though not equivalent to ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist’, their terms ‘computational’
and ‘connectionist’ split the playing field along similar lines; what’s missing is explicit
reference to normativity or the lack thereof.
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leans more towards Fodor or to Sperber and Wilson, since hypothesis gener-
ation in pragmatic inference (and thus symbol origins) is context-deciding,
it seems to be either very, very difficult computationally or, instead of being
syntatically computational at all, could be a matter for an empiricist psy-
chology, more concerned with causal relationships between representations.
Sperber and Wilson claim that they escape the FP because relevance is not
computed, that accessibility plays a major role, and that interpretation is
not normative, so it seems self-defeating to nonetheless insist on deduction.
The next chapter looks more closely at why some context-deciding infer-
ence needn’t assume normativity; the following section looks at evidence for
context-deciding processes in human brains.
2.6 Neurological and behavioural evidence
Questions of computation can be quite abstract, whereas my central question
needs, at least potentially, to be relatable to the evolution of actual brains.
This section thus reviews evidence showing that there are observable be-
havioural and neurological differences in how humans process constrained
and unconstained inferences, especially in pragmatic interpretation. The
upshot is that humans have two basic interpretational processes, one domi-
nating in context-constrained cases and the other in context-deciding cases.
Both operate in parallel, and the context-constrained case shares some sim-
ilarities with Sperber and Wilson’s deductive approach, while the other is
what will allow for insight and creativity.
The experiments discused below are principally concerned with hemi-
spheric differences in processing meaning (not inference generally) and these
differences are describable in a number of ways, including distinctions be-
tween fine and coarse coding; inference at the sentence and discourse level;
context evaluation; figurative language; and graded salience. I claim that
these are related to context size, and I support this with empirical evidence
in part II. Most of what follows assumes some kind of spreading activation
between contentful representations, which is one reason I highlighted the
role of an empiricist psychology in the previous section.
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2.6.1 Fine vs. coarse coding
I begin with the distinction between coarse and fine coding which underlies
much of what follows. Simplifying somewhat, when processing words, the
left hemisphere (LH) shows rapid and focused activation of a very narrow
range of associated representations or meanings while the right hemisphere
(RH) involves a slower, weaker, broader and more diffuse spread of activa-
tion (Beeman et al., 1994; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 1998; Jung-Beeman,
2005). Take the ambiguous word ‘bank’, where the dominant meaning is
a financial institution and the subordinate meaning is the side of a river.
If a subject is primed with such a word, spreading activation will facilitate
quicker or more accurate processing of associated target stimuli money and
river than unrelated words, such as farm. Typically this facilitation is
tested behaviourally by lexical decision tasks (where subjects press differ-
ent keys to indicate whether a stimulus is a word in their language or not);
go/no-go tasks (where subjects press a key if some criteria is met, and do
nothing otherwise); or naming tasks (where subjects simply read the word
displayed). It is also investigated neurologically with various methods of
measuring brain activity.
Differing degrees of priming facilitation show that LH processes are more
likely to involve sustained activation for the dominant meaning, while RH
processes involve more sustained activation of both dominant and subordi-
nate meanings (Jung-Beeman, 2005). However, talk of dominant and subor-
dinate meanings suggests a clear-cut dichotomy, while the matter is actually
more graded, so it is better to talk of comparatively narrow/fine vs. com-
paratively broad/coarse semantic fields, where ‘narrow’ suggests not only a
smaller number of associated activations, but also activation of more closely
related representations; ‘broad’ suggests activation of a larger number of
more distantly related representations. So LH processing of words is typ-
ically a matter of fine coding while RH processing is typically a matter of
coarse coding (Jung-Beeman, 2005).
The relevance of this fine/coarse distinction to the current discussion
about contextual constraint is as follows. The LH usually dominates in
processing linguistic meaning, but its fine coding means that the LH is
better at processing representations with highly constrained relationships.
When the relationships between representations are less constrained, the RH
is more likely to shoulder an increased burden, comparatively. A loosening
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of contextual constraint should thus lead to observation of increasing levels
of RH involvement. This jump from ‘fine vs. coarse coding’ to ‘contextually
constrained vs. unconstrained’ needs a little unpacking, though.
2.6.2 Semantic coding and inferential context
There are two main ways in which fine coding can be related to constrained
contexts, and coarse coding to unconstrained contexts.
(1) Fine coding in the LH provides a highly constrained inferential con-
text in that limited spreading activation in response to a word constrains the
set of candidate representations that might be involved in inferences about
the meaning of subsequent words. Coarse coding provides a comparatively
unconstrained inferential context in that activation spreads to a much wider
range of representations. There are at least two ways of construing this: for
a fine context, we could claim that only a small set of representations are
available (or, figuratively, ‘visible’) to LH processes and that other repre-
sentations are unavailable or invisible. Alternatively, we could claim that
the LH dominates in situations where only a small set of information is pre-
dicted to be very relevant. The corresponding construals for the RH are
that either a wide range of representations are available for or are visible to
the inferential processes, or that the RH dominates when there is not much
information about which representations are predicted to be relevant. The
RH is ‘less discriminant’ (Faust and Kahana, 2002, 893).
(2) We could distinguish degrees of inferential contextual constraint in
terms of the scale of the structure to be interpreted. That is, interpreting
a word involves a smaller-scale context than a sentence, which involves a
smaller-scale context than a group of sentences, in turn smaller than an en-
tire narrative structure. The larger the structure, the more information one
must sift through in order to find what is relevant. The relevance of the
fine/coarse distinction is this: the larger the structure, the less likely it is
that the LH’s small set of closely related representations is sufficient for pro-
viding coherence, and the more likely that distantly related representations
must be integrated in the RH.
We thus have the following, related points in need of empirical support.
I examine these in turn below.
1. (a) A small set of representations visible to LH inference; a wide
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range visible to RH inference
(b) LH performs better where small set of highly predicted repre-
sentations are sufficient for understanding; RH performs better
where levels of prediction unknown or varied
2. RH increasingly important as structures grow larger
2.6.3 Hemispheric differences in inference
In support of point 1 (a) above, I examine evidence for the claim that
the RH’s broader semantic network succeeds better in contextually uncon-
strained situations than the narrow network of the LH. I begin with looking
at evidence for broad coding, then turn to discuss whether the coding is
particularly semantic.
Beeman (1993) compared the ability of RH-damaged (RHD) patients
and normal subjects to draw causal inferences implied by contextual infor-
mation in short texts. For example, given a vignette such as: ‘John waded
in the water, not knowing there was lots of glass nearby. Then John called
for help, and the lifeguard came running,’ one might link his cry to contex-
tual information about glass and reach the coherence-creating inference that
John called for help because he had cut his foot on the glass. Compared
to normal subjects, RHD patients performed badly at answering questions
about inferred information, though they succeeded at questions about ex-
plicit information. So RHD patients struggle with inferences that require
weighing up the contribution of contextual information.
Abstracting away from the narrative setting and using only neurolog-
ically normal participants, Beeman et al. (1994) showed subjects sets of
three priming stimuli followed by a laterally presented target word that
the subjects had to name. Summation primes were made up of three words
only distantly related to the target: ‘foot/cry/glass’ were distantly related to
‘cut’, as per the above vignette. Direct primes (e.g. ‘none/scissors/whether’)
were made up of one word (‘scissors’) directly related to the target (‘cut’),
surrounded by two unrelated words. After direct priming, subjects re-
sponded better to targets presented to the right visual field/left hemisphere
(RVF/LH), while left visual field/right hemisphere (LVF/RH) targets were
facilitated by summation priming.
Their interpretation of all this is shown in fig. 2.12. LH activation of
114 CHAPTER 2. AN INFERENTIAL HIERARCHY
foot only spreads to very closely associated representations toes, sock,
heel, while RH activation of foot also includes 12 inches and pay (pre-
sumably in the context ‘foot the bill’). The context in the former is tightly
constrained; in the latter it is broader. In the sets of primes in fig. 2.13,
the constrained LH activation of the three summation primes does not acti-
vate cut, while the overlap afforded by broader activation in the RH does,
even though the individual contribution of each stimulus is very weak. These
results support point 1 (a) above: the set of contextual representations avail-
able to the LH is smaller than those in the RH and small-context constrained
inferences are thus cognitively distinct from larger-context unconstrained in-
ferences.
Figure 2.12: Small, focused semantic field activated by foot in the LH and broad, diffuse
field in the RH (Beeman et al., 1994).
Jung-Beeman (2005) distinguishes various areas within each hemisphere
that contribute to these results20. He identifies three main processes and
brain areas implicated in those processes (fig. 2.14). Semantic activation
is when activation of one representation spreads to related representations
(as in fig. 2.12), principally associated with the posterior Middle/Superior
Temporal Gyri (pMTG/pSTG). Semantic integration is when multiple such
activations converge on a potential target (as in fig. 2.13), mainly in the ante-
rior Middle/Superior Temporal Gyri (aMTG/aSTG). So semantic activation
focuses on the word level, while semantic integration focuses on the message
level. Semantic selection chooses among competing activations, bringing one
20I only mention this because some of these regions will turn out to be important in
what follows in this section and in the next chapter. You don’t need to buy his story
completely in order to appreciate later evidence that focuses on these regions.
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Figure 2.13: Non-overlapping fields in the LH and overlapping fields of summation primes
in the RH (Beeman et al., 1994).
to consciousness or initiating behavioural output, typically associated with
the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG).
There are also physical-level differences underlying these differences in
processing. Jung-Beeman (2005) claims that the RH has a greater propor-
tion of white matter than the LH, promoting connections between neurons.
He also points out that pyramidal neurons in the RH have longer dendrite
branches than those in the LH, meaning that each neuron is connected to a
broader range of inputs, allowing more overlap between connections in the
RH (fig. 2.15).
I turn now to the question of whether the RH representational network
differs from the left in encoding semantic information. In a split-visual-field
priming task, Chiarello et al. (1990) tested two kinds of relationships: as-
sociations (one word typically elicits the other as a response, such as ‘bee’
and ‘honey’) and semantically similar pairs (both words belong to the same
category, such as ‘dagger’ and ‘rifle’). They also tested combination asso-
ciated+semantic pairs (‘bread’ and ‘butter’). They found that semantic-
only pairs facilitated responses to lexical decision and naming tasks in the
LVF/RH, but not in the RVF/LH. Semantic+associated primes facilitated
responses in both hemispheres.
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Figure 2.14: Location of brain areas identified above: in this case, the RH (Jung-Beeman,
2005).
Grose-Fifer and Deacon (2004) analysed event related potentials (ERPs),
measurements of electrical activity across the scalp in relation to specific
events such as stimulus presentation. A wave called the N400 (so called
because it is a Negative deflection, typically peaking around 400 milliseconds
after stimulus onset) is an indicator semantic relatedness: if two stimuli s1
and s2 are observed in that order and are semantically related, the N400
for s2 decreases in amplitude21. Grose-Fifer and Deacon presented subjects
with pairs of stimuli that were either unrelated, or shared relatively few
features (‘sofa’,‘vase’), or shared many features (‘bookcase’, ‘cabinet’). They
found attenuated N400 signals (indicating semantic relatedness) for pairs
with high feature overlap in the RH only, and no significant attenuation for
low feature overlap in either hemisphere22.
In another ERP study, Kiefer et al. (1998) found that indirectly related
21Differences in N400 response are also implicated in congruity in world knowledge, as
in examples discussed by Menenti et al. (2009) below.
22For the sake of completeness, Grose-Fifer and Deacon conceive of the LH/RH dif-
ference here as follows: the LH involves local representation, by which they mean that
concepts are represented as entire units; the RH involves distributed representation, by
which they mean that concepts are represented as sets of features which may be acti-
vated independently. It seems that Jung-Beeman (2005) doesn’t consider this entirely
incompatible.
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Ultimately, the LH quickly focuses semantic activation
on features related to the dominant, literal or contextually
relevant meaning while inhibiting features related to the
subordinate or contextually irrelevant meanings. This
strong categorical semantic activation is conducive to
most language comprehension tasks, and especially to
production – speakers must produce a single word, not a
hybrid of several related ones. By contrast, the RH
maintains weak, diffuse semantic activation of a broader
semantic field, including distant and unusual semantic
features, features that seem irrelevant to the context, and
secondary word meanings [28–32]). These large semantic
fields provide only a coarse interpretation, rife with
ambiguity. For instance, if you were listening to a story
and heard the word ‘foot’, but couldn’t determine whether
it referred to twelve inches or a part of the body, you would
quickly get bogged down, unable to follow rapidly
unfolding natural language.
However, coarse semantic activation has some
advantages. Given multiple input words, larger seman-
tic fields are more likely to overlap than smaller, more
focused semantic fields. Thus, the RH is more sensitive
than the LH to distant semantic relations, as observed
when people make semantic relatedness judgments to
words presented to the rvf-LH versus the lvf-RH [31].
People also show stronger semantic priming (i.e.
facilitated responses) in the lvf-RH than in the rvf-LH
for target words that are distantly related to preceding
prime words, but stronger priming in the rvf-LH for
target words closely related to the preceding primes
[28–30,32]. Event related potentials (ERPs), particularly
when paired with visual hemi-field presentations, also
demonstrate hemispheric differences in semantic pro-
cessing [33]. Reduced N400 amplitude (indicating
semantic relatedness) to lvf-RH target words indicates
the RH is particularly sensitive to: feature overlap in
the absence of associations [34]; indirect (i.e. mediated)
semantic relations [35]; unusual interpretations [36];
and joke endings [10,28].
The biggest advantage conveyed by coarse semantic
coding arises when people process multiple distantly
related words, as in natural language. On a smaller
scale, when people view three-word primes (foot–glass–
pain)where each word is distantly related to a target word
(CUT), weak semantic activation from the three prime
words appears to summate in the RH, yielding stronger
priming for lvf-RH than for rvf-LH target words. By
contrast, a single strongly related prime word (scissors)
yields stronger priming for rvf-LH than for lvf-RH target
words [37]. Such crossover interactions demonstrate
qualitative rather than quantitative differences in seman-
tic processing.























Figure 2. (a) The LH strongly activates small and focused semantic fields, containing information closely related to the dominantmeaning of input word(s). By contrast, the RH
weakly activates large diffuse semantic fields, including information distantly related to the words, providing only a coarse interpretation, insufficient for many language
tasks. (b)However, the larger semantic fields of the RH aremore likely to overlap, allowingweak activation to summate, when input includesmultiple distantly relatedwords.
Therefore, the RH is sensitive to distant semantic relations, and comprehenders capitalize on this sensitivity when understanding natural language, particularly figurative
language or unusual constructions. (c)Neurons in RH and LH language areas differ in several characteristics likely to affect computations; for example, pyramidal neurons in
the RH have longer initial dendritic branches andmore synapses further from the soma, on average, than LH neurons. This causes RH neurons to receive a broader andmore
overlapping field of inputs than those of the LH (see also Box 1; [51]) (Figure adapted with permission from [68].) d. LH cortical columns are more widely spaced than RH
cortical columns, with less overlap among input fields.
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Figure 2.15: Pyramidal neurons in LH and RH language areas respectively, showing
broader branching in the RH (Jung-Beeman, 2005).
words (‘lemon’ and ‘sweet’ are indirectly related through ‘sour’) showed
reduced N400 in the RH only. Semantic activation in the RH can thus
spread from one representation to its associates, and then spread from the
second representation to its associates in turn.
So semantic information — including category membership, shared fea-
tures, indirect relations and even antonyms (Beeman et al., 1994) — seems
to be more typical of RH processing, while associative information seems
to span both hemispheres to different degrees. Zlatev (2008) suggests that
lateralisation played a role in the evolution of signification, and that the RH
is rincipally implicated in the sign’s co tent (as opposed to its form). The
results reviewed above are compatible with that claim.
An interesting complication in t is picture is c eativity. Atchley t al.
(1999) administered a test of verbal creativity to divide subjects into low,
medium and high creativity groups. They found that low and medium cre-
tive subjects displayed the abov pattern, whereby subordinate meanings
are primed only in the RH, while high cr atives had subordinate meanings
primed in both hemispheres. One particular measure of creativity, then,
involves coarse or RH-style coding extending to the LH.
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2.6.4 Predictability
In support of point 1 (b) above, I examine evidence for metaphor interpreta-
tion based on what is called the Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH, Giora,
1997). I should point out, though, that ‘salience’ in this body of literature
means something more like ‘conventionality’ than how I’ve been using it so
far, but that’s fine given that I’m interested what happens before there are
linguistic conventions.
According to Mashal et al. (2005), previous studies of metaphor had fo-
cused on dimensions such as literal vs. figurative meanings and had found
conflicting results. Consequently, they base their study on the GSH, where
the fact that a conventional metaphor is coded linguistically predicts that
it is processed like a literal expression, despite involving figurative mean-
ing. That is, a conventional metaphor such as ‘bright student’ has salient
(strong or easily accessible) associations between the two words; the second
is reasonably predictable given the first. Conversely, a non-salient or novel
metaphor such as ‘pearl tears’ has no linguistically coded or conventional as-
sociation between the words, so interpretation involves a creative process of
finding novel semantic connections. Richards (1950) argues that metaphor
interpretation involves finding the ground, or set of shared properties, be-
tween the topic ‘student/tears’ and vehicle ‘bright/pearl’. His usage suggests
something very much like the Peircean ground I discussed in §1.2.3.2: we
must make a judgement of relevance in establishing the respect in which
something is bright or like a pearl. While the ground is conventional in
salient metaphors, it must be inferred for novel ones, so this is very much
like the process of interpretation I argued is necessary for pragmatic infer-
ence of a novel symbol (§1.5.2.3).
Mashal et al. (2005, 2007) generated four lists of word pairs: literal
(‘broken vase’), conventional metaphor (‘bright student’), novel metaphor
(‘crystal river’) and unrelated (‘boot laundry’). Twenty judges rated these
pairs as literal, metaphorically plausible, or unrelated, and 75% agreement
was needed for assignment to a category. Ten further judges rated the
metaphors on a five-point familiarity scale, where those scored less than 3
(average 1.98) were considered novel and those more than 3 conventional
(average 4.67). An fMRI study was conducted on still further subjects, who
were shown word pairs and were asked to decide silently whether the pair
was literal, metaphorical or unrelated (but not what kind of metaphor).
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Mashal et al. (2005) conducted a principal components analysis to discover
functional networks involved in processing stimuli, while Mashal et al. (2007)
investigated regions of interest independently of such networks. Both found
that the RH, particularly the temporal lobe, played a prominent role in inter-
preting novel metaphors, as opposed to classical LH language areas for con-
ventional metaphors and literal expressions23. So contextually constrained,
predictable relationships can be distinguished from less constrained, novel
relationships in terms of differing hemisphere involvement.
Still on point 1 (b), Faust and Kravetz (1998) show that the LH benefits
more from contextual constraint than the RH, where by ‘constraint’ they
mean cloze probability, i.e. predictability that a word follows, based on the
previous parts of the sentence. They had twenty judges complete unfinished
sentences by providing three possible endings, and used these results to di-
vide sentences into groups according to level of constraint: high, medium
and low. If a possible completion was given by more than 90% of judges,
for instance, this completed sentence was considered highly constrained. In
a split-visual-field task, a further group of subjects was presented with in-
complete sentences centrally, followed by lateral presentation of a target
in a lexical decision task. Analysis of accuracy and latency by constraint
group show that the LH is more sensitive to sentence constraint (read ‘pre-
dictability’) than the RH. While both hemispheres responded better to high
constraint than medium or low, the difference between these conditions was
smaller in the RH than in the LH. So the LH is more sensitive to constraint
and performs best at highly constrained contexts, while the RH is less sen-
sitive to context. But this doesn’t address what the RH may be better
at.
Kircher et al. (2001) conducted an fMRI experiment where subjects had
to read a sentence, or choose between two potential completions of the sen-
tence, or generate a possible completion. All sentences had low close prob-
ability. During the GENERATION condition, Kircher et al. found signifi-
cantly more activity in the RH (particularly the temporal cortex, including
the STG) than in the baseline READING condition, and no significant dif-
ference in the LH. They conclude,
The prominent engagement of the right lateral temporal cortex
23Other implicated regions for novel metaphors include the IFG-RH and MFG-RH, cf.
fig. 2.14.
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during the GENERATION conditions may reflect the processing
of linguistic context, and particularly the activation of multiple
meanings in the course of producing an appropriate completion.
(Kircher et al., 2001, 798)
This claim about the RH processing context sounds at odds with the
claim in Faust and Kravetz (1998) that the RH is less sensitive to context,
but they seem to mean different things. The interpretation offered by point
1 (b) above is that Faust and Kravetz show that the LH excels at context-
dependent processes, while Kircher et al. show that the RH performs more of
a role in processing what the context is. Assuming that a sentence provides
the context for inferences about words in that sentence, the task in Faust
and Kravetz and the DECISION task in Kircher et al. involve given contexts
and processes sensitive to levels of predictability within those contexts, while
the GENERATION task in Kircher et al. involves hypothesising what the
message or context might be in the first place.
There are two sources of support for this interpretation. Firstly, Fe-
dermeier and Kutas (1999) conduct an ERP study with manipulations of
semantic relatedness and contextual constraint (again, a matter of how pre-
dictable a sentence completion was given the rest of the sentence). They
conclude that:
The left hemisphere is more sensitive to contextual constraint
because constraint specifically reflects the extent to which con-
text information allows specific predictions to be made. Because
only the left hemisphere seems to be generating expectations,
only its processing reflects a strong influence of constraint. In
fact, the right hemisphere seems to outperform the left precisely
under conditions where prediction is difficult. (Federmeier and
Kutas, 1999, 387)
A second source of support comes from a divided-visual-field lexical prim-
ing experiment by Faust and Chiarello (1998). Priming sentences ending in
ambiguous words such as ‘second’ were presented centrally, followed by lat-
eral presentation of a target word for a lexical decision task. The sentences
could be consistent with the ambiguous word’s dominant meaning (‘He could
not wait for even a second’) or subordinate meaning (‘She stood in line
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and was second’). The target word could relate to the dominant meaning
(‘time’), subordinate meaning (‘number’) or be unrelated (‘sound’).
They found RVF/LH facilitation only for a target word coherent with
the priming sentence: after a dominant-consistent sentence, only the domi-
nant target was facilitated; after a subordinate-consistent sentence, only the
subordinate target was facilitated. In contrast, for the LVF/RH, both domi-
nant and subordinate meanings were primed, regardless of sentence context.
So the LH selects the most relevant meaning of the ambiguous word within a
given context, while the RH operates across these context boundaries. This
is consistent with the previous study, but it adds the key terms ‘relevance’
and ‘salience’:
The unique capabilities of each hemisphere are drawn upon as
needed based upon alterations in information salience and rele-
vance that modulate the use of multiple processors distributed
throughout the brain. (Faust and Chiarello, 1998, 833)
There is thus a range of support for claim 1 (b): the LH dominates in sit-
uations where meaning is predictable from context, while the RH dominates
in unconstrained contexts.
2.6.5 Scale
The previous experiments examine only sentence-level effects, while the RH’s
ability to process information across sentence contexts suggests it may be
useful in processing larger discourse structures, which moves us on to point
2. The following two experiments show firstly that coarse coding allows
activation of a wide range of representations at the narrative level (Virtue
et al., 2006), not just the sentence level, and secondly that this activation
plays a role in RH coherence-creating inferences (Menenti et al., 2009).
Virtue et al. (2006) presented subjects with vignettes such as:
After the rugby match, Justin’s friends teased him for not
knowing the rules. He gathered around his friends and joked
about beating them next time. In order to look macho, Justin
grabbed a beer from the cooler.
The vignettes were completed either by strongly constraining sentences
(‘His friends were soon covered in beer’) or weakly constraining ones (‘His
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friends were soon cheering him on’). The former is strongly constraining in
that it promotes a causal inference that strongly predicts the target word
(which in this case was ‘spray’) while the weaker ending does not. Re-
sponse to laterally presented targets was facilitated in both hemispheres
by strongly constrained vignettes, while weakly constrained vignettes facil-
itated response to the target in the LVF/RH only. Coarse coding thus has
an effect at the level of narrative structure, not just within a sentence.
The narrative level involves conceptual structures not present within
any individual sentence. Integration of world knowledge to cohere with
narrative-level representations may thus be distinct from integration of world
knowledge to cohere with sentence-level representations. We would thus
expect hemispheric processing differences when world knowledge coheres
with or fails to cohere with contexts on different scales.
Contrast ‘the train is sour’ and ‘the train is on time’. The anomaly in
the first depends on linguistic meaning, while the second depends on non-
linguistic information: it is untrue if you happen to know that the train
is late. Menenti et al. (2009) review previous research showing that cases
like the latter, involving world knowledge integration, are accompanied by
increased activation in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, see fig. 2.14). They
investigate processing of such world-knowledge anomalies in narrative con-
text. The sentence ‘the elephant flies’, for instance, involves an anomaly.
But when preceded by the contextual sentences ‘the circus is is travelling
by airplane,’ or ‘Dumbo is a fantasy animal,’ this local context promotes an
interpretation that reduces the anomalous effect, such that we would expect
decreased activation in the IFG compared to a neutral context.
In an fMRI experiment, Menenti et al. showed participants vignettes
consisting of four sentences each. The first sentence was invariant across
condition and introduced the topic. The next two sentences either intro-
duced a world-knowledge anomaly (local context) or not (neutral context).
The fourth sentence had a critical word that differed between conditions,
either cohering with the neutral or local context. So, for example:
Neutral context: Carl Barks wrote many Donald Duck stories and in-
vented Duckburg. In his early sketches we see Huey, Dewey and Louie
as young well-behaved boys with hats and scarves. They often go out
to help old ladies.
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Local context: Carl Barks wrote many Donald Duck stories and invented
Duckburg. In his early sketches we see Huey, Dewey and Louie as
young bad boys with striped sweaters and masks. They often go out
to rob old ladies.
Critical sentence: Donald Duck’s nephews are boy scouts/thieves and
very smart.
One prediction is that the IFG should show increased activation at the
critical sentence when preceded by local contexts (world-knowledge anoma-
lies) compared to neutral contexts. A second prediction is that, since the
RH is better at discourse-level processing, it should be better at integrating
local context information into an inference about anomalous critical sen-
tence interpretation and thus the IFG-RH should display less activation at
the critical point (‘thieves’) than the IFG-LH after local contexts. These
predictions are borne out by the fMRI data. So RH broad coding is of
benefit at the narrative level.
In an fMRI study, Xu et al. (2005) adapted nine of Aesop’s fables to
match them for features such as word frequency and syntactic complexity.
In three conditions, subjects were presented either with individual words
from the fables, or with sentences made up of these words, or with entire
fables made up of these sentences, so each subject observed three fables per
condition. Subjects were instructed to read the stimuli silently. Brain acti-
vation for each of these was compared against a baseline (reading random
letter strings). Classic LH perisylvian language areas were observed to be
active throughout the experimental conditions, but RH activation increased
with context size, reaching a maximum at the narrative level. Within that
level, RH activity increased as the narrative progressed, becoming signifi-
cantly more active at the end of the narrative than at the beginning, sug-
gesting the RH is responsible for forming a representation of the narrative
as a whole, further supporting point 2 above.
Failure at narrative-level inference is typical of RHD patients. For exam-
ple, Kaplan et al. (1990) presented RHD and normal patients with vignettes
with manipulations of two features:
1. The literal truth or falsity of one character’s claims about another
character’s ability
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2. The relationship between characters.
Literally false comments invited alternative inferences, but these infer-
ences depended on the characters’ relationships. For instance, if one char-
acter complimented another’s golf technique, but it was obvious that the
second character was a terrible golfer, then the comment is literally false. If
the two are good friends, one might infer that the first character was being
kind and encouraging; if they are not friends, one might infer that the first
character was being sarcastic. The authors found that RHD patients were
unable to use this contextual information to make inferences about speaker
meaning.
This range of experiments, in supporting points 1 and 2 above, then,
shows that differential hemispheric processing supports a distinction be-
tween contextually constrained and comparatively unconstrained inference
(at least when it comes to meaning) since a small set of representations are
made salient by LH processes, while RH processing evaluates a wider set,
and does so in situations where a relevant interpretation is found over the
course of multiple sentences, which is one of the things pragmatic inference
needs to do.
2.6.6 RH processes and pragmatics
It only remains, then, to compare such claims with pragmatic interpretation
as described by Sperber and Wilson (1995). While they treat pragmatic
interpretation as though it were one kind of process, these claims suggest
that we should distinguish at least two kinds, or more weakly, at least two
aspects. I admit this may not matter to their account of inference if we
were to treat it as a computation-level account, but the algorithmic-level
difference will turn out to be important for symbol evolution. Consequently,
I will not be focusing overtly on their computation-level deductive analysis,
but rather on their reliance on the explanatory role of accessibility, which
suggests an empiricist psychology as discussed in §2.5.2.3. By addressing my
criticisms from §1.5.2.2, I will highlight ways in which symbolic-threshold
inferences rest more heavily on non-deductive, creative inferences, which
Sperber and Wilson admit operate in the background.
Their account involves retrieving assumptions related to utterances in
the memory store of the interpretive device. These assumptions are re-
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trieved in order of accessibility until relevance is achieved. Sperber and
Wilson do not distinguish between highly accessible and less accessible as-
sumptions apart from the criterion of relevance, and state explicitly that
the process proceeds step by step. The various approaches above, though,
suggest that LH and RH interpretive processes operate simultaneously, and
that LH processes search more accessible assumptions and do so within a
given context, while RH processes additionally search weakly accessible as-
sumptions and do so context-independently, but since the RH processes are
slower and weaker, they contribute most when less accessible assumptions
turn out to be relevant or when coherence (for which, read ‘relevance’) de-
pends on integrating representations across contexts or above the sentence
level.
This can be seen clearly by comparing their account with the Beeman
(1993) vignette above, where John cried out because he had cut his feet
on the glass. The following discussion should be considered a parallel to
my worries in §1.5.2.2 about the accessibility of representations related to
ossobuco. Let’s assume that we are at the point of making an inference
about why John cried out. If contextual assumptions had included activation
of the representation scissors, then activation of cut would be quick and
strong in the classic language areas of the LH. As it is, though, cut was less
accessible in this vignette and inferring that he had cut himself thus required
the overlap of spreading activation in the RH, as in fig. 2.13. The conclusion
in Beeman is based on 32 such scenarios, so it is not merely a peculiarity
of this particular example. It might be countered that the LH would have
got there eventually, if only the RH hadn’t found the answer first. After
all, RHD patients are still able to find some interpretation in the above
discussion of Kaplan et al. (1990). These patients’ interpretation is not the
intended one, but I agree with Sperber and Wilson’s foundational point that
relevance is not a matter of validity or fail-safe intention-matching.
But the worry is more pressing given my second concern: though they
reject a code model, it is conventional coding that provides initial access
to their interpretive process (§1.5.2.3). They included novel gesture under
the same umbrella as linguistic interpretation, but the work on the GSH
(Mashal et al., 2005, 2007, comparing conventional — i.e. coded — and
novel metaphors) showed that the more novel the metaphor, the more RH
the interpretive process. It thus seems plausible that novel or unconven-
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tional signals require more RH processing than (and are thus cognitively
different from) conventional language. These experiments proved this point
for a novel collocation of units as opposed to novel units (though there is a
similarity: a ground must be inferred in both cases), so the pressing concern
that falls out of all this is that we need to establish whether, or to what
extent, a novel sign involves the same cognitive difference.
I have mentioned on several occasions that hypothesis generation must
therefore be our focus, so the problem for language evolution now becomes
establishing empirically whether, or in what circumstances, hypothesis gen-
eration in the face of a novel sign is a context-deciding inference of the type
I have been discussing. If it is, it would be unsurprising that animals are
generally incapable of such a thing, but that chimpanzees, for example, are
capable of learning a symbol when the context is heavily constrained by
experimenters. This is not to say, though, that the complexity of such in-
ference is the only reason other animals don’t manage to learn symbols, but
this is a feature of the problem that has not been addressed in the litera-
ture, and it is an important gap to fill. The next chapter thus finishes off
the theoretical section of this dissertation by looking at abduction, which is
Peirce’s account of creative or novel hypothesis generation; at insight, which
Peirce claims is a feature of abduction and which is typically a STG-RH phe-
nomenon; and at induction, which has been the focus of most work in this
area but is contextually constrained.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I have argued for an inferential hierarchy. It begins with
minimal rationality, which is distinct from normative rationality in that it is
concerned with the explanatory role of content, not with truth or optimality.
The addition of contextual information to this provides us with minimally
inferential cognition and I argued that this makes sense of animal behaviours
such as TI. Basing the one on the other means that some kinds of inference
might not be truth-preserving or optimal. Further, degree of contextual
constraint should thus be a major dimension of inferential complexity in
evolutionary terms in addition to higher-order relationships, which have
been the main focus in the limited body of research in this area.
I then gave evidence supporting a cognitive distinction between com-
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paratively constrained and comparatively unconstrained inferences. While
much research has focused on constrained contexts, I argued here and in
the previous chapter that we need to look beyond those for symbol origins.
The following chapter thus turns to examine contextually unconstrained in-
ference in more detail, where I will evaluate the relative contributions made
by abduction and induction and argue that the former played a dominant
role at the symbolic threshold.
To avoid potential misunderstanding: I claimed that contextually uncon-
strained inference is more complex than contextually constrained inference,
and I argued that the LH dominates in constrained cases, while the RH
dominates in unconstrained cases. This does not mean that I believe the
LH processes evolved before RH processes, or that our LH processes are
more similar to animal cognition than our RH processes. Rather, the claim
is that evolution solved the relevance problem in animal inference, mak-
ing certain representations salient in the context of others, whereas humans
are comparatively sophisticated because we evolved two strategies that deal
with the relevance problem: one for situations where meaning is compara-
tively predictable from context and the other for situations where meaning
is comparatively unpredictable. In both cases, meanings must be inferred,
unlike animal signals which are largely innate.
A question for further research, based on the previous subsection, is
whether and to what extent my inferential hierarchy aligns with the mime-
sis hierarchy posited by Zlatev (2008). Both are layered models concerning
the evolution of linguistic meaning, but Zlatev focuses on the sign, while I
focus on the cognitive processes interpreting the sign. I already highlighted
a parallel between Zlatev’s claim that hemispheric differences might corre-
spond to a distinction between signifier and signified in the sign function
and my claim that semanticity interacts with the fine/coarse coding distinc-
tion (§2.6.3). I also drew a line from Zlatev’s claim about triadic mimesis
through inference about speaker intention to the role of relevance and thus
context in inference (§1.4.2.3). Whether there are further connections or
differences remains to be seen.





So far, I’ve argued that context-deciding inference (specifically, in hypoth-
esis generation) was a necessary part of our evolving across the symbolic
threshold, and that context-deciding inference is more complex than and
cognitively distinct from contextually constrained inference. I also high-
lighted a few relevant key terms: creativity, insight, analogy, hypothesis
generation, hypothesis evaluation, deduction, and induction. The last two
are types of inference; the rest are either features of inference, or of cogni-
tive processes more generally. But some of these don’t seem to match up: in
particular, creativity and insight are not typical features of either induction
or deduction, and it’s not clear to what extent analogy is related to either.
Further, as I will argue in this chapter, hypothesis generation does not fall
within the boundaries of induction.
Consequently, I describe and evaluate a less well known and poorly un-
derstood form of inference called abduction, which is Peirce’s label for hy-
pothesis generation, but which he claimed is creative in that it is the only
form of inference capable of producing new ideas, and which operates in-
sightfully or by analogy, thus incorporating the above key terms that were
out of place in deduction or induction.
First I discuss how reasoning has been preoccupied only with deduc-
tion and induction but argue that inference needn’t be limited to these
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two options (§3.2). I then present Peirce’s account of abduction or hypoth-
esis generation (§3.3) as a type of inference distinct from both of these.
Thereafter, I make explicit comparisons between abduction and induction
to show that hypothesis generation is not, in general, amenable to inductive
explanation (§3.4). Finally, comparisons between abduction and creative
mechanisms such as insight and analogy will provide testable predictions for
the previous claim (§3.5).
3.2 Background
It is commonly assumed that there are two types of reasoning: deduction and
induction (Burks, 1946; Goel and Dolan, 2000; Thagard, 2007). Deductive
conclusions follow necessarily from their premises, while the influence of
Mill (1843) has made it standard practice to call everything non-necessary
‘induction’. The following is thus typical of descriptions of induction: it
encompasses ‘all inferential processes that expand knowledge in the face of
uncertainty’ (Holland et al., 1986).
Both are rational in a high-level, normative sense (as opposed to a min-
imally rational non-normative sense) as invoked by a rationalist psychology
(Fodor, 2001) or rational analysis (Anderson, 1990). The former is concerned
with truth-preserving processes (thus, primarily, deduction); the latter with
optimality computations based on probability (thus, primarily, induction).
This means that reasoning is concerned with standards of justification, or
the extent to which beliefs are warranted. Because reasoning is conscious,
explicit or reflective, these standards of justification are potentially con-
scious, explicit or reflective: we have the potential to ask ourselves whether
a certain conclusion is warranted, and on what grounds.
However, since I have distinguised reasoning and inference, the claim
that deduction and induction are the only two kinds of reasoning needn’t
mean that they are the only two kinds of inference1. Inference differs from
reasoning in two crucial ways that make room for a third kind of inference:
(1), reasoning is propositional while inference needn’t be. (2), reasoning
involves rationalist (normative, syntactic) strategies. I argued for the pos-
sibility of empiricist (non-normative, associative) inferences.
1Since Peirce doesn’t distinguish reasoning and inference in the way I do, I will translate
his claims about reasoning to claims about inference where appropriate.
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Concerning (1), both truth (for deduction) and degree of probable be-
lief (for induction) require propositions or at least proto-propositions. You
cannot believe that socrates or think it’s likely that socrates, but you
can believe or think it likely that mortal(socrates). On the other hand,
I argued that animal inference needn’t be propositional: a vervet doesn’t
need to represent currently-present(kin) or kin(x) to sound an alarm
in the context of a leopard and some kin2. But since their behaviour is ex-
plained by mental content, though doing so requires context, their behaviour
is minimally inferential in my terms.
Concerning (2), minimal rationality involves an empiricist psychology
(§2.3). Inference evolved out of minimal rationality, so some aspects of
inference may be empiricist (§2.6). An empiricist psychology is not sensi-
tive to logical form, but rather to causal relations between representations:
representation dodo probably causes activation of dead, but the premise
∀(x)(dodo(x) Ð→ dead(x)) is not reducible to this causal relationship,
and the validity of arguments containing this premise is thus not evaluated
in terms of this causal relationship (Fodor, 2001).
So if deduction and induction are typically propositional and normative
and if some inferences are not propositional or normative, then it is possible
that some inferences are not deductive or inductive. Non-deductive infer-
ences are ampliative, meaning that they increase our knowledge of the world
by going beyond necessary conclusions, but rather than equating ampliative
inference with induction (as Mill, 1843, does), a Peircean approach is to dis-
tinguish abduction and induction as different kinds of ampliative inference
(fig. 3.1). Kemp and Jern (2014) equate ampliative reasoning with a broad
sense of ‘induction’, but allow a distinction between abduction and a narrow
sense of ‘induction’.
3.3 Abduction
As mentioned previously, it is difficult to arrive at a clear, unified account
of what Peirce thought about anything. It is typical, then, to refer to stages
of development in his thought. In this section, I contrast his early views on
abduction with his later views. The early account allows for more explicit
2Since I think this vervet representation isn’t propositional, there’s no sense in trying
to decide whether kin would be a predicate or an argument, hence both options above.
As in the previous chapter, x represents an attentional index.




Figure 3.1: Three basic kinds of inference.
comparisons with induction and deduction; the later one is more general in
that it doesn’t assume propositions
3.3.1 Peirce’s early views
Peirce initially offered a syllogistic account of the difference between these
three types (CP 2.623, 1878): the same propositions could be arranged in
three ways to yield different argument structures. In each case, imagine a
room with a table in it, a bag of beans on the table and separate pile of
beans also on the table. The phrase ‘these beans’ refers to the beans on the
table.
(3.1) All beans from this bag are white
These beans are from this bag
∴ These beans are white
(3.2) These beans are from this bag
These beans are white
∴ All the beans from this bag are white
(3.3) All the beans from this bag are white
These beans are white
∴ These beans are from this bag
In (3.1), you know that all beans from the bag are white but can’t see
the colour of the beans in the pile. If you know that the beans in the pile
came from the bag, you can deduce that the beans in the pile must be white:
the conclusion follows necessarily. In (3.2), you’re taking beans out of the
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bag one by one and putting them in the pile. Initially you don’t know what
colour the beans in the bag are, but because all the beans you then place in
the pile are white, you generalise to conclude that the beans remaining in
the bag are probably also white. This is ampliative and inductive: you’ve
reached a conclusion about something you haven’t observed and thus don’t
know (there could be a black bean in the bag that you just happen not
to have picked), so you generalise from a previously observed sample to a
population. In (3.3), you know that the beans in the bag are white, and are
wondering where the white beans on the table came from. You abductively
hypothesise the possibility that they came from the bag. Again, this is
ampliative because, like the inductive inference, it is potentially untrue. The
claim that all ampliative inference is inductive obscures crucial differences
between (3.2) and (3.3).
For instance, consider what sorts of things might make (3.2) or (3.3)
stronger or weaker as inferences. In (3.2), if you have only taken two beans
out of the bag, the conclusion is weaker than it would be if you’d taken 50
beans out. In (3.3) on the other hand, these quantities wouldn’t make much
difference: if you see two beans on the table or 50, you might still wonder
where they came from, and you know all the beans in the bag are white, so
statistical properties of these proportions don’t enter into it.
Further differences relate to context and creativity and are thus relevant
to symbol evolution. Context affects argument strength differently in (3.2)
than in (3.3): the context is constrained by the premises of (3.2), but not in
(3.3). In (3.3), you’d be less likely to hypothesise that the pile came from the
bag if you noticed a large mound of white beans in the corner of the room.
But how far does this context extend? What if you saw a pile of beans in
the corridor outside the room? Or a man leaving the room with a bag of
beans that had a hole in it? Or if the room was in a bean-processing plant?
This is a context-deciding inference. In (3.2), in contrast, the context of the
argument is limited to categories appearing in the premises of the argument:
the pile and the bag. A pile of beans in the corner of the room will not affect
the statistical evaluation of how likely it is that all the beans in the bag are
white, given that a certain percentage of them are white. In other words,
induction involves local information, abduction global information (Fodor
2001. I introduced these terms in §2.2.3 above).
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Further, (3.3) goes beyond its premises more creatively than (3.2): (3.2)
only introduces new formal information while (3.3) introduces new content
information (CP 6.531, 1901, though he doesn’t use these terms). Con-
sider the inductive ampliative inference made by someone who observes a
series of red apples, and generalises to conclude that all apples are red:
∀x(apple(x) Ð→ red(x)). This conclusion contains new formal or syn-
tactic information (the universal quantifier ∀), but no new content (i.e.
semantic/conceptual) information since the concepts apple and red are
already part of this person’s representation of the world. Since these par-
ticular concepts are contained in these particular premises, the inference is
contextually constrained.
On the other hand, consider the abductive ampliative inference made
by someone who observes a series of apples falling, and hypothesises that
something is causing everything to fall: ∃y∀x(cause(y,fall(x))). Natu-
rally we already know that this ‘something’ is gravity, but the existence of
this something, y, is a new addition to this persons’ representation of the
world: this is novel content information, unlike the red-apple example.
While y is new, let’s suppose that his mind already contains the concept
cause. In that case, cause wouldn’t be new content information relative
to his representation of the world. Nonetheless, cause is not contained in
the premises here, so it is new relative to this inference. The abduction thus
involves retrieving information from somewhere in his set of representations
of the world, but the premises themselves do not contain information that
would constrain that search, so this is a context-deciding inference, just like
pragmatic inference as described by Sperber and Wilson (1995). Example
(3.3) is similar, in that the beans’ coming from the bag wasn’t observed,
and is therefore new content information. To learn more about y, he would
have to decide that the colour of the apples isn’t a relevant feature, but that
their mass is, so further progress would require relevance-deciding inference.
So the basic idea is that induction (in early Peirce) is about general-
isation, while abduction is about coming up with an explanation (Burks,
1946). Further, creativity, context and probability are three differences be-
tween these types of ampliative inference. Before moving on to Peirce’s
mature account, a couple of points need clarification.
Firstly, abduction is guessing. But it is informed, not random guessing.
If you were shown three buckets and told that food was under one of them,
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you’d make a guess and pick one at random. There’d be no information to
go on and this guess wouldn’t be abductive.
Secondly, since these simple forms of induction and deduction are con-
strained by their premises, they can be minimally inferential. The transitive
inference example (§2.4.2) was a low-level form of deductive inference, for
instance, and many animals are able to generalise across stimuli. Even this
simple abduction, however, is contextually unconstrained, so it is only likely
to be useful at comparatively advanced levels of inference.
3.3.2 Peirce’s mature views
Peirce eventually rejected the syllogistic approach as being too constrained
(Campos, 2011). He also wanted to integrate the three types of inference
into his general theory of inquiry: how humans manage to learn about the
world. He thus eventually defined these types of inference according to
what role they play in inquiry. Abduction generates hypotheses; deduction
derives the necessary consequences of those hypotheses to provide testable
predictions; induction then tests these to decide which hypothesis should be
believed, and the cycle can be repeated indefinitely until it produces stable
habits of belief3. This may sound like a theory of scientific method, but
Peirce maintained that it also characterises patterns of thought in our daily
lives.
Deduction remains unchanged in this new framework, though it offers a
different take on induction: previously ‘induction’ either meant all amplia-
tive inference, or just generalisation from observed cases to others. Now,
induction is hypothesis evaluation, which is how Bayesian approaches to
cognition see it. These are three quite different senses of ‘induction’ and it
is sensible to bear the differences in mind4.
In the earlier framework, abduction offered an explanation of an obser-
vation in the premises, but here it is made explicit that
[a]bduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis.
3I say ‘stable habits of belief’ rather than ‘truth’ because induction provides
probability-based reasons for why it may be rational to believe something, but does not
claim to reach incontrovertible truths.
4Tenenbaum et al. (2006) for instance, skip from the generalisation sense to the
Bayesian sense in the space of a paragraph. On its own, this is not a serious problem. But
if one intends to mean something useful by a claim such as ‘humans are uniquely able to
induce a solution to a particular problem’, such a move is best avoided.
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It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea;
for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction
merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis.
Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that
something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that
something may be. (CP 5.171, 1903)
At this stage, Peirce’s schematic characterisation of abduction is as fol-
lows (CP 5.118, 1903):
(3.4) The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true.
We have already seen something with the above form in Tomasello’s ex-
ample of a joint-attentional scene in an Hungarian train station (§1.5.1.2):
A was a guess at the meaning of a novel word; C was the ticket seller’s
utterance of that word in that context. Despite not using this term at
all, Tomasello was talking about abduction. A similar argument pattern
occurred in §1.5.2.3 while I was arguing that crossing the symbolic thresh-
old was an instance of pragmatic inference. I’ll give a few more examples,
then use them to unpack features of abduction. In each case, people (X or
Y) come up with an abductive hypothesis that explains a feature of their
environment.
(3.5) While playing charades, X shouts out a series of increasingly
desperate guesses about what the novel gesture means.
(3.6) X is waiting for two friends, F1 who is always punctual and F2 who
is always late. Both F1 and F2 are 10 minutes late. X wonders if F1
was held up at work, but doesn’t wonder about F2.
(3.7) X and Y are medical students who have learned that symptoms S1
and S2 are both caused by diseases D1 and D2. X only recalls D1
and offers that diagnosis. Y recalls both D1 and D2 and knows that
D2 causes symptom S3, which the patient has. He draws X’s
attention to S3. X then recalls D2 and offers this diagnosis.
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(3.8) X lives in a culture where disease is thought to be caused by god’s
ill-will. But having noticed a relationship between degree of
cleanliness and mortality, X comes up with the idea that something
in the dirt causes diseases and calls that something a germ.
(3.9) X notices that the pavement is wet and guesses it has rained. He
goes out and takes his umbrella. Upon leaving the house, he notices
that the sky is blue. He abandons the rain hypothesis, and wonders
if someone had turned the sprinklers on. Later than night, he
spontaneously recalls having been told about a burst pipe on the
street, and updates his hypothesis accordingly.
(3.10) X and Y spot something vaguely triangular in the water. X thinks
it might be a shark and won’t go in the water. Y thinks it might be a
shark or may be a piece of driftwood and goes swimming.
(3.11) X is trying to diffuse a bomb. He has already examined the bomb
mechanism and had a hunch that he should cut the red wire, but
hasn’t confirmed that yet. There is 1 second remaining on a bomb’s
timer, so X goes with his hunch and cuts the red wire.
(3.12) X is a stereotypical teenager who enjoys lying in his room
contemplating why life and his parents are so unfair.
(3.13) X and Y are scientists. A report of data comes in calling into doubt
a theory of theirs. X assumes the report is reliable and starts working
on an updated theory; Y starts looking for problems in the data.
(3.14) One of the planets is not orbiting precisely as predicted by
Newtonian mechanics. X hypothesises a previously unobserved
planet to account for it; Y hypothesises that Newtonian mechanics is
wrong.
Four points follow to clarify just what abduction is, given that hypoth-
esis generation is poorly understood (Gettys and Fisher, 1979; Fodor, 2001;
Dougherty and Hunter, 2003; Navarro and Perfors, 2011). In §3.4 I will
make explicit contrasts between abduction and induction5, and in §3.5 I
5I mostly ignore deduction in what follows, since word learning is a matter of ampliative,
i.e. non-deductive, inference.
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make comparisons between abduction, insight and analogy. What follows
here, then, is just a description of abduction in order to allow such compar-
isons. These points are not intended to be strong arguments that abduction
as described here is a psychological reality: that can wait until the empirical
chapters.
3.3.3 The hypothesis is mere conjecture
The hypothesis A is meant to be ‘entertained interrogatively’ (CP 6.524,
1901) or as ‘mere conjecture’ (CP 8.209, 1905): the conclusion is not that
one should believe that A; rather, one would conjecture or wonder if it’s
possible that A. This is a conjecture in the sense that ‘P, but we conjecture
that ¬P ’ is not a logical contradiction, unlike ‘P, but we believe that ¬P ’
(Gabbay and Woods, 2006, 207). ‘Suspect’ in (3.4) implies this weaker type
of epistemic attitude, whereas if one inferred A to be true, one would be
committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. In (3.5), X may shout
out a number of guesses, but the whole point of the game is that X is trying
to discover the truth of each, and only in this very weak sense is X suggesting
that any hypothesis might be true. So ‘whereas deduction is truth-preserving
and induction is probability-enhancing, abduction is ignorance-preserving’
(Gabbay and Woods, 2006, 192).
The abductive conjecture is accepted not as true or even as probably
true, but merely as a provisional guide for future investigation (Plutynski,
2011; Gabbay and Woods, 2006), in that it points out things that might be
worth investigating if one’s resources allow and if one’s goals include reach-
ing a stable belief about the matter. These resources and goals constitute
the economics of inquiry (CP 5.600, 1903). In (3.11), the bomb expert’s re-
sources (here, time) limit further investigation while in (3.12), the teenager
can afford to speculate endlessly. The teenager’s goals may not include
reaching a stable belief on the matter, while the bomb expert would much
prefer to be sure before cutting anything. In (3.5), a stable belief is reached
quite easily: the gesturer simply tells X if he’s right. In general, though,
one would have to proceed with deduction and induction to test the matter
for oneself; or new information may come along. This may lead to retrac-
tion of the hypothesis and the generation of a new hypothesis, as in (3.7).
Alternatively, it might be the case that one’s memory already contains the
information, but that one only makes the connection much later, as in (3.9).
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If the content of the hypothesis explains subsequent behaviour, it is min-
imally rational, at least (cf. §2.3). In (3.10), X might think it as unlikely to
be a shark as Y does. But if X has a phobia of sharks, the mere activation of
shark in the hypothesis would trigger a strong fear reaction (an emotional
interpretant) in X. Even if this effect is out of all proportion to the prob-
ability of the hypothesis, its content still plays an explanatory role in X’s
subsequent behaviour: he is behaving that way, not because it is a shark,
or because he believes it is a shark, but because he worries or conjectures
that it might possibly be. Relative to the economics of inquiry, in (3.13),
the actions of X are partly explained by his hypothesis that a new theory
is needed while the actions of Y are partly explained by his hypothesis that
the report may contain errors. Neither may yet have reached any kind of
stable belief on the matter: Y might say ‘Since checking the report is less
time-consuming than rehauling our theory entirely, I’m beginning with that
hypothesis despite thinking a mistake unlikely.’
Finally, abduction participates in a cycle of inquiry, but since it is the
conjectural origin of that cycle, it is the cheapest part of the process in
terms of the economics of inquiry. It is only deduction and induction that
need be directly concerned with the truth or optimality of those behaviours
in a particular environment. If we believe that a particular sabre-toothed
tiger trap is efficient and it turns out to be a dud, we might be killed by
the tiger in question, or will have wasted time, energy, and materials in
its construction, so we have every reason to decide whether our beliefs are
warranted. But the act of imagining new traps is unlikely to get us killed
by the tiger, and we can imagine a host of new traps at comparatively little
expense. Popper (1972) argues that a uniquely human step in evolution is
our ability to let our hypotheses die in our stead.
3.3.4 Conjecture is best considered in the context of discov-
ery
There have been two focuses for studies of abduction, borrowing terms from
Reichenbach (1938) and Popper (1968): in the context of discovery, we
have to account for how hypothesis A appears in the conditional premise in
(3.4) at all, or how it is that one’s representational system comes up with
A in the first place; in the context of justification, we investigate whether
there is some context in which (3.4) would offer a reason to believe that
140 CHAPTER 3. ABDUCTION, INDUCTION AND INSIGHT
A (Josephson, 2000), or whether some modification to (3.4) might warrant
such belief (Kapitan, 1992).
The context of discovery is sometimes called creative or Hansonian ab-
duction, while the context of justification is called Harmanian abduction, or
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE, Lipton, 2004). IBE is ‘not so much
an inference to the best explanation as an inference that the best explanation
is true’ (Paavola, 2006, 8). Such approaches try to strengthen the abductive
conclusion, usually by adding further requirements. For instance, if A is
the only potential explanation, then (to some degree), belief in A might be
warranted. Alternatively, if A is simpler, more economical or more elegant
than other hypotheses, or explains a wider range of apparently unrelated
facts, or makes more detailed predictions, then belief might be warranted.
Such features contribute to an explanation’s ‘loveliness’ (Lipton, 2004), a
gloss for whatever features make an explanation the best. The idea is that
particularly lovely explanations are worthy of belief. There are a number of
problems with such an approach, though.
Kapitan (1992) argues that if additions to (3.4) succeed in making it war-
ranted, then that would only make abduction dependent on deduction and
induction, in which case it wouldn’t be a distinct form of inference. Campos
(2011) argues that IBE is just deduction and induction, and that abduction
is thus better considered in the context of discovery. Paavola (2006) takes
the weaker position that IBE blurs the distinction between abduction and in-
duction. But induction already has powerful, well supported techniques for
dealing with warranting: Bayesianism. On a practical level, then, the IBE
approach wouldn’t add anything to this. Though a reliance on Bayesianism
would reduce abduction to induction in the context of justification, it would
still be a distinct type of inference in the context of discovery.
The problem underlying all of this is that Harmanian approaches attempt
a rational or normative reading of abduction, but hypothesis generation
is inherently non-normative (Gettys and Fisher, 1979): one can creatively
imagine any number of sabre-tooth tiger traps, but truth or optimality only
become an issue when someone actually decides to build and use one. Plu-
tynski (2011) argues that Peirce didn’t intend an IBE reading of abduction,
and Sperber and Wilson (1995) similarly claim that pragmatic inference is
not a matter of justification. The creative process itself is somewhat hap-
hazard:
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It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the
logical situation . . . is to say that men have a certain Insight, not
strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough
not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right . . . The
relative frequency with which it is right is on the whole the most
wonderful thing in our constitution. (CP 5.173, 1903)
We could attempt to account for the logic of abduction by showing how
an hypothesis logically guides further action. But no specific further action
is determined by the adoption of a hypothesis, so this is impossible. Any
potential action will be relative to the economics of inquiry and these can
vary widely across contexts. So abduction is only logical to the extent that it
participates in unpredictable cycles of pragmatic inquiry, and it is misguided
to evaluate the logic of abduction per se.
We are thus left with the context of discovery: where the hypothesis
comes from. I am interested in how our ancestors managed to make any
guesses at all about meaning, compared to chimpanzees who have to be
trained so exhaustively in constrained contexts. This is not to say that
abduction is irrational. Rather, in the next subsection, I will argue that
it is rational in a minimal, not normative sense. The remainder of this
subsection, though, will first explore the notion of ‘discovery’.
As mentioned above (§3.3.1), abduction has the potential to add new
content to our representation of the world. ‘Potential’ means it doesn’t
always do this, though, so we must distinguish creative from selective ab-
duction (Schurz, 2008). Selective abduction involves retrieval of an hypoth-
esis from memory; creative abduction involves creation of an hypothesis
not contained in memory. The medical student Y in (3.7) performed selec-
tive abduction; the genius in (3.8), on the other hand, introduced a novel
concept germ to his representation of the world. It wasn’t enough to cor-
relate dirt with disease (which would have been a generalisation of the type
called ‘inductive’ in early Peirce); rather something unobserved in the dirt
was inferred to exist and to have some properties which would explain the
disease6.
6Though (3.8) is a fictional example, Paavola (2006) provides a detailed account of
the actual discovery of germ theory in the 19th century by Ignaz Semmelweis, to show
that he performed a creative abduction, not merely a generalising induction or Harmanian
abduction.
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There is a graded continuum between creative and selective abduction.
In (3.5), X is guessing the meaning of a novel gesture. The concepts corre-
sponding to the guesses he makes already exist in his memory, so this is not
purely creative abduction. But these concepts are not connected to or cued
by the novel gesture: he is not remembering what this sign means, so this
is not purely selective either. He must make a new link between an existing
representation and a novel sign, so it is partly creative.
(3.14) offers examples of creative abduction taken from the history of
science (Rosenberg, 1974). The orbit of Uranus turned out to differ from
that predicted by Newtonian theory. Adams and Leverrier, rather than hy-
pothesising that Newtonian theory should be abandoned, hypothesised the
existence of a new planet that would explain the perturbations. The hypoth-
esis was borne out when Neptune was observed. Later, perturbations were
observed in the orbit of Mercury. Scientists again hypothesised the existence
of a new planet: Vulcan. No such planet was found, though, so the orbit
of Mercury remained unexplained. Much later, Einstein hypothesised the
possibility of curved spacetime which would explain Mercury’s orbit. While
Adams and Leverrier added a new representation, Einstein posited an en-
tirely new representational system or theory. Both are creative abductions,
though Einstein’s discovery required rather more insight.
I’ve mentioned the economics of inquiry in relation to deduction and
induction, but Peirce (CP 2.776, 1902) points out that it also includes dis-
covery: it is usually uneconomical to think up all (or even many) possible
hypotheses that might explain something. Creative abduction, then, is not
just grabbing at random straws, since this would be uneconomical: it would
take a long time to reach a good hypothesis by random methods, and hu-
mans seem to have a knack for reaching good hypotheses very quickly.
The human mind’s having such a power of guessing right that
before very many hypotheses shall have been tried, intelligent
guessing may be expected to lead us to the one which will sup-
port all tests, leaving the vast majority of possible hypotheses
unexamined7. (CP 6.530, 1901)
Having argued in this subsection that we cannot talk of the logic of
abduction, though, I still have to account for how abduction can still be
7Compare this quotation with the first of the two options offered by Hurford in §1.3.1.3.
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(minimally) rational rather than random.
3.3.5 Discovery is psychological, not logical
The argument pattern in (3.4) allows for an explicitly cognitive approach,
as opposed to a purely logical or normative one. It is about how we think,
not just about how we ought to think or what we are warranted in thinking;
Peirce sometimes calls the former ‘psychology’ and the latter ‘logic’ (Burks,
1946) and admits that abduction is ‘very little hampered by logical rules’
(CP 5.188, 1903)8. Similarly, outside the Peircean tradition, Popper (1968)
argued that discovery is not a matter of logic, but of psychology instead.
This is a reasonably common view in the philosophy of science (Aliseda,
2004). Arguments in favour of a psychological approach to hypothesis gen-
eration follow here.
Firstly, schema (3.4) speaks of surprise. This is an explicitly psycho-
logical response to an event that is unexpected, i.e. incompatible with an
individual’s world knowledge or some previously held hypothesis, so it is
context-dependent. In (3.6), X is suprised at one friend but not the other,
and thus has more reason to theorise about the lateness of the former than
the latter. It may have been surprising to someone pre-Galileo that a can-
nonball wouldn’t fall faster than a feather in a vacuum, but this wouldn’t
be surprising to a modern physicist. In (3.5), X expects to see and is thus
not surprised by novel gestures, but in this case X is required by the rules of
the game to hypothesise about gestures that are not explainable given what
X currently knows. It is, on the whole, a rather human desire to want to
guess at all.
Secondly, the notion of explanation here is also psychological, not logical.
Adapting an example from Thagard (2007), if a friend is grumpy and the
hypothesised explanation is that they are stressed, then the premise accord-
ing to schema (3.4) would be, ‘If they are stressed, their grumpiness would
be a matter of course’. But this explanation is not the logical conditional,
‘If they are stressed, then they are grumpy.’ One could adopt the hypothesis
and still allow that the friend might be stressed without being grumpy. In
the case of a material conditional, this would contravene modus tollens. On
the other hand, a coroner can assent to the truth of the material conditional
8Despite Peirce’s calling it ‘psychology’, abduction is far more likely to be studied by
AI than by psychology (Thagard, 2007). This is an incongruity I hope to mend.
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‘if one is human, one will die’ without finding ‘he was human’ a satisfac-
tory explanation of someone’s death (Josephson, 2000). The hypothesis is
an explanation to the extent that it achieves some level of psychological
satisfaction: one simply stops wondering why the friend is grumpy on this
occasion if one is satisfied with the explanation, and one needn’t feel pressed
to find out whether the friend can be stressed but not grumpy9.
So explanation here is rather subjective, varying according to the indi-
vidual’s beliefs and knowledge in addition to their goals and resources, as is
typical in the economics of inquiry. Science aims at objective, logical expla-
nations, but as Sperber and Wilson (1995) remarked, scientific progress is
not necessarily the best analogy for the very fast, highly fallible inferences
that humans make on a daily basis, including pragmatic inference. Sperber
and Wilson thus reject this open-ended form of inference to focus on deduc-
tion. I differ from Sperber and Wilson by claiming that pragmatic inference
and scientific reasoning both involve abductive hypothesis generation. The
difference is that scientific reasoning proceeds more logically, and thus more
slowly and dependably, after hypothesis generation.
Thirdly and finally, abduction allows for quite a broad view of represen-
tation: the hypothesis needn’t be a proposition, but could be an image, a
concept, a fact, a rule, or a theory. If you see a scratch on your car in the
parking lot and spontaneously have an image of a shopping trolley scrap-
ing past then this is an hypothesis (Thagard, 2007). Logic is a matter of
propositions only; this example is a matter for psychology.
An area of confusion in Peirce’s writing is that he sometimes describes
abduction as inference and sometimes as instinct. However, Peirce doesn’t
distinguish inference and reasoning as I have, so by ‘inference’ here he means
beliefs reached by deliberate or conscious reflection (CP 2.182, c. 1902), i.e.
my ‘reasoning’. Peirce’s use of the term ‘instinct’, then, simply means ev-
erything that is not consciously or deliberately reasoned: it is not limited
to innate behaviour, and can be adapted by learning (Paavola, 2005). So
Peirce’s claim that abduction is instinctive is compatible with my sense of
‘inferential’.
Peirce presents this in an explicitly evolutionary framework: ‘all human
9Cf. Wason’s card selection test (Wason, 1968) where people deviate from rational
application of modus tollens depending on context: the context is a matter of just what
is to be explained.
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knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development of
our inborn animal instincts’ (CP/, 2.754, 1883), so my inferential hierarchy
is Peircean in spirit. In particular, Peirce’s claim seems to be that there
is an affinity between our ideas and nature (CP 2.776, 1902). That is, our
representations and the structures that they participate in are unlikely to
misrepresent the world entirely. If they did, our survival would be unlikely.
Abduction may be capable of flights of imagination, but if its mechanisms are
rooted in representations and structures that have an affinity with nature,
then it may be constrained by them, as I will argue below.
In sum, this subsection has argued that research into abduction is better
carried out in a psychological framework (how we think), rather than a
normative one (how we ought to think). The next subsection looks at what
sort of psychological process this might be.
3.3.6 The psychological processes of discovery involve plau-
sibility, not probability
Abduction is not a random guess. It is a process operating over informa-
tion of some kind. The description above may seem to suggest (and it is
commonly assumed in cognitive science) that the relevant information is
probabilistic, but Peirce claims that abduction a matter of plausibility, not
probability (CP 2.103, c. 1902; 2.662, 1910). These concepts are sometimes
considered distinct (e.g. Gettys and Fisher, 1979; Bylander et al., 1991), but
are more commonly conflated (e.g. Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2009). Since I
will argue (following Peirce) that probability cannot explain creative abduc-
tion, I need something other than probability to go on. This section thus
offers a proposal for what plausibility might be, such that it differs from
probability. It is just a proposal, however, because cognitive science has
not studied plausibility as extensively as probability. Fortunately, Peirce
mentions two particular mechanisms which play an abductive role: insight
(CP 5.181, 1903) and analogy (CP 7.218, 1901). These are less vague than
plausibility and are studied in some detail in psychology, so these will even-
tually provide testable predictions.
Simplifying somewhat and taking a subjectivist reading of probabil-
ity10, a Bayesian approach to new data evaluates a prior probability (the
10That is, by ‘probability’ meaning someone’s degree of belief in an hypothesis (Chater
et al., 2006). This is opposed to a frequentist reading, which concerns statistical relation-
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probability of the hypothesis prior to seeing the data) and a likelihood (how
probable that data would be, assuming the hypothesis) to calculate the pos-
terior probability (how probable the hypothesis is, given that specific data).
Bayes’ rule makes the posterior probability proportional to the product of
the prior probability and the likelihood (Griffiths et al., 2010).
The general idea concerning plausibility is that it has something to
do with over-all coherence in relation to background knowledge (CP 7.220,
1901). To provide something more concrete, I ground plausibility in a se-
mantic network (fig. 3.2), a complex, layered, multi-dimensional, structured
web of representations where one node causes activation of others associated
with it according to the strength or weight of the connection between them.
Negative strengths or weights provide inhibitory relationships. A compari-
son with fig. 1.1 in §1.2.3.1 suggests that nodes in these networks function
as representational interpretants (Eco, 1978).
The proposal here is intended to underlie the notion of accessibility in
Sperber and Wilson (1995). But in their model, the associates of a concept
are accessed one-by-one, while a node here simultaneously activates all of
its associates with differing strengths. Sperber and Wilson don’t explicitly
allow for inhibitory relationships, while I do. Holyoak and Thagard (1995)
argue that something just like this underlies analogy, and it is also similar to
a Bayes net (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2009). Bayes nets typically (but not
always) express causal relationships (Griffiths et al., 2008), while I intend
this to include semantic relationships in multiple dimensions.
Bayesianism typically assumes that the structure of the net and the
strength of the connections between nodes are in turn derived from previ-
ous data by probabilistic principles (for instance, Griffiths and Tenenbaum,
2009). In that case, probability would be the ultimate explanation for the
network. I assume that strength and structure may partly be derived from
probabilistic information, but that this isn’t the whole story since salience,
relevance and context interact with probabilistic information in complex
ways not yet fully understood.
An example will help distinguish plausibility- from probability-based hy-
pothesis generation. Imagine that a friend told you they had a new pet and
that you hypothesised that it was a dog. A subjective probability-based ac-
count would argue that the ultimate explanation for why you generated this
ships in the world.
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Figure 3.2: Two ways in which information might potentially be represented in a semantic
web (though neither happens to show connection weights). The first shows word associ-
ations centred on butterfly (Kiss et al., 1973). The second shows world knowledge
associated with plant (Quillian, 1968). They simply represent different dimensions of
our semantic knowledge.
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hypothesis first is that your prior probability for dogs being pets is higher
than for other animals or, taking a frequentist view, that dogs are the most
common pet in your experience. A plausibility-based account would claim
that the representation most accessible from pet in your representational
network was dog.
On a plausibility-based account, the accessibility of dog from pet isn’t
necessarily rationally derived from probabilistic data. When asked to give
the first word that comes to mind when they hear ‘pet’, people are much
more likely to say ‘dog’ than ‘cat’ (Kiss et al., 1973; Nelson et al., 1998).
Perhaps dogs are more prototypical pets. However, there are approximately
equal number of dogs and cats in Britain (Pet Food Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, 2013), where the data in Kiss et al. was collected. Unless most
people’s experience of pets is severely biased such that they encounter dogs
much more often than cats despite the numbers being equal, this would
mean that the weights in their semantic network don’t necessarily reflect
probabilities and thus aren’t solely explained by them. I’m not claiming
that probability has no role to play here, but I’m currently arguing that
abduction is distinct because it involves plausibility, and that plausibility
doesn’t reduce to probability; nor is it an algorithmic-level approximation of
probability alone. A large scale study comparing similar word associations
and statistics would determine whether the above accessibility/probability
disjunction is the norm or an aberration.
As a further illustration of the plausibilty/probability disjunction, there
are bound to be facts that you recall with difficulty, but are certain about
once recalled11, as well as things you’re uncertain about but recall with
ease. Switching to a frequentist view, there are bound to be irrelevant
things you’ve experienced frequently that you struggle to recall and salient
things you’ve experienced once that you will never forget12.
This discussion has been quite informal so far, but there is evidence sup-
porting a plausibility account. Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) review
11Until I looked it up just now, I would have struggled to name the capital of South
Sudan, even though I’ve read about it recently. But if instead I’d been shown a list of 20
African capitals, I’d have been able to pick out the right answer with absolute confidence,
so the information is in my brain and has a high prior, but is relatively inaccessible.
12These are empirical questions, but they lie beyond the limits of this dissertation. This
is not a serious gap in my argument, since I derive testable predictions from Peirce’s claims
that abduction rests on analogy and insight. I will argue that these, like plausibility, rest
on representational structures.
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experiments based on subjective judgements of probability, and argue that
accessibility in representational structures underlies commonly observed de-
viations from optimal or rational judgement. One such deviation is much
like the above pet/dog example and is normally called ‘the representative-
ness bias’ in the relevant literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). After
reading a text that describes Linda as concerned with social justice issues
(among other things), participants rate it more likely that she is a feminist
bank teller than that she is a bank teller, even though, rationally, the prob-
ability of two events occurring cannot be higher than the probability of one
of them. The description of Linda makes her appear similar to participants’
representation of a typical feminist. Morewedge and Kahneman explicitly
frame the matter in dual-process terms, such that system 1 processes ‘gener-
ate impressions and tentative judgments, which might be accepted, blocked,
or corrected by controlled [system 2] processes’ (Morewedge and Kahne-
man, 2010, 435). They seem, then, to characterise system 1 as associative
and non-normative and the mention of ‘tentative’ sounds compatible with
abductive conjecture.
Recall the vignette about John wading in water not knowing there was
glass nearby, then crying for help (Beeman, 1993). The hypothesis was that
he’d cut his foot. A basic probability-based account would have to explain
how it is that an interpreter’s representative system contained the hypothesis
and how the interpreter came to represent or estimate both a prior proba-
bility for that hypothesis and the likelihood that he would cry out if he cut
his foot. Not knowing John, I have no idea whether he tends to cry when
bleeding, though I think it plausible. A plausibility-based account rests on
activation spreading through a semantic network, as described in §2.6. Neu-
rological evidence supports the plausibility account. Firstly, RHD patients
struggled to generate the plausible hypothesis about why John cried out
(Beeman, 1993), but these RH temporal areas are not implicated in pro-
cessing inductive probability, which is associated more with hippocampal
and LH frontal activation (Goel et al., 1997; Goel and Dolan, 2004). They
are, however, implicated in the sort of semantic and associative relation-
ships under consideration (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Bowden et al., 2005).
Secondly, Beeman et al. (1994) showed RH facilitation for the target cut
given primes foot/glass/cry. These correspond to general concepts, not
propositions, so they (and the weights of their connections) are distinct from
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whatever probabilities might play a role in a basic Bayesian account, since
this would concern degree of belief in a proposition13.
As a final way of distinguishing plausibility and probability, consider
novel metaphors. I reviewed evidence (§2.6.4) showing that these involve
context-deciding inferences over semantic structures and are thus of interest
here. Compare ‘the investors were squirrels collecting nuts’ with ‘the in-
vestors were trams’ (Bottini et al., 1994). The first is plausible, the second
nonsensical, but probability has nothing to do with the fact: investors are
not squirrels and they are not trams. They are not even closely related to
squirrels, so the simile ‘investors are like squirrels’ is quite unlike the literal
statement ‘rats are like squirrels’. The latter straightforwardly supports in-
ductive generalisation from ‘squirrels have novel property X’ to ‘rats have
novel property X’. The former cannot support a similar generalisation prior
to relevance-, salience- or context-deciding inferences about the ground of
the metaphor. For instance, the metaphor may prompt the inference that
‘investors are acquisitive’ but not ‘investors have bushy tails’. Having bushy
tails is a salient property of squirrels, but is not salient in this particular
context. Bottini et al. (1994) show in a neuroimaging study that partici-
pants’ evaluation of plausibility in metaphors implicates RH areas like those
active in context-deciding inference (§2.6), and Bookheimer (2002) explicitly
interprets the results of Bottini et al. as a matter of context.
In sum, rather than evaluating the probability that something belongs
to a certain category or has a certain feature, a cognitive system might
evaluate its similarity to a prototype in semantic memory or its centrality
in the structured representation of that category; rather than evaluate the
probability of an event, a system might respond with whatever representa-
tion is most accessible given a particular cue. These plausibility features of
semantic representation do not reduce to probability.
The discussion above has focused on distinguishing plausibility from
probability in selective abduction. In selective cases, I admit that plau-
sibility may not sound all that different in practice from probability. But
even if it turned out that plausibility sometimes reduces to probability, that
reduction wouldn’t work outside of contextually constrained, selective cases.
That is, it wouldn’t extend to creative cases. Inductive accounts tend to stick
to contextually constrained cases, though, so it’s unsurprising if they some-
13I examine more sophisticated Bayesian approaches below.
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times think hypothesis generation isn’t much of a problem to explain. But
for the symbolic threshold, we are interested in contextually unconstrained,
creative abduction, so this difference is important.
Peirce’s reasons for rejecting a probabilistic account of creative abduc-
tion are quite straightforward: if a problem is entirely new, one is ignorant
of the hypothesis in question. Or, in the case of a partly creative abduc-
tion as in (3.5), one is ignorant of the relationship between the relevant
hypothesis and the explanandum. So in the context of discovery, since one’s
memory lacks either a representation of the hypothesis, or of the relationship
between hypothesis and explanandum, the representational system lacks ei-
ther a prior probability or a likelihood function14. Basic forms of induction
are thus unable to explain such cases.
But there are more sophisticated forms of induction that propose ways
of getting around the problem of no priors, no likelihoods, or no hypotheses.
These have to posit additional machinery that are much like the representa-
tional structures I’ve been discussing, so in the next section I examine that
machinery in light of contextually unconstrained, novel hypotheses.
3.3.7 Conclusions
I’ve argued that abduction is conjecture in the context of discovery, and
thus requires a non-normative psychological account, rather than by a log-
ical account that looks for optimality or truth. I made some proposals for
how plausibility might underlie such an account, but this rests on seman-
tic associations rather than syntactic processes. That is, abduction is an
empiricist, not rationalist process. In the next section, I turn to examine
whether the rationalist processes posited by Bayesianism can ever explain
hypothesis generation in unconstrained, novel contexts. That is, Bayesian
accounts are appropriate to the context of justification, and are misapplied
to hypothesis generation, properly considered in the context of discovery.
14Though Peirce didn’t phrase things in these Bayesian terms, Psillos (2009) argues
that this is what he meant, and that Peirce’s phrase ‘inverse probability’ translates to
‘likelihood’, while ‘antecedent probability’ is ‘prior probability’.
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3.4 Abduction can’t be reduced to induction
Crossing the symbolic threshold requires novel context-deciding inference. I
suggested in the previous section that induction in its basic form isn’t able
to deal with novel contexts. Here, I consider more sophisticated Bayesian
tactics for dealing with novelty and complex contexts. I conclude that even
sophisticated induction is still contextually constrained and ill-equipped for
creativity. The conclusion is not that induction is flawed or inappropriate;
just that inductive accounts are incomplete, that this is most obvious in
creative, context-deciding situations, and that abduction provides a small
set of hypotheses as the constrained context for inductive evaluation, thereby
allowing it to be psychologically realistic or computationally tractable. In
other words, the central point of this section is to argue that hypothesis
generation is not fully explicable in inductive terms, though it might seem
to reduce to induction in artificially constrained cases such as experiments.
3.4.1 Types of Bayesianism and Bayesian assumptions
I must be specific about just what kind of Bayesianism I am engaging with
when I say that abduction complements induction, and which I’m avoiding
outright or think incompatible. There are two important dimensions here.
The first dimension distinguishes enlightened from fundamentalist Bayesians
(Jones and Love, 2011). The second distinguishes methodological from theo-
retical Bayesians (Bowers and Davis, 2012a). (1) Fundamentalist Bayesians
are concerned only with the computational level and make no commitments
to psychological mechanisms of any kind. Englightened Bayesians focus on
the computational level, but are interested in what computational models
tells us about human cognition at the algorithmic level. (2) Methodological
Bayesians are enlightened Bayesians who think that computational models
of Bayesian processes inform us about human cognition, without claiming
that human cognition actually carries out Bayesian calculations. Theoret-
ical Bayesians are enlightened Bayesians who think that the mind either
performs or approximates Bayesian calculations, which requires representa-
tions or approximations of priors and likelihoods.
My claims in this section (that probabilistic accounts of hypothesis gen-
eration are either psychologically unrealistic or computationally intractable)
are intended to engage only enlightened methodological Bayesians. Funda-
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mentalist Bayesians are uninterested in the question of psychological pro-
cesses, and theoretical Bayesians assume that the relevant processes are
probabilistic. I recognise that there is an element of straw man (or even
Bogeyman) in this picture, and leading Bayesians deny the existence of ev-
erything other than enlightened methodological Bayesianism (Chater et al.,
2011; Griffiths et al., 2012). Nonetheless, Jones and Love (2011) and Bow-
ers and Davis (2012b) quote from the literature to show either that these
Bogeymen exist, or at least that Bayesians often talk as though they exist.
Regardless of their existence or imputed character, I think it important to
stake out the playing field clearly, and the above can serve as warning flags
indicating that one is about to go out of bounds. They can usefully serve
that function even if nobody explicitly intends to do so.
I think there is a particular temptation to sneak out of bounds when
it comes to hypothesis generation. If one assumes that inference is either
deductive or inductive (and I’ve mentioned that this is a widespread assump-
tion), then since hypothesis generation is not deductive, it would follow that
it must be inductive. Unless, of course, one allows for ampliative inferences
that are not inductive, as methodological Bayesians must allow. However,
very few explicitly do so (one example is Kemp and Jern, 2014); others
tend to talk as though everything ampliative is inductive. Similarly, there
might not actually be any real fundamentalist Bayesians. But if it turns out
that some computational process is intractable but nonetheless performed
effortlessly by humans, and if one wants to account for the evolution of this
process, one should inquire into just how algorithmic processes handle the
situation and whether there might be several types of algorithmic process
at work, unless of course one is a fundamentalist.
With all that in place, we can now set out some basic assumptions. Re-
call that, for Peirce, induction is ‘for testing hypotheses already in hand’
(CP 7.217, c. 1901). A related point underlies Bayesian induction in that
it assumes structured hypothesis spaces that are well defined or ‘known,
enumerated and exhaustive’ (Gettys and Fisher, 1979). That is, ‘[a] proba-
bilistic model starts with a formal characterization of an inductive problem,
specifying the hypotheses under consideration, the relation between these
hypotheses and observable data [i.e. a likelihood function], and the prior
probability of each hypothesis’ (Griffiths et al., 2010, 358). So the relevant
hypotheses are already known and in place before induction begins its work
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(Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007; Holyoak and Cheng, 2011).
While Bayesian accounts are concerned with relative strengths of those
hypotheses already contained in the hypothesis space, ‘they do not pro-
vide criteria for evaluating the hypothesis space itself’ (Carroll and Kemp,
2013, 287). Secondly, Chater and Oaksford (2008) claim that calculating
posterior probability is descriptively simple, but that assigning priors and
likelihoods in the first place is the difficult part of a Bayesian approach. Both
these points are emphasised by Jones and Love: ‘[t]he prior distribution is
the well-known and oft-critized lack of constraint in most Bayesian models
. . . However, a much more serious source of indeterminacy comes from the
choice of the hypothesis set itself’ (2011, 178); ‘the hypothesis space is where
the interesting psychology lies in most Bayesian models’ (2011, 219). Given
all this, some Bayesians admit that hypothesis generation is still poorly un-
derstood from an inductive point of view (e.g. Bonawitz and Griffiths, 2010;
Navarro and Perfors, 2011). However, even these tend to assume that it is
somehow still inductive.
Given that a well defined hypothesis space is a basic assumption of induc-
tion, it seems that Bayesianism alone can thus never provide a psychological
account of how new hypotheses are discovered. But it has nonetheless made
some valiant efforts, which I must thus examine in coming subsections, where
I’ll be arguing for cognitive mechanisms that involve neither representations
nor approximations of probability. The above boundary markers will be
important in what follows, given that it is standard practice for cognitive
Bayesians all of stripes to assume rational analysis, while treating abduction
as rational is to misconstrue the nature of discovery: the minimal unit that
includes abduction and is rational is the entire process of inquiry (§3.3.4).
3.4.2 Constrained and unconstrained word-learning tasks
Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) investigate word-learning by presenting partic-
ipants with a picture together with a novel label. The picture could be
interpreted by categories at various levels of generality: the label accompa-
nying a picture of a red pepper could mean ‘red pepper’, ‘pepper’ or ‘veg-
etable’. Before the word-learning task, however, the experimenters showed
the participants all 24 items in the test. Participants could thus be pretty
certain just what counted as a possible hypothesis by the time they had to
learn novel words, and it was not a large set (pace, Quine). This task is
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thus constrained by the experimental methodology. The authors admit that
the main work is done by specifying priors and likelihoods in their model,
and that, from a psychological point of view, hypotheses could be derived
from similarity judgements (to be discussed further when I come to look at
analogy in §3.5.1).
Compare the above with a less constrained word-guessing task such as
charades. Let’s say that a particular game is limited to English nouns. Like
the above constrained example, players must generate hypotheses about the
meaning of a novel signal. To do so, either (1) guessers must evaluate a vast
hypothesis space of all English nouns, or (2) they can first make inferences
to generate a small, focal set of hypotheses to evaluate.
If (1) were true, then by an inductive account, participants would have
to evaluate the posterior probability of all nouns in their memory. How-
ever, both within Bayesianism and outside, it is generally recognised that
for such complex, unconstrained cases (so typical of real-world problem solv-
ing), exact calculations of posterior probabilities are either computationally
intractable or, if tractable, would take much longer than is normal for hu-
man problem solving (Chater and Oaksford, 2008; Griffiths et al., 2010;
Kwisthout et al., 2011; Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2012). Without mention-
ing Bayesianism, Sperber and Wilson (1995) make a similar point when
they argue that pragmatics is context-deciding (cf. §1.5.2.1). These are
computational-level worries, but there is also experimental evidence demon-
strating that evaluating probabilities in large spaces is psychologically un-
realistic.
Smith et al. (2011) investigated word-learning in situations where par-
ticipants must track probabilities across contexts. Context size could vary.
They found that participants were unable to track probabilities accurately
once the context contained more than eight entities. It is unlikely, then,
that the charades problem is solved by evaluating posterior probabilities for
all English nouns (or, indeed, for many). Other experiments demonstrate
that humans do not actively evaluate large sets of hypotheses: typically, we
generate a comparatively small, focal set of relevant or salient hypotheses
on the fly (Gettys and Fisher, 1979; Johnson and Krems, 2001; Dougherty
and Hunter, 2003; Thomas et al., 2008). If the generated focal set is well
defined, induction avoids having to evaluate posterior probabilities across
vast spaces.
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It is thus computationally intractable and psychologically unrealistic for
humans to inductively evaluate vast hypothesis spaces: the evidence shows
(1) to be false, leaving (2). Evaluation of a vast range of hypotheses is
possible in theory, but in practice some process produces a focal set for
evaluation. The vast range of possible hypotheses may exist in the semantic
memory of the agent in question (as in a game of charades), or the hypothesis
might not exist at all in any psychologically realistic sense (before Einstein
thought up curved spacetime to explain the anomalous orbit of Mercury, it
could not have realistically been the case that this idea existed in anyone’s
memory). Hypothesis generation either selects or creates hypotheses for a
focal set, placing them in working memory. The conclusion here is a two-step
model: generation of the focal set (by selection or creation), then evaluation
of hypotheses in working memory (Gettys and Fisher, 1979; Dougherty and
Hunter, 2003; Cherubini et al., 2005; Gabbay and Woods, 2006; Thomas
et al., 2008; Bonawitz and Griffiths, 2010; Navarro and Perfors, 2011).
Consequently, a potential issue with all inductive experiments (such as
Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007, above) is that they begin with the second step:
by giving the participants the relevant set of hypotheses, they constrain the
context of the inference. This may not be problematic for methodological
Bayesian purposes, but it does mean that the results of such experiments
are not necessarily informative in accounting for symbol origins. I argued
that the symbolic threshold requires an account of how humans generate
hypotheses in unconstrained contexts. Therefore, an inductive account of
word-learning in a constrained context cannot be used to argue for an in-
ductive account of symbol origins. I’ve discussed how Medina et al. (2011)
raised the same issue in child world learning (§2.5.2.2).
3.4.3 Two-step models: single- or dual-process?
The plausibility of two-step models (first hypothesis generation, then evalu-
ation) raises the question of whether the two steps are cognitively similar at
the algorithmic level. Although the first step does not involve computation
of posterior probabilities, hypotheses could still be selected for inclusion in
the focal set according to inductive features (such as priors or likelihoods),
in which case the two steps would be quite similar. If this fails, it could be
that some or other probabilistic algorithm succeeds.
In the charades example, assuming uniform priors won’t help, since that
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wouldn’t recommend any hypothesis over another for inclusion in the focal
set, and the context would remain all possible nouns. Neither will assuming
that priors can be derived from word frequencies: words used in a game
of charades are typically infrequent, so working from more frequent to less
frequent meanings would still involve evaluating a vast space.
Bonawitz and Griffiths (2010) provide experimental support for the ba-
sic idea that hypothesis generation is not simply a matter of priors or likeli-
hoods. They presented participants with a variant of a transitive inference
task. Participants saw pairs of cubes marked with letters approaching each
other. When the cubes met, one would light up according (unbeknownst
to the participants) to an arbitrary ordering of those letters. Before the
inference task, one group of participants was primed with a vignette about
teachers observing children playing a game and trying to predict who would
win. The vignette stated that teachers realised that each time the taller child
won: tallness is a transitive relationship. The other group was given a neu-
tral vignette which didn’t prompt a transitive interpretation. The primed
group were more likely to solve the cube problem, but both groups rated the
answer equally probable when given it. The results of the experiment would
be surprising if participants represented the relevant priors and likelihoods
and if hypotheses were generated for evaluation because they were probable
by either count. A natural interpretation, I think, is that humans simply
don’t explore a vast hypothesis space, selecting hypotheses for inclusion in
the focal set according to priors and likelihoods. Bonawitz and Griffiths
seem to assume that generation still somehow involves approximations of
probability, but they note that larger hypotheses spaces will compromise the
success of these approximations, which raises the question of how humans
still manage to be quite good at this sort of thing in open-ended contexts.
In fact, there are serious issues with trying to give any kind of probabilis-
tic account of how the focal set is generated. It turns out that our evaluations
of probability are sometimes relative to a focal set. For instance, Dougherty
and Hunter (2003) show that the size of the focal set (determined in part by
individual differences in working memory) influences judgements of proba-
bility. Sprenger et al. (2011) show that dividing attention also has an effect
on probability judgements, and claim that memory encoding and retrieval
(i.e. accessibility) play an explanatory role here. Hayes and Newell (2009)
demonstrate, by manipulating the relative salience of focal hypotheses, that
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different inductive inferences are drawn depending on the set. Since sub-
jective probability is determined relative to a focal set, it becomes doubtful
whether it can fully explain the set’s constitution. Tversky and Kahne-
man (1974) show that participants often neglect priors and sample sizes in
their probability judgements. I discussed why sample size is irrelevant for
abduction, unlike induction (§3.3.1).
Kaplan and Simon (1990) tested participants on a problem called the
Mutilated Checkerboard15. Solving the problem either involves an exhaus-
tive search through a vast problem space, or involves noticing salient features
of the problem and forming a representation of them. Some representations
were relevant, others irrelevant. A relevant representation allowed compar-
atively quick solution times. They found that participants typically began
with an exhaustive search, but that since that ‘[s]ubjects are not equipped
with generators for searching the space of “all possible representations”’ (Ka-
plan and Simon, 1990, 403), they became discouraged with this approach
and switched to the other. The authors describe this switch in strategy in
terms of salience, relevance, representation and insight. Because the strate-
gic switch resulted in a significant shortening of the solution time, I take
it that these features are implicated in producing a focal hypothesis set. I
eventually aim to show that they are.
There are also a few computational models divided (roughly) along
the sorts of lines I’m proposing. Johnson and Krems (2001) argue that
since context-dependent processes compete with context-independent ones,
a complete model of abduction requires both connectionist (system 1) and
syntactic (system 2) processes16. Thomas et al. (2008) examine hypothesis
generation and evaluation in medical diagnosis, roughly the sort of situation
described in example (3.7) above. The model does not evaluate the posterior
probability of all possible hypotheses held in the semantic memory of the
agents, but just evaluates a small set held in working memory. Hypothesis
15Participants were asked to decide (and prove informally) whether it’s possible to
cover all squares on a checkerboard with dominoes that each cover two squares (hori-
zontally or vertically adjacent) after the top left and bottom right corner of the board
have been removed, leaving an even number of squares. Solution involved noticing that
the removed pieces were the same colour, but that all possible domino positions covered
different colours. So it is impossible to cover all squares with dominoes.
16They consider abduction in the IBE sense, though, which assumes a degree of nor-
mativity and blurs the lines with induction (§3.3.4). It is uncontroversial to characterise
induction as rationalist (and thus system 2), so my focus here is on whether abduction is
distinct from induction by including system 1 processes.
3.4. ABDUCTION CAN’T BE REDUCED TO INDUCTION 159
generation is what selects a subset of the hypotheses in semantic memory
for activation in working memory, so it is a two-step model. Hypothesis
generation in the model is a combination of accessibility and similarity, not
explicitly encoded probability, so it is a dual-process account, too. Hélie
and Sun (2010) argue that, in order to model human performance in tests of
creativity, insight and inference, one needs dual-process architecture with re-
dundant representations: both distributed, associative representations and
local probabilistic representations.
These experiments and models suggest that hypothesis generation is not
solely a matter of inductive probability, firstly since probabilities are judged
relative to a focal set, not independently of it; and secondly since genera-
tion is describable in non-inductive terms. It is thus highly plausible that
something other than probability might play an explanatory role in how the
focal set is generated in the first place. Based on my discussion of contextu-
ally unconstrained inference in ch. 2 and abduction in §3.3, and the evidence
here, candidates for such a role include insight, analogy, salience, relevance
and accessibility. These are all hallmarks of abduction in unconstrained
contexts.
That is, I am proposing both a two-step model (generation then eval-
uation) and a dual-process model (system 1 is empiricist and system 2 is
rationalist). These two parameters are logically independent: Bonawitz and
Griffiths (2010), for instance, assume a two-step model without assuming
dual processes. What I am arguing, then, is that the parameters are not
independent in practice, given the problem of novelty in unconstrained con-
texts. ‘System 1’ and ‘system 2’ are used in variety of senses by different
authors (Evans, 2008), but a common distinction involves associationist vs.
syntactic implementations. My characterisation of them as empiricist and
rationalist, respectively, adds normativity to the mix: abduction is non-
normative because it is conjectural, which is why typical normative argu-
ments against system 1 accounts (for instance, Fodor, 2001; Griffiths et al.,
2010) don’t apply. Abduction doesn’t need to be normative, because that’s
what induction is for. It is common to characterise system 1 processes as
modular and system 2 as global (Evans, 2008; Mercier and Sperber, 2009),
but since abduction is contextually unconstrained, it is in fact global (Fodor,
2001, cf. §3.3.1 above).
In sum, I predict that there should be measurable differences in cognitive
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processing between constrained and unconstrained contexts. Abduction and
induction both play essential roles in unconstrained contexts, since these re-
quire a two-step process. But in constrained contexts (such as inductive
word-learning experiments) the role of abduction is reduced because a focal
set of hypotheses is simply handed to participants. Because I’ve argued for a
dual-process account of the two-step process, I predict that these cognitive
differences due to contextual constraint should involve terms highlighted
above, such as insight, salience, relevance and accessibility. These predic-
tions are tested in part II.
3.4.4 Missing information: the problem of no priors
The previous section focused on the problem of context-size. But hypothe-
ses can be unconstrained in other ways, too. In charades, the gestures are
novel. Even though someone trying to interpret the gesture has a represen-
tation of the eventual answer stored in their memory, this doesn’t mean they
are able to make the link between that particular representation and that
particular gesture (unless they always link all possible nouns to all possible
gestures, which is psychologically unrealistic). Psychologically, there simply
is no likelihood function. At the symbolic threshold, our ancestors would
have lacked priors, likelihoods, whole hypotheses, and even entire theories
of meaning.
Before I look at how Bayesianism deals with novelty, I’ll outline how
the lack of likelihoods and priors in novel cases makes a principled differ-
ence to the problem. Binmore (2009) and Brighton and Gigerenzer (2012)
argue that Bayesian methods are only appropriate in small worlds. A well
defined hypothesis space is a small world: its elements are known, as are
the associated priors and likelihoods. If there is missing information, such
as uncertainty about which hypotheses are in the set, or unknown proba-
bilities, it becomes a large-world problem. They argue that large worlds
increase uncertainty in both variance and bias, and that methods of reduc-
ing one tend to increase the other. Large worlds (and thus novelty) thus
undermine the assumptions and (thus the validity) of a rational analysis ap-
proach. Bayesianism often ignores this limitation, though (Gigerenzer and
Sturm, 2012). I argued that abduction is not a rationalist process, so it
is coherent that a two-step dual-process account should treat a large-world
problem as abductive and a small-world problem as inductive.
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Figure 7. Three hierarchical Bayesian models. (a) A model for inferring !new, the bias of a coin.
dnew specifies the number of heads and tails observed when the coin is tossed. !new is is drawn
from a beta distribution with parameters " and #. The prior distribution on these parameters has
a single hyperparameter, $. (b) A model for inferring enew, the extension of a novel property. dnew
is a sparsely observed version of enew, and enew is assumed to be drawn from a prior distribution
induced by structured representation S. The hyperparameter $ specifies a prior distribution over
a hypothesis space of structured representations. (c) A model that can discover the form F of the
structure S. The hyperparameter $ now specifies a prior distribution over a hypothesis space of
structural forms.
is tightly peaked around its mean when " + # is large, flat when " = # = 1, and U-shaped
when " + # is small (Figure 6). Observing the coin being tossed provides some information
about the values of " and #, and a learner who begins with prior distributions on the values
of these parameters can update these distributions as each new coin toss is observed. The
prior distributions on " and # may be defined in terms of one or more hyperparameters. The
hierarchical model in Figure 7a uses three levels, where the hyperparameter at the top level
($) is fixed. In principle, however, we can develop hierarchical models with any number of
levels — we can can continue adding hyperparameters and priors on these hyperparameters
until we reach a level where we are willing to assume that the hyperparameters are fixed in
advance.
At first, the upper levels in hierarchical models like Figure 7a might seem too abstract
to be of much practical use. Yet these upper levels play a critical role — they allow
knowledge to be shared across contexts that are related but distinct. In our coin tossing
example, these contexts correspond to observations of many di!erent coins, each of which
has a bias sampled from the same prior distribution Beta(",#). It is possible to learn
something about " and # by tossing a single coin, but the best way to learn about " and #
is probably to experiment with many di!erent coins. If most coins tend to come up heads
about half the time, we might infer that " and # are both large, and are close to each other
in size. Suppose, however, that we are working in a factory that produces trick coins for
Figure 3.3: A hierarchical Bayesian model (Griffiths et al., 2008).
This worry notwithstanding, Chater and Oaksford (2008) suggest that
one way of constraining probabilistic models (for instance, when lacking pri-
ors or lik lihoods) is o make representation, rather than probability, foun-
dational. In that case, probabilities can be inferred from representational
structures. Hierarchical Bayesian models offer a plausible way of doing this:
representations may fall into higher-level categories or be decomposable into
lower-level features, so missing information at one level might be derivable
from representations at other levels in a hierarchical structure.
For example, Griffiths et al. (2008) discuss how priors can be derived
from background knowledge in a case of novel property induction. Learners
discover that members f a category have a novel property (e.g. that gorillas
carry enzyme X132) and must then decide how far this property extends
(e.g. whether chimpanzee carry X132). Assuming the hier rchical mo el in
fig. 3.3, they are trying to infer enew, the extension of the property; they have
ob erved a subset of dnew, the data that migh esult fr m that exte i n.
In this example, enew is a binary vector representing the extension of the
property. Let’s assume that learners have hypothesised that the element of
vector enew corresponding to gorillas is 1 since dnew includes observations of
gorillas with that property; it would be 0 otherwise. The task is to infer
values for other elements of the vector for which there are no observations
(such as the element corresponding to chimpanzees). Given that the prop-
erty is new, they do not initially represent a prior for chimpanzees having
X132.
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The point of a hierarchical Bayesian model is that, since there are no pri-
ors for elements in enew, priors can be derived from higher-level information
in S, which is the structured background knowledge relevant to this prob-
lem. In this case, S is a tree structure representing taxonomic information:
chimpanzees are closely related to gorillas, and seals are less closely related
(fig. 3.4). Priors for elements in enew can be derived from the structured
representation in S: the closer an animal is to gorillas in the taxonomic
tree, the higher the inferred prior for the element of enew corresponding to
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Figure 9. Learning a tree-structured prior for property induction. Given a collection of sparsely
observed properties di (a black circle indicates that a species has a given property), we can compute
a posterior distribution on structure S and posterior distributions on each extension ei. Since the
distribution over S is di!cult to display, we show a single tree with high posterior probability. Since
each distribution on ei is di!cult to display, we show instead the posterior probability that each
species has each property (dark circles indicate probabilities close to 1).
Figure 3.4: Representational structure in S (Griffiths et al., 2008).
Since S is itself learnt, its parameters are not fixed and must be derived
from a higher level. So ‘the hyperparameter λ specifies a prior distribution
over a hypothesis space of structured representations’ (Griffiths et al., 2008,
26). We cannot have an infinite regress of derived probabilities, so at some
point we need a level with parameters that are fixed in advance, hence λ.
It is possible to include additional levels between S and λ, though. In
the above example, S is a taxonomic tree, but Griffiths et al. (2008, 2010)
and Tenenbaum et al. (2006) point out that other problems might need
chains, rings, sets of clusters, linear continua, Euclidean spaces, domain-
specific theories (such as Newtonian physics), schemas, causal Bayes nets or
various other kinds of representation. Fig. 3.5 shows suitable structures for,
respectively, a novel property problem of the sort discussed above; a problem
where the property is a disease and the structure reflects the intuitive theory
that diseases are much more likely to pass from prey to predator than the
other way around; a linear representation animals ranked by weight. In
fig. 3.6, F allows us to infer which kind of S b st fits a given set of data.
In sum, w en faced with a lack of priors, hierarchical Bayesian models
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assuming a prior generated by a random drift process over
that graph (Figure 3a, right).
Learning theories to support property induction
If differently structured theories are necessary to account
for inferences about different kinds of predicates, it
becomes even more pressing to explain how these theories
could be acquired. Bayesian approaches can address this
question at all levels of the theory hierarchy in Figure 1,
and we illustrate by showing how the taxonomic theory
might be acquired (Figure 4). First, consider the problem
of learning the tree structure given raw observable data,
in the form of a large collection of species-property pairs
(e.g. lions have sharp teeth, chimps have hair, etc.). There
are many different ways to organize species into a tree
(Figure 4a), but we can search for the tree that maximizes
the likelihood P(DatajStructure) for the dataset of
observed properties [49,46]. Intuitively, the best choice
allows features to vary smoothly over the tree: for
example, because gorillas and monkeys share many
properties, these species should be located nearby in
the tree.
This approach to learning a structured probabilistic
model relies crucially on abstract knowledge at the highest
level in Figure 1: a ‘taxonomic principle’ specifying that
living kinds should be represented by a tree structure.
Could such anabstract domain principle itself by acquired?
Abstract knowledge of this sort is often thought to be innate
[15,50], perhapsbecause it seemsso remote fromthedataof
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Figure 3. Theory-based Bayesian property induction. (a) Three models for property induction: a taxonomic model (left), a food-web model (centre) and a dimensional-
threshold model (right). Each model assumes that properties are generated by a different probabilistic process over a different kind of graph structure, and each model is
appropriate for a different kind of property. In the taxonomicmodel, properties are generated by amutation process: there is a small probability of a property appearing at any
point along any branch of the tree. In the food-web model, properties are generated by a causal transmission process: there is a small probability of a property arising
spontaneously in any species, and a high probability of transmitting that property from the species to each of its predators. In the dimensional-threshold model, properties
are generated by a random-drift process biased such that species towards one end of the dimension are increasingly likely to have the novel property. The ‘Data’ level of the
figure shows properties with high prior probability under each of these models: e.g. the dimensional-threshold model favors hypotheses that include all species beyond
some point in the linear order. (b) Three possible outcomes if a property is generated by the taxonomic model, shown in order of decreasing prior probability: properties are
most likely if they can be explained by a small number of mutations, and if those mutations occur on long branches. (c) The importance of domain theories in Bayesian
models of property induction is illustrated by a double dissociation in model predictions for two different kinds of properties (preliminary findings from [70]). Participants
learned both a taxonomy and a food web over a set of species and were asked to make inductive judgments about either genetic or disease properties. The Bayesian
taxonomic model correlated strongly with judgments for genetic properties but not disease properties, and vice versa for the Bayesian food-web model.
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.7 July 2006 313
www.sciencedirect.com






#, $ S S
Figure 7. Three hierarchical Bayesian models. (a) A model for inferring !new, the bias of a coin.
dnew specifies the number of heads and tails observed when the coin is tossed. !new is is drawn
from a beta distribution with parameters " and #. The prior distribution on these parameters has
a single hyperparameter, $. (b) A model for inferring enew, the extension of a novel property. dnew
is a sparsely observed version of enew, and enew is assumed to be drawn from a prior distribution
induced by structured representation S. The hyperparameter $ specifies a prior distribution over
a hypothesis space of structured representations. (c) A model that can discover the form F of the
structure S. The hyperparameter $ now specifies a prior distribution over a hypothesis space of
structural forms.
is tightly peaked around its mean when " + # is large, flat when " = # = 1, and U-shaped
when " + # is small (Figure 6). Observing the coin being tossed provides some information
about the values of " and #, and a learner who begins with prior distributions on the values
of these parameters can update these distributions as each new coin toss is observed. The
prior distributions on " and # may be defined in terms of one or more hyperparameters. The
hierarchical model in Figure 7a uses three levels, where the hyperparameter at the top level
($) is fixed. In principle, however, we can develop hierarchical models with any number of
levels — we can can continue adding hyperparameters and priors on these hyperparameters
until we reach a l vel where we re willing to assume that the hyperparameters are fixed in
advance.
At first, the upper levels in hierarchical models like Figure 7a might seem too abstract
to be of much practical use. Yet these upper levels play a critical role — they allow
knowledge to be shared ac oss contexts that are related but distinct. In our coin tossing
example, these contexts correspond to observations of many di!erent coins, each of which
has a bias sampled from the same prior distribution Beta(",#). It is possible to learn
something about " and # by tossing a single coin, but the best way to learn about " and #
is probably to exp rime t with many d !erent coins. If most c ins tend to come up heads
about half the time, we might infer that " and # are both large, and are close to each other
in size. Suppose, however, that we are working in a factory that produces trick coins for
Figu e 3.6: A more complex hierarchical odel (Griffiths et al., 2008).
ground probability in background knowledge such as a taxonomic tree. The
structure in S is not a r presentation of probability per se, but probabilities
ca be derived from it. This is a tactic I wholeheartedly support, given that
I argu d that such represe tations underlie plausibility (§3.3.6). I will, how-
ever, mention some important differences below between a purely ayesian
approach and one adding abduction as a prior s p because, now that we’ve
pushed the question of novelty back to representations, we must consider
how those representations are le rnt or disco e ed.
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3.4.5 Where do representational structures come from? A
problem of relevance
I agree with Bayesianism that hypothesis generation can be based on rep-
resentational structures. Where we differ is on the question of where these
structures come from. Griffiths et al. (2008) derive them from previous
Bayesian processes, such that the ultimate explanation of each structure is
probabilistic. I argue that this is not always the case. If they are not pro-
duced by a Bayesian process, but play a role in hypothesis generation, then
hypothesis generation isn’t reducible to induction.
Griffiths et al. (2008) argue that learners in the above example would
have observed familiar properties across those same categories prior to ob-
serving novel property X132, and that the structure in S is thus learnt from
that data. Initially, S was an hypothesis space of all possible trees over
the animals seen in fig. 3.4. This space is searched to find the tree with the
highest posterior probability relative to that data17.
I gave a few examples in §3.3.6 of how accessibility in representational
structures might not reduce to probability. Here, though, I’ll try a differ-
ent tack. Since they do not explicitly assume a two-step process here18,
Griffiths et al. (2008) do not distinguish the full, rich, vast, unbounded rep-
resentational structures stored in semantic memory (Ss), from the severely
simplified, pruned structures stored in working memory (Sw). However, two-
step models require that, for the purposes of a particular task, a manageable
subset of one’s semantic memory is extracted and put in working memory
as a basis for induction, so fig. 3.5 and fig. 3.7 represent Sw. It is psychologi-
cally unrealistic that any Sw might pre-exist a novel inductive task, because
then all possible subsets would have to pre-exist.
Because Bayesians conflate these two representations (or at least, con-
struct models that fail to distinguish them), but given that a two-step model
insists on a difference, their account of novelty conflates explanations of
how Ss is learnt and explanations of how this particular Sw comes to be in
17Naturally, the number of possible trees is vast, but the authors point out that the
calculations can be approximated with Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. Whether
humans actually do so is an open question, though Griffiths et al. (2012) profess not to
be theoretical Bayesians, which means they should think not. I don’t intend to argue.
18One of these authors, Griffiths, argues for a two-step model in Bonawitz and Griffiths
(2010). The latter paper didn’t involve a hierarchical model, though, so representational
structure didn’t enter the discussion there.
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Figure 3.7: The structured representation (Sw) that an inductive account supposes in a
word-learning task (Tenenbaum et al., 2006).
working memory when dealing with this particular inference19. The latter
introduces a problem of relevance which inductive accounts usually man-
age to avoid, either because Sw is derivable from a higher-level theory F ,
or because Sw is artificially constrained by experiment or model designers.
For example, when Edmond Halley was trying to work out whether three
observations were of the same comet or three different comets, Newtonian
theory dictated which properties are relevant for comet orbits: the mass of
comets is relevant, their colour is not. The taxonomic tree in fig. 3.7 was
constrained by showing the experimental participants all the stimuli before
training. In either case, there has usually been a degree of abstraction prior
to the inductive inference. The question now is whether it is possible to
give a inductive account (either psychologically realistic or computationally
tractable) of how humans manage to perform relevance-deciding processes
in unconstrained contexts.
19This problem cropped up earlier, while discussing Lewis’s suggestion of a scarecrow
in quicksand (cf. §1.4.1.3)
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Shafto et al. (2005, 2008), working within a Bayesian paradigm, acknowl-
edge the basic problem here. They point out that a cat has lots of features
(it climbs trees, eats mice, has whiskers, is feline). If we find out that mice
have a certain disease, it’s the mouse-eating feature of cats that turns out
to be relevant to whether cats have the disease, not the having-whiskers fea-
ture. To investigate this context-sensitive problem, a hierarchical Bayesian
model would need to distinguish relevant from irrelevant features. They
construct two models, each with a different representational structure in S:
one involves a taxonomic tree, the other a Bayes net (much like the first
two structures in fig. 3.5). They find that the tree structure predicts human
performance on a novel-biological-property problem and the net structure
does so on a novel-disease problem. So different theories guide inferences
about different properties, and such inferences are thus context-sensitive.
However, they designed the models such that the causal structure applies to
reasoning about disease, because diseases are more likely to pass from prey
to predator than the other way round. That is, their models are sensitive
to relevance, but are not relevance-deciding.
Though not directly addressing the problem of relevance, Kemp et al.
(2004) describe a model that can itself infer which of two representational
structures (taxonomic tree or linear continuum) best suits certain data. The
two types of theory were built into F , so the model is solving the relevance
problem in S by choosing from a built-in list at a higher level in the Bayesian
hierarchy: the problem is still artificially constrained, just at a higher level.
Kemp et al. (2007) acknowledge that inductive learning in novel contexts
would be impossible without such theories (or overhypotheses) and that
some theories are innate, but they assume that all others are ultimately
explainable by yet more abstract hyper-theories in a hierarchical Bayesian
model20.
Inductive explanations of novelty have thus been pushed back from the
representational to the theory level, and I will investigate theories in the
next subsection. For now, though, there are formal, computational reasons
for thinking that the problem of relevance imposes a principled limit for
Bayesian approaches. Kwisthout (2012) offers a computational complex-
20They mention another option: theories could be inferred by analogy with previous
cases. Tenenbaum et al. (2006) acknowledge, however, that analogy is not yet explained
by induction. I show in §3.5.1 that analogy is nonetheless a matter of representational
structure, in which case not all representational structure is explained by induction.
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cognitive processes like problem solving (in a broad sense, including problems like inten-
tion recognition (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009), visual perception (Cavanagh, 2011), 
analogy (Keane, 1988) and others), we need to address the issue of representation as well 
as the issue of computation.
This observation inspires an enhanced notion of computational complexity (Figure 
3), where the abstraction step is explicit. The starting point of a complexity analysis here 
no longer is the abstract computational problem !C, but the real world problem !R: for 
this problem to be feasibly solvable, we not only require reasonable encodings and trac-
table computations, but also relevant abstractions. As an example, in the "nd-our-hotel 
problem, the distance between crossings is typically a relevant characteristic that should 
be included in the abstract computational problem. The color of the roof of the hotel is 
typically not relevant and thus should not be included in the abstraction. It will be clear 
that we can ‘mess up’ with the complexity analysis by in#ating the problem instances, 
in a similar way as we can use unreasonable encodings, such that the resulting running 
time of the algorithm solving the problem—which is measured as a function on the input 
size—no longer re#ects the actual di$culty of solving the problem.
In the remainder of this paper, we introduce a computational framework capturing 
the relevancy problem in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss hard-to-abstract and easy-
Figure 3. The enhanced computational complexity view on solving problems. Here we 
make an explicit distinction between the actual problem in the real world, i.e., "nding 
one’s way in an unknown city, and the abstract computational problem: "nding a short-
est path between two points. In addition to the previous demands on the encoding and 
the computation, we also demand that the abstraction captures the relevant aspects of 
the problem in the real world, e.g., distances between crossings, and abstracts away from 
many typically irrelevant details.
Figure 3.8: When faced with a problem, full, rich, unbounded reality is first abstracted to
produce an input to a computational problem (Kwisthout, 2012).
ity analysis of the general problem I’m looking at here. He mentions that
computational complexity is usually discussed in the context of deriving so-
lutions, i.e. whether it is computationally tractable to derive a solution from
certain inputs given a formal syntactic representation of the problem (the
arrow marked ‘feasible’ in fig. 3.8). But this formal representation presumes
that a relevance-deciding process of abstraction has already taken place: the
input in these computational models is not full, rich, vast, unbounded re-
ality. If, for instance, one’s goal is to get to one’s hotel quickly, then the
problem of achieving that goal is computed given certain inputs such as
position, distance and time (as Kwisthout points out, if it’s 3am one might
have to take a taxi, rather than public transport). The pattern of paving
stones where one is standing or the amount of light currently emitted by the
Pleiades are not relevant, so they are not part of the input to or represen-
tation of the problem. If one’s goal is to evaluate Euler’s Seven Bridges of
Königsberg problem, then distance and time are not in fact relevant, since
the problem depends only on topology.
‘[A] computational complexity analysis typically assumes that a relevant
abstraction of the problem is readily available’ (Kwisthout, 2012, 20), but
these complexity analyses typically don’t take the abstraction process itself
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into account. The state of reality at any given moment would need to be
described by a massive number of dimensions or properties, but hardly any
of these will turn out to be relevant to a given problem. Kwisthout thus
investigates computational complexity in the context of abstraction (the
arrow marked ‘relevant’ in fig. 3.8).
Kwisthout’s formal analysis shows that, in general, the abstraction prob-
lem is intractable. So the complexity of a problem is not just a matter of
solving it, but also of representing it. This result applies to my discussion
above about deriving Sw from Ss: even if a Bayesian account explains some
structural aspects of Ss, it does not explain extraction of Sw from Ss. If
inductive accounts ignore the implications of a two-step model, they risk
glossing over this problem.
Kwisthout notes, however, that the abstraction problem can be tractable
in specific cases if people have subjective expectations of relevance. These
are derived from prior knowledge, among other things. We know what’s
relevant in getting to our hotel in part because we’ve had to get places
before. Halley knew what was relevant in computing comet orbits because
he had studied Newtonian theory. Sometimes we will expect few dimensions
to be relevant, sometimes many, but when we have no prior experience
with a problem, we have no idea how many dimensions are relevant and
the problem remains intractable. We might have experience with a roughly
similar problem (cf. the suggestion of Kemp et al. above), but making this
connection involves analogy, for which see §3.5.1 below.
There are easy-to-abstract and hard-to-abstract problems, and infer-
ring the meaning of novel symbols is one of the latter because symbols
involve relevance-deciding inferences about grounds (§1.5.3). At the sym-
bolic threshold, our ancestors would have no experience with problems of
this type, so would have had no expectations about which features of a novel
sign were relevant. Kwisthout (2012) explicitly links his claims to relevance
in the Sperber-and-Wilson sense, and to the Frame Problem. I discussed
the link between these in §2.5.2.3, so Kwisthout’s formal analysis supports
the less formal claims I made there. He also links relevance to insight, for
which see §3.5.2 below.
In conclusion, Bayesian hierarchical models propose to solve the problem
of novelty. However, they pose a problem of relevance. Potential solutions
to this problem include theory-derived constraints or analogy. The symbolic
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threshold still presents an extremely serious problem for inductive accounts
because neither of these tactics could have worked and because, as I now
turn to argue, it involved novel theories.
3.4.6 Extreme cases of novelty: the problem of no theories
Halley was able to mechanically derive an hypothesis space from Newtonian
theory since the theory decides what properties are relevant (and thus what
observations should be made, or what the relevant data would be), and it
gives laws relating those properties (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2009). But
the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinean physics is an entirely different
story (§3.3.4): the orbits of Uranus and Mercury deviated from Newtonian
theory. Hypothesising a new planet only fixed the first problem; the second
remained a mystery until Einstein thought up relativity and curved space-
time. Einstein’s hypothesis involved creatively going beyond Newtonian
theory since it was not mechanically derivable from that theory in the same
way that Halley’s was (Rosenberg, 1974). Rosenberg explicitly describes
theory change as abductive.
Einstein’s creative leap produced an entirely new way of representing the
universe, but simpler cases involve new concepts rather than entire theories.
This example is taken from Paavola (2006) and Weisberg (2009). Ignaz
Semmelweis, while trying to explain unusually high mortality rates in a
particular maternity clinic in Vienna, considered and rejected a range of
hypotheses. Fortuitously, a friend of his pricked his finger while conducting
an autopsy and died with similar symptoms. Semmelweis noticed that in
this particular clinic, doctors would move from the autopsy room to the
maternity ward. He thus posited some ‘cadaveric matter’ that caused the
disease, the origins of germ theory. Paavola (2006) and Weisberg (2009) both
describe this process as abductive. Paavola highlights the role of similarity
which allowed Semmelweis to make a connection between two previously
unconnected things; Weisberg argues that the process cannot have been
inductive.
The previous subsections looked at how Bayesianism deals with represen-
tations by deriving probabilities from a theory, whereas the present examples
involve a novel successor theory or novel concepts at the theory level. Un-
til these hypotheses were created and disseminated among the scientific or
medical community, nobody’s representational systems could have included
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information about them, so nobody could have represented priors for them,
so theory-based induction cannot account for the creation of these hypothe-
ses. Neither could anyone have estimated the probability, since estimation
requires representation of the thing to be estimated. In short, probability
does not explain how the idea was created by Einstein’s or Semmelweis’
mind, nor does anything else at the theory level.
Major scientic breakthroughs provide striking examples, intro-
ducing wholly new concepts and theories that no one could have
had a prior degree of belief in. . . . Even just day to day experi-
ence provides hypotheses for which we do not have prior degrees
of belief. I am right now wondering why I feel fatigued despite
having drunk four cups of coffee. I think it most likely that the
regular and decaffeinated pots have gotten mixed up, so that I
have been drinking decaffeinated coffee all morning, but I had
no prior degree of belief in that hypothesis when I walked into
the cafe. (Weisberg, 2009, 133)
A hierarchical Bayesian response to this criticism would be that, just
as a prior for property X132 could be derived from a higher-level theory,
so could a prior for the theory of curved spacetime be derived from a yet-
more-abstract hyper-theory. The hyper-theory would contain all possible
physics theories and a prior distribution for them. Indeed, this is just what
Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2009) suggest for problems of this type, though
their example involves a constrained set of just two entities, one property,
and two possible theories linking them. Glymour notes that ‘[Bayesians] are
singularly unembarrassed by the rarity of explicit probabilistic arguments
in the history of science’ (1981, 67) and I have the feeling that spelling
out entire theory changes in this way would sound just as unappealing to
enlightened methodological Bayesian ears as it does to mine.
Anyway, we would then need to know where the principles, categories
and probabilities of the hyper-theory come from, so a hyper-hyper-theory
must be posited to account for that. Griffiths and Tenenbaum admit that
‘at this point, concerns about an infinite recursion, providing no ultimate
solution to the question of how people learn causal relationships, seem jus-
tified’ (2009, 708). They’re not too worried by this, though, since they seem
to slip into a somewhat fundamentalist mood at this point. They later make
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two concessions to the demands of psychological reality (though these don’t
address the psychological reality of hyper-theories themselves): (1) they al-
low that hyper-theories eventually bottom out into basic assumptions about
causation. Griffiths and Tenenbaum don’t spell this out, but Kemp et al.
(2007) explicitly claim that these could include innate general theories of
causation. (2) Associative mechanisms could play algorithmic roles if those
mechanisms serve as approximations for these increasingly abstract proba-
bilities, allowing probability to bear the explanatory burden.
It is unclear just how a general, abstract theory of causation could ever
explain how Einstein had such a momentous insight, but there is a more
pressing problem with applying (1) to the symbolic threshold: it may or
may not be the case that humans have an innate idea of causation, but
meaning is not causation. Prior to the symbolic threshold, there would have
been no innate theory of symbolic meaning in any psychologically realistic
sense.
Further, while physics or medical theories seek (to varying degrees) to
represent reality, meaning is a purely cognitive relationship, so it is doubly
inappropriate to posit hyper-theories that derive theories of signification. It
is not the case that some australopithecine with an abstract hyper-theory
about theories of signification was hanging around the savannah thinking
to itself, ‘Gee, I guess ‘gavagai ’ could mean rabbit, but I don’t know which
theory of signification is most appropriate here, so I’ll put symbolic com-
munication on hold until my species solves that problem’. His species was
incapable of meaning anything at all by ‘gavagai ’ at that stage, so it seems
odd to explain how they developed that theory by positing a hyper-theory
of meaning.
Concession (2) fares no better:
Intractable Bayesian computations are not generally tractably
approximable. This is not to say, of course, that cognitive algo-
rithms do not approximate Bayesian computations, but rather to
claim that approximation by itself cannot guarantee tractability.
(Kwisthout et al., 2011, 780)
The above authors argue that approximation is only tractable in cases
where the representation of the problem provides constraint and thus tractabil-
ity. A similar, weaker claim is made by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2009),
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who say that theories constrain representational structures. For a set of four
entities with no assumptions about causal relationships, there are 4096 pos-
sible causal graphs linking them. If we know that two entities are germs and
two are symptoms, then there are only 16 possible graphs. So a principle
at the theory level (that germs cause symptoms) constrains the number of
structures in S.
But the current problem concerns situations where the theory itself, or
critical constraining concepts in the theory (such as germ) don’t exist psy-
chologically. The symbolic threshold is just such a case. In such novel
contexts, Bayesian approximations thus cannot be the only explanations of
representational structures, since representational structures are what make
these approximations possible. A hierarchical Bayesian approach may jus-
tify why one particular taxonomic arrangement of all the animals in fig. 3.3
is more likely to explain the data than all other possible arrangements, but
this involves mechanical rearrangement of the same things. It does not
involve the introduction of entirely new things, nor entirely new ways of
structuring those things. Otherwise, it would be hard to see what Linnaeus
adds to Aristotle. Bayesianism can use the idea of germs being present in
food to limit the possible trajectory of diseases in fig. 3.5, but not explain
where the concept germ comes from. Chater and Oaksford (2008) admit
that algorithms approximating probability are likely to work only for do-
mains for which the brain has a dedicated module. Prior to the symbolic
threshold, there couldn’t have been a module for symbolic meaning. What’s
more, theories are one way of solving the relevance problem of the previous
subsection. If the theories aren’t there (or the relevant concept, such as
germ isn’t there), then the relevance problem is unavoidable.
The addition of new content is a crucial difference between abduction
and induction (§3.3.1). Unlike the case with induction, there is no shortage
of abductive (or analogy- or insight-based) analyses of theory changes or the
creation of new concepts that play constraining roles in theories: Gentner
and Markman (1997) and Myrstad (2004) on Kepler, Rosenberg (1974) on
Newton and Einstein, Paavola (2006) and Weisberg (2009) on Semmelweis’
germ hypothesis and Paavola (2004) on Darwin’s theory of evolution. These
analyses all demonstrate the role of abduction, insight or analogy in par-
ticular momentous discoveries, while Dunbar (1996) demonstrates the role
of analogy and insight in more modest discoveries in biology laboratories.
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Rosenberg (1974) and Aliseda (2004) argue that abduction plays a role in
coming up with new explanations in science in general, and Holyoak and
Thagard (1995) do the same for analogy. I eventually aim to show that
these play a role in guessing the meaning of novel signs.
Given that discovery is non-rational, a much more sensible response to
the problem of no-theories is to abandon the idea that it’s Bayes all the
way down and to allow that non-probabilistic associative mechanisms could
create novel concepts, connections between concepts, or larger structures.
Research on creativity abounds with such processes (Mednick, 1962; Abra-
ham and Windmann, 2007; Hélie and Sun, 2010; Thagard and Stewart, 2011)
whereas inductive accounts of creativity merely involve novel rearrangements
of familiar units based on probability distributions (for instance Jern and
Kemp, 2013, who give a probabilistic account of creativity in as far as its
involved in putting different foods together to create new kinds of salad).
In a detailed review of creativity research, Abraham and Windmann (2007)
argue that novel combinations of familiar elements are not very creative at
all, in the grander scheme of things.
My position here accords with a range of previous research. Fodor (2001)
argues that syntactic processes cannot in principle cope with contextually
unconstrained inferences such as abduction21, which entails that rational-
ist approaches in general cannot. Since I argued that abduction is non-
normative (while Fodor assumes an IBE — inference to the best explana-
tion — view of abduction), I don’t think this is as worrying as Fodor does.
Schurz (2008) claims that abduction introduces new representations while
induction is what transfers them to new instances. Deutscher (2002) argues
that abduction is what produces new levels of abstraction: these correspond
to theories in the discussion here. ‘In those cases where agents respond to
new evidence by inventing new hypotheses, the Bayesian model is silent’
(Okasha, 2000, 706-7).
In the end, we are left trying to understand what animals do
and how they do it. The hard problems remain inaccessible to
the tools of Bayesian analysis, which merely provide a means to
21For instance, Fodor argues that simplicity is context-dependent and thus not explicable
by any local syntactic property such as string length. Allowing it to be explained by a
non-local syntactic property engages the Frame Problem, so no syntactic property at all
will work.
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select an answer once the hard problem of specifying the list of
possible answers has been solved (or at least prescribed). (An-
derson, 2011, 190)
Opening the black box of discovery (to adopt a phrase from Paavola,
2006) requires recognising that hypothesis generation is not inductive, and
seeing whether non-rationalist processes offer any suggestions.
3.5 Empiricist approaches
In this section, I explore empiricist (i.e. associative, non-normative) ap-
proaches to hypothesis generation. Three initial reasons for optimism here
are (1) I’ve built inference upon minimal rationality, which assumes an
empiricist psychology (§2.2.3). (2) I’ve already reviewed evidence for asso-
ciative processes in context-deciding inference (§2.6). (3) Abduction is not
logically valid (i.e. truth-preserving) or optimal (i.e. probability enhancing)
so there’s no need to shoehorn it into a normative framework (§3.3.3).
I investigate two processes which can produce hypotheses in an empiri-
cist manner: analogy and insight. The two are not always clearly distinct.
Christie and Gentner (2010), for instance, describe participants having a ‘re-
lational insight’ while solving an analogy problem and Gentner and Mark-
man (1997) discuss how comparison fosters insight. Further, I will frame
analogy in terms of structural similarity and insight in terms of semantic
structures and Graham and Kilbreath (2007) review evidence showing that
judgements of similarity can be sensitive to semantic categories and vice
versa. Ansburg (2000), in an individual-differences study, shows that success
at insight problems is strongly correlated with success at verbal analogies.
Both insight and analogy involve novel connections between two repre-
sentations (or two representational structures), and because both involve
novelty, they are not based on learnt probabilities. The discussion here
has some features in common with hierarchical Bayesian models in that it
posits representational structures that guide inference in novel cases, though
I argued that probabilities alone cannot explain those structures, novel hy-
potheses or novel theories in open-ended contexts. The literature on insight
and analogy explicitly addresses key issues raised throughout this chapter:
how representational structures help determine similarity (Day and Gentner,
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2007), creativity (Mednick, 1962), salience (Gentner and Markman, 1997)
and relevance (Ross and Bradshaw, 1994).
3.5.1 Analogy
Analogy involves associations (or mappings) from sources (or bases) in prior
experience to targets currently being interpreted. Here I’ll outline how anal-
ogy can in principle provide hypotheses in pragmatic inference, but since it’s
not clear what the source analog at the symbolic threshold would have been,
I will quickly move onto insight for concrete predictions.
Structure Mapping Theory (SMT, Gentner, 1983, 2010; Gentner and
Markman, 1997) proposes that analogy involves mapping, or the forma-
tion of novel connections, between structured representations. The mean-
ings underlying both ‘The dog chased the cat’ and ‘Umbrella Corp. made
a takeover bid for Acme Co.’ involve structured representations, some-
thing like chase(dog,cat) and take-over(Umbrella,Acme). Connec-
tions can be drawn between objects (dog ∼ Umbrella; cat ∼ Acme) and
predicates (chase ∼ take-over). Higher-order mappings are possible be-
tween large-scale causal structures, such as narratives22.
The process of structure mapping involves a number of steps. First,
all possible mapping between elements are made. These may involve in-
consistencies or many-to-one mappings. Second, these elemental mappings
coalesce into more structured clusters, called kernels. Third, the kernels are
merged into structures that are consistent according to theoretical principles
(Gentner and Markman, 1997; Gentner and Medina, 1998). For instance,
compare chase(cati, mouse) with chase(dog, catj). At the first stage,
relational mappings are possible between cati and dog because both do the
chasing. At the same time, object mappings are possible between cati and
catj . One principle of SMT is that mappings which reflect the argument
structure of predicates are preferred, so a more consistent mapping is from
cati to dog. One-to-one mappings are similarly preferred to many-to-one
22Gentner and Markman (1997) say that analogy should focus more on predicates and
higher-order relations and less on mappings between objects. The distinction is intended
to highlight the fact that analogy allows for abstract cognition: Kepler, for instance,
drew an analogy between the motive force of the sun on the planets and the effects of a
whirlpool on boats: there are no object matches here. Nonetheless, a range of research
shows that object mappings play a role in pragmatic inference (Ross and Bradshaw, 1994;
Catrambone, 2002), so I won’t exclude these from discussion here.
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nonmatching predicates may be rerepresented to permit the overall match. This paper
focuses chiefly on the first three processes.
This basic structure-mapping framework is now widely shared among analogy research-
ers (Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008; French, 2002; Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov,
2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Kokinov & Petrov, 2001;
Larkey & Love, 2003; Ramscar & Yarlett, 2003; see Gentner & Farbus, in press, and
Kokinov & French, 2002, for reviews). However, accounts differ as to how the process takes
place—an issue crucial to understanding the role of analogical processing in development.
There are three aspects of SME that make it particularly apt for modeling cognitive develop-
mental bootstrapping.
• In SME, the initial process is a symmetric structural alignment between the two repre-
sentations. New inferences and alignable differences follow from this alignment. In
contrast, many other models of analogical processing begin by choosing a structure in
the base and projecting it to the target. This is an appealing intuition, and indeed it
was my original proposal in the early 80s (e.g., Gentner, 1983); but it has a big draw-
back for development: It requires a well-structured base analog, in which the key
structure is clear, in order for experiential learning to take place. Such a process could
not account for the speed of learning in young children and infants, who have not yet
accumulated a store of clearly structured examples. Moreover, research shows that
young children can gain from comparing things even when neither of them is yet well
understood (Gentner & Namy, 1999; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Son, Smith, &
Goldstone, 2007). SME’s process of structural alignment can capture the fact that a
learner who aligns two partially understood exemplars can still gain insight from
A
B
Fig. 2. Comparison as structure-mapping. (A) Structural alignment highlights common structure (which may
then serve as an abstraction) and alignable differences. (B) Structural alignment supports the projection of candi-
date inferences.
D. Gentner ⁄Cognitive Science 34 (2010) 755
Figure 3.9: Structure mapping promotes (A) abstraction and salience; (B) further infer-
ences (Gentner, 2010).
mappings and relational mappings consistent with higher-order or system-
atic mappings are preferred to relational mappings without higher-order
mappings.
Once the most consistent mapping is chosen, th stage is se for further
abstract cognition: inferences can be drawn from the base to the target;
the target can be reinterpreted or its structure reconfigured to promote
further consistency; abstractions can be drawn; and attention can be drawn
to salient similarities or differences (Gentner and Markman, 1997; Gentner,
2010, see fig. 3.9). Reinterpretation and reco figuration will be di cussed
below under the heading ‘Insight’; the rest are explained below. As an
example of the first point, the information that a dog is likely to damage
a cat might prompt the hypothesis that Umbrella Corp. might have an
adverse effect on Acme Co. Day and Ge tner (2007) demons rate this effec
experimentally and Colhoun and Gentner (2009) show that SMT predicts
human patterns of inductive inferences in causal situations.
This seems more like plausibility than probability (as I discussed in re-
l tion to the metaph r ‘The investors were squirrels’, §3.3.6), given that the
probability of one company damaging the other is rationally independent of
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the probability of a dog damaging a cat. SMT deals with novel situations,
not by deriving priors from theories, but by mapping comparatively familiar
or richly represented bases to comparatively unfamiliar or sparse targets,
and then using those mappings to transfer information from the former to
the latter. Christie and Gentner (2010) show in a child word-learning ex-
periment that analogy can affect hypotheses generation independently of
cross-situational probabilities.
Obviously, we don’t constantly compare each representational structure
with all others all the time: comparison between two objects or events is
often prompted by something in experience, such as spatial juxtaposition
(Christie and Gentner, 2010) or their being labelled with the same novel
sign (Graham and Kilbreath, 2007). SMT seems compatible with whatever
processes underlie the joint attentional scenes discussed in §1.5.1.2 (for in-
stance, the Hungarian train tickets, Tomasello, 1999). If the tourist maps
the Hungarian scene onto the familiar scene, then joint attention can prompt
inference from base to target, where the inference is an hypotheses about
the meaning of the Hungarian word. A range of studies thus shows that
analogy can play an abductive role in word learning.
SMT also offers salience-deciding processes (Gentner and Markman, 1997).
Compare fig. 3.10 (a) and (b). In both pictures, the boy is looking at some-
thing. This prompts a predicate mapping between look(boy,snake) and
look(boy,fish). An object mapping is also possible between the dressers
in each picture. According SMT’s systematicity principle, the dresser is less
salient in analogy because it is merely an object mapping, which is dispre-
ferred to predicate mappings involving look.
Further, analogy involves alignment of two structures, and alignable dif-
ferences are more salient than non-alignable ones (Gentner and Markman,
1997). Alignable differences occur when different elements in each structure
play the same role: the fish and the snake in fig. 3.10 are alignable differences
because they play the same role in predicate look(x, y). Non-alignable dif-
ferences occur when an element of one structure has no correspondence in
the other: the dog in fig. 3.10 (a) corresponds to nothing in (b). Gentner and
Markman (1997) review evidence for the comparative salience of alignable
differences. For instance, people are able to list more differences between
hotels and motels than they are between magazines and kittens because the
first pair involve many alignable differences (hotels have several stories, mo-
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I 
Figure 3 
The Role of Commonalities and Differences in 
Similarity 
Note. This triad o~: pictures demonstrates that commonalities become important 
when they are part of a matching system and that differences become important 
when they are related to the commonalities. 
Alignable differences can be contrasted with non- 
alignable differences, which are aspects of one situation 
that have no correspondence at all in the other situation. 
For example, in the comparison of Figures 3A and 3B, the 
dog in Figure 3A has no correspondence with anything in 
Figure 3B, and hence it is a nonalignable difference. 
Just as commonalities gain in importance when they 
are part of a matching system, so too do differences. That 
is, alignable differences are more salient than non- 
alignable differences. Intuitively, this focus on alignable 
differences makes sense, for it leads to a focus on those 
differences that are relevant to the common causal or 
goal structure that spans the situations. However, if we 
follow this logic a few steps further, we arrive at the 
rather intriguing prediction that there should be more 
salient differences for high-similar than for low-similar 
pairs (because in general, high-similarity pairs will have 
larger common systems and more alignable differences). 
For example, if you imagine listing all possible differ- 
ences for the pair hotel-motel and contrast that with 
listing all possible differences for the pair magazine- 
kitten, you will probably find that it is much easier to 
list differences for the first, high-similarity pair. Experi- 
mental results bear out this observation. Participants who 
were asked to list differences between hotel and motel 
readily listed (alignable) differences: "Hotels are in 
cities, motels are on the highway"; "you  stay longer in 
hotels than in motels"; "hotels have many floors, motels 
only one or two";  and so on. When given a low-similarity 
pair like magazine-kitten, participants tended to list non- 
alignable differences, such as "You pet a kitten, you 
don't pet a magazine," or "kittens have fur and maga- 
zines don't ." This finding of a greater number of 
alignable differences for high-similarity pairs has been 
obtained in empirical studies involving both word pairs 
(Markman & Gentner, 1993b; Markman & Wisniewski, 
in press) and picture pairs (Markman & Gentner, 1996). 
An informal observation is that participants often ex- 
pressed confusion or irritation over the low-similarity 
pairs, perhaps reflecting their feeling that it makes no 
sense to talk about differences in the absence of a mean- 
ingful alignment. 
If the comparison process focuses on alignable dif- 
ferences rather than on nonalignable differences, then 
alignable differences should be listed more fluently than 
nonalignable differences. This means that people should 
find it easier to list differences for pairs of similar items 
than for pairs of dissimilar items, because high-similarity 
pairs have many commonalties and, hence, many 
alignable differences. Such a prediction runs against the 
commonsense v iew--and  the most natural prediction of 
feature-intersection models-- that  it should be easier to 
list differences the more of them there are to l is t -- that  
is, the more dissimilar the two items are. In a study by 
Gentner and Markman (1994), participants were given 
a page containing 40 word pairs, half similar and half 
dissimilar, and were given five minutes to list one differ- 
ence for as many different pairs as they could. They were 
told that they would not have time to do all 40 pairs, 
and so they should do the easiest pairs first. The results 
provided strong evidence for the alignability predictions: 
Participants listed many more differences for similar 
pairs (M = 11.4) than for dissimilar pairs (M = 5.9). 
Furthermore, this difference was concentrated in the 
alignable differences. Over twice as many alignable dif- 
ferences were given for similar pairs (M = 9.0) than for 
dissimilar pairs (M = 3.9). 
Because people focus on alignable differences rather 
than on nonalignable differences when making compari- 
sons, alignable differences have a greater impact on peo- 
ple' s perception of similarity than do nonalignable differ- 
ences. Thus, all else being equal, alignable differences 
count more against similarity than nonalignable differ- 
ences. One way to test this prediction is to pit compari- 
sons involving a given alignable difference against com- 
parisons involving the same contrast as a nonalignable 
50 January 1997 • American Psychologist 
Figure 3.10: Alignable and non-alignable differences based on the predicate look(x, y)
(Gentner and Markman, 1997).
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tels just one or two). While the second pair has more differences overall,
these are not alignable and thus less salient.
In early work, Gentner (1983) claims that SMT operates over syntactic,
not semantic information. I think, though, by ‘syntactic’ she is focusing on
the fact that analogy maps predicates onto each other: dogs and Umbrella
Corp. have nothing in common semantically, but play a similar role in the
structured representation they find themselves in. There is a semantic link
between predicates chase and take-over, though, so I don’t think that
Gentner’s sense of ‘syntax’ precludes semantic information from explaining
how analogy plays an abductive role. Ross and Bradshaw (1994) presented
participants with ambiguous texts, and found that associative object map-
ping affects interpretation of the ambiguity. Similarly, semantic relationships
affect recall in analogy (Catrambone, 2002). In as far as recall informs ac-
cessibility, which underpins relevance-deciding inference, these results show
that semantic or associative information allows similarity or analogy to play
an abductive role.
I have been focusing on the work of Gentner and colleagues, but alter-
natives to SMT exist. A major milestone in analogy research is Holyoak
and Thagard (1995). They note that analogy is creative: it plays a role in
dealing with novelty because it tries to understand the novel in terms of
the familiar, a process that often involves a mental leap or the formation of
a novel connection between representations. They describe this as a spark
jumping across a gap, an image I’ll explore further under ‘Insight’. In their
view, analogy is not logical, but not haphazard either: they say it is sub-
ject to something like logic which they call analogic. I argued that since
abduction is not logical, it is psychological. Their description does make
analogic seem psychological, and they state that the ‘rules’ of analogy are
not rigid, but relative to a person’s goals, for instance. Indeed, this addition
of purpose is a major difference between their approach and SMT, which
is purpose-blind. Further, they state explicitly that ‘analogy is a source of
possible conjectures, not guaranteed conclusions’ (1995, 30, emphasis mine).
Like SMT, their work supposes systematic mappings. They are less dis-
missive of object mappings than SMT is, though. While SMT downplays the
role of semantic connections between representations, Holyoak and Thagard
believe that ‘[t]he semantic connections between concepts provide important
building blocks for seeing analogies’ (1995, 23). In this regard, they present
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a model of representational structure that accords very closely with my view
of plausibility (§3.3.6). This structure is one way of deciding what counts as
relevant in a mapping, much like accessibility in Sperber and Wilson (1995).
They are, however, more interested in the evolutionary question of how hu-
mans evolved higher-order representations than they are in how we evolved
context-deciding inferences, which is unsurprising given that Holyoak is one
of the authors in Penn et al. (2008, cf. §2.5.2.3 above). They also posit a
dual-process model for analogy, combining elements of associative and syn-
tactic processing. It is thus clear that their view of analogy is compatible
with it playing an abductive role, and elsewhere one of the authors of Penn
et al. explicitly makes such a connection (Thagard, 2007).
3.5.2 Insight
Like analogy, insight is a matter of connections between representations.
Weak or distant connections can be strengthened in insight problem solving,
or novel connections can be formed: insight is creative (Mednick, 1962;
Kounios and Beeman, 2009; Cushen and Wiley, 2011). An accumulation
of novel or newly strengthened connections in a representation can mean
that one’s representation of the problem has been restructured entirely23, as
illustrated in an experiment by Durso et al. (1994). Participants had to come
up with an explanation for an unusual scenario: ‘A man walks into a bar
and asks for a glass of water. The bartender points a shotgun at the man.
The man says, “Thank you,” and walks out’ (1994, 95). Typical features of
solving an insight problem such as this are as follows (Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004; Bowden et al., 2005; Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005; Kounios et al., 2006;
Kwisthout, 2012, variously):
1 Participants reach an impasse or ‘blank’ and are unable to progress. Then
they suddenly realise the answer.
2 Once the relevant dimensions are known, the answer is obvious; but until
they are known, it is non-obvious.
23Early or Gestaltist approaches to insight insist that it requires such restructuring, but
this has been downplayed somewhat in much modern work. Since restructuring is just
the result of a number of novel individual connections, we are dealing with a difference of
scale, not type: both involve representational change. Hélie and Sun (2010) acknowledge
the existence of a continuum here.
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3 Participants usually cannot report the process by which they reach the
answer.
4 They typically arrive at the solution all at once rather than through a
step-by-step mechanical process, so insight problem solving is not ac-
companied by a feeling of increasing ‘warmth’ or closeness to solution.
5 They usually report feeling a flash of surprise, an ‘Aha!’ or a ‘Eureka!’
moment, much like a cartoon light bulb going off in the head.
The solution to the above problem is that the man had hiccoughs. Drink-
ing water is one cure for hiccoughs. Receiving a fright is another, hence
the barman’s behaviour. Durso et al. (1994) divided participants into two
groups: solvers (those who discovered the solution within 2 hours) and non-
solvers (those who failed to do so). After solving the problem or failing to
do so within the time limit, all participants rated the relatedness of pairs
of concepts in the solution (e.g. remedy), or in the scenario (e.g. barman)
or in a bar generally (e.g. pretzels). Graphs of these concept associations
were abstracted over each of the two groups (fig. 3.11). These graphs show
that solvers and non-solvers had different representations of the problem.
Solvers had formed connections that non-solvers did not, such as between
remedy and glass-of-water or relieved and thank-you.
Their claim that insight involves connections between representations
coheres remarkably with Peirce’s description of abduction:
It is an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight. It
is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our
minds before; but it is the idea of putting together what we had
never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new
suggestion before our contemplation. (CP 5.181, 1903)
Another example of an insight problem24 is a Compound Remote Asso-
ciates (CRA) task. Here, participants are given three words, such as
24Insight is a feature of people’s solutions to problems, not of problems themselves, so
by ‘insight problem’ I mean a problem that typically is solved by insight processes. In
addition, some people may solve a particular problem with insight, others might solve
it more mechanically. Indeed, one person might solve a given problem with insight and
another example of the same type mechanically. The CRA task here could be solved
mechanically by listing all possible collocations of these words and then searching the lists
for common elements. This is presumably how we’d get a computer to do it. Humans
solve it mechanically some of the time, but it is typically solved with insight, according
to the evidence below.
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Figure 3.11: Graphs based on conceptual association showing that solvers (top) and non-
solvers (bottom) had different representations of the problem. The highlighted node indi-
cates the centre of each graph. Redrawn from Durso et al. (1994).




and are asked to think of a fourth word that could be placed before or
after all three. In this case, the answer is ‘apple’. This doesn’t require re-
structuring as such (though fixation on the most common collocations, such
as ‘pine cone’, would lead to an impasse), but it does require recognition of
distant associations and is usually described in terms of automatic spread-
ing activation over semantic representations (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Hélie
and Sun, 2010)25: compare this to the foot/glass/cut example or John
crying out while swimming near glass (§2.6.3).
‘One critical cognitive process distinguishing insight solutions from non-
insight solutions is that solving with insight requires solvers to recognize
distant or novel semantic (or associative) relations; hence, insight-specific
neural activity should reflect that process’ (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, 501).
The authors provide two pieces of evidence for insight-specific neural activ-
ity.
In an fMRI experiment, participants were asked to solve CRA problems,
and report whether they felt a flash of insight, as described above. Those
reporting such a flash showed significantly more activation in the anterior
Superior Temporal Gyrus in the right hemisphere (aSTG-RH) than those
reporting no insight. The role of the STG-RH (and RH language processing
in general) has already been discussed (§2.6): these areas are involved in
distant semantic associates, and I mentioned how this was a matter of con-
textually unconstrained pragmatic inference. This result is not explicable
by the emotional effect of having an ‘Aha!’ moment because the activation is
present before solution. Behavioural evidence from a split-visual-field prim-
ing study supports this neurological evidence (Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
1998). In addition, the fact that this is a priming study supports the claim
that insight involves spreading activation across semantic representations.
In a second experiment, Jung-Beeman et al. measured EEG responses
while participants performed the same task, since these provide informa-
tion about the time course of the relevant cognitive processes. The results
showed a burst of gamma-band activity (implicated in transitions from non-
25In the case of the latter, this is explicitly situated in a dual-process framework.
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awareness to awareness) in the anterior right temporal lobe for insight solu-
tions, but not for non-insight solutions. This burst occurred approximately
0.3 seconds before participants pushed the response button, supporting the
claim that insight involves sudden solution rather than a step-by-step me-
chanical process.
Kounios et al. (2006) show, in EEG and fMRI studies, that participants’
brain states predict whether they will solve such problems insightfully or
not, before they even see the problem. In particular, they found increased
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) before insight problem
solving. The results support the description of strategy switching in the
Mutilated Checkerboard problem above (§3.4.3).
[T]he activity observed in ACC prior to insight may reflect in-
creased readiness to monitor for competing responses, and to
apply cognitive control mechanisms as needed to (a) suppress ex-
traneous thoughts, (b) initially select prepotent26 solution spaces
or strategies, and, if these prove ineffective, (c) subsequently shift
attention to a nonprepotent solution or strategy. Such shifts are
characteristic of insight. (Kounios et al., 2006, 887)
Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) performed an individual-differences study,
giving participants insight and non-insight problems to solve and various
tests of cognitive abilities: Raven’s matrices test of general intelligence, a
number of verbal and spatial ability tests, as well as tests of cognitive flex-
ibility. They found that insight problems tended to cluster with other in-
sight problems and non-insight problems tended to cluster with non-insight
problems. General intelligence was predictive of non-insight task success,
but not of success in insight tasks. Measures of cognitive flexibility were
important for insight task solving, but not non-insight tasks. So insight
problems are cognitively different from non-insight problems. A further
individual-differences study (Schooler and Melcher, 1995) showed that in-
dividuals’ ability to break out of the initial context of a problem predicted
insight problem solving ability, as opposed to non-insight problems.
Ansburg and Hill (2003) also conducted an individual-differences study.
Participants were given tests of creative or insightful ability (remote asso-
26By this, they seem to mean ‘predictable’ or ‘likely’. Cf. my discussion in §2.6.4 of how
LH systems dominate when predictable relations are sufficient, but RH systems play an
increasing role as broader semantic fields are needed.
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ciation tasks, like those discussed above) and tests of analytic or deductive
ability. They were then required to memorise printed word lists (focal cues)
while a second, recorded word list was audible in the background (peripheral
cues). Unbeknownst to the participants, some focal and peripheral cues were
solutions to a later anagram problem. Participants capable of diffuse atten-
tion (both focal and peripheral cues) should thus prove more successful at
the later anagram problems than those only capable of focal attention. Suc-
cess at the creative tasks predicted ability to use peripheral cues in solving
the anagrams; success at analytic or deductive tasks didn’t. ‘[I]ndividuals
who cast broad attentional nets are more likely to capture unexpected cues
and to generate remote associations than are those whose cognitive resources
are more narrowly focused’ (Ansburg and Hill, 2003, 1142), and their results
show that insightful individuals are those capable of such diffuse attention.
I discussed the relationship between broad attention and hemispheric dif-
ferences in contextually unconstrained inference in §2.6. Murray and Byrne
(2005) tested individual differences in attention (among other things). They
found that the ability to switch attention correlates with insight success; fo-
cused (selective, sustained) attention does not. Kounios and Beeman (2009)
found an alpha band burst over the right occipital cortex immediately prior
to the gamma band response discussed above, which they interpret to mean
a suppression of focal attention.
Coren (1995) gave left- and right-handed participants tests of divergent
thinking, such as combining familiar objects to make a new object with a
novel function.
It is called divergent because it often involves the considera-
tion of several different directions, alternatives, or information
sources. Divergent thinkers seem more capable of breaking sets
and achieving novel solutions. For this reason divergent thinking
is often listed as a major component of the psychological trait of
creativity. (Coren, 1995, 313)
These terms are highly reminiscent of previous examples: broad atten-
tional nets and breaking out of initial representations. Left-handed males
scored higher than right-handed males at the divergent thinking tests, and
the authors tentatively link left-handedness with a reduction in the usual
leftward hemispheric asymmetry compared to right-handers. That is, left-
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handers’ RHs are less reduced than those of right-handers. Abdullaev and
Posner (1997) show that divergent thinking is associated with increased ac-
tivation in RH homologues of Wernicke’s area.
Kwisthout (2012) explicitly links insight to relevance, and I have pre-
viously discussed his claims about the computational intractability of the
relevance problem in abstraction (§3.4.5). He offers a slightly different (but
compatible) definition of an insight problem: he considers them to be prob-
lems which are comparatively easy to solve once the relevant dimensions
of the problem are known, or once the representation of the problem in-
cludes the relevant information. Finding the relevant representation is the
hard part. The impasse is reached when the original representation of the
problem does not contain the relevant information. Restructuring the repre-
sentation is what replaces irrelevant with relevant information. Kwisthout’s
notion of relevance is compatible with that of Sperber and Wilson (1995).
Familiarity with a given problem can constrain relevance, but misclassifica-
tion of the problem leads to impasse. Novel problems (such as novel symbols)
preclude familiarity, hence the difficulty of the relevance problem and the
need for insight in these cases. Allott (2013) characterises hypothesis gen-
eration in Sperber and Wilson (1995) as a step-by-step mechanical process,
and I think that is an accurate description of their theory, but the evidence
suggests that their theory is thus not an accurate description of pragmatic
inference in novel contexts.
To take an example from a different study (Luo and Niki, 2003), think
of something that can move heavy logs but not a small nail. The initial rep-
resentation of the problem makes certain information salient (here, weight).
Weight, however, turns out to be an irrelevant dimension. The relevant
dimension is density, because the answer is ‘a river’ in that it can usefully
transport logs from one place to another while a nail would simply sink.
Searching for a solution based on the initial interpretation cannot lead to
the solution, hence the impasse. Nor is the relevant concept density ana-
lytically derivable from the statement of the problem; it requires a creative
leap to decide what is relevant. Another example, from Murray and Byrne
(2005) is this: how would you throw a ping pong ball so that travels a short
distance, stops on its own, and returns? You cannot bounce it or tie any-
thing to it. People typically have two problems with relevance here: they
misconstrue the dimension of travel as horizontal when it should be vertical,
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and they do not realise that gravity is relevant: you simply throw the ball
directly upwards.
Before returning to the problem of word learning in novel cases, I’ll
quickly list a few other results that demonstrate that insight problem solv-
ing as a distinct mode of cognition is a psychological reality. Schooler et al.
(1993) and Schooler and Melcher (1995) showed that verbalising one’s think-
ing while trying to solve a problem disrupts insight problem solving, but not
non-insight problem solving. Wagner et al. (2004) shows that sleep greatly
facilitates insight problem solving. Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) mea-
sured participants’ heart rates in insight and non-insight problem solving,
and found that they increased gradually and steadily during non-insight
problem solving, but increased suddenly just before solution in insight prob-
lem solving, matching the step-by-step mechanical nature of the former and
sudden-flash nature of the latter. Cushen and Wiley (2011) argued that
bilinguals should perform better at insight problems, given that they have
at least two words for many concepts, so each concept has a broader or more
diverse range of associations, and insight involves activation over diverse as-
sociations. They found that bilinguals performed better than monolinguals
at insight problems; the reverse was true for non-insight problems.
Returning now to abduction and induction, insight is a matter of spread-
ing activation over a semantic network, hence a matter for an empiricist
psychology. Because it requires diffuse attention or shifts in attention and
representational changes, it is a context- and relevance-deciding process.
Further, it is involved in creativity, and centres on brain regions I showed
to be important for contextually unconstrained pragmatic inference. These
features mean it is potentially suitable for playing an abductive role as Peirce
claims. Consequently, I aim to show experimentally that abduction is in fact
insightful, and that insight (and thus abduction) play a role in communica-
tive situations sharing features with the symbolic threshold.
On the other hand, no amount of searching will alight on the solution
if one has misrepresented the problem, so insight is not a matter of induc-
tively searching an hypothesis space to choose the most likely explanation.
Indeed, it is hard to see how the hiccough-shotgun problem above is expli-
cable inductively: one may represent both frights and water as very likely
remedies for hiccoughs, but that doesn’t mean one comes up with the ex-
planation for that scenario by evaluating such probabilities. The problem
188 CHAPTER 3. ABDUCTION, INDUCTION AND INSIGHT
is the representation itself: making a novel connection or strengthening a
weak connection between water and remedy. Murray and Byrne (2005)
characterise insight problems as being inherently ill defined, but induction
needs a well defined hypothesis space (§3.4.2), so induction is ill equipped
for insight. CRA problems, on the other hand, are potentially explicable
inductively, but the neurological evidence discussed above shows that this
is not how humans typically solve such problems.
3.5.3 Evolutionary background: evidence from animals and
children
My description here coheres with the claim in Deacon (1997) that insight
was crucial at the symbolic threshold, though Deacon doesn’t discuss the
psychological realities of insight or abduction. Indeed, he focuses entirely
on the prefrontal cortex, while evidence reviewed above has focused on the
RH temporal lobe. Similarly, he focuses on higher-order relations, while I
focus on context.
Human insight doesn’t require an evolutionary saltation, since animals
are capable of insight problem solving. The difference is that they do so less
spontaneously than we do, and do so domain specifically: I don’t know of any
evidence that doesn’t relate to food retrieval. I’ve discussed evidence from
Köhler (1927) of insight problem solving in apes stacking boxes to reach
food, but this is anecdotal (§2.5.1). Foerder et al. (2011) provide similar
evidence for elephants in a comparable task. Conflicting results emerge from
experiments: Mendes et al. (2007) found orangutans to be highly successful
in the Floating Peanut Task27, while Hanus et al. (2011) found low solution
rates in chimpanzees and gorillas. Apart from mammals, there is much
evidence of insightful behaviour in corvids (e.g. Bird and Emmery, 2009).
Rooks spontaneously learnt to solve a variant of the Floating Peanut Task
by dropping rocks into a tube with a floating worm, such that the water
level would rise and they could reach it with their beaks. They also learnt
to use big rather than small rocks, which is more efficient.
Taylor and Gray (2009) argue that this doesn’t involve human-like knowl-
edge of causation, because if it did, the birds would have used only large
rocks initially. However, I think this may overestimate the causal knowledge
27A peanut is floating out of reach in a tube. The problem is solved by spitting water
into the tube to raise the water level.
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of children. The only study I know that tests children’s ability in the Float-
ing Peanut Task (Hanus et al., 2011) used water poured from a pitcher, not
rocks, so we have no evidence to suggest that children would start with large
rocks. In the youngest age group of children tested by Hanus et al. (4 year
olds), only 2 out of 24 were successful, so the bar is set rather low. In one of
the experiment with chimpanzees, the success rate was 2 out of 19. Anyway,
Taylor and Gray (2009) seem to be assuming that a rationalist account must
explain this, while I’ve been arguing that insight is in fact empiricist.
Hanus et al. argue that functional fixedness (the inability to use a famil-
iar object for a new purpose) underlay low success rates among the primates,
while functional flexibility is a feature of creativity and insight in humans
(§3.5.2). The experimenters compared children’s success in a wet condition
(water already in the tube) and dry condition (no water in the tube). Across
all age groups, children in the wet condition were more likely to solve the
problem. This suggests an effect of relevance: water was associated with the
problem in the wet condition, but not the dry condition, where a more dis-
tant connection had to be made to realise its relevance. Primates performed
badly in both conditions, so perhaps they struggle with basic problems of
relevance. It would be interesting to see what would happen if the water
source was made salient to them, as empty feeding tubes were in Savage-
Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh (1978), which I discussed in relation to context
and symbol learning (§2.5.2.2).
Taylor and Gray (2009) call insight a ‘rather murky’ term, but I hope I
have shown that it is not, though much still needs to be done to understand
it properly. Anyway, their understanding seems to be based on texts by
biologists, not psychologists. Taylor and Gray also consider (and, again,
reject) the possibility that the rooks are ‘Popperian creatures’ (Dennett,
1994), ones capable of generating hypotheses28. A proper understanding
of inference as it relates to insight explains just how these concepts are
related, and I think that’s just what my inferential hierarchy and discussion
of abduction have done.
The question of animal representations is a contentious one, though, and
the above studies do not investigate just how animals represent these prob-
28Though this is not how they phrase it, and Dennett’s original formulation focuses
on preselected hypotheses, neglecting Popper’s context of discovery, for which see §3.3.4
above
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lems. It is therefore worth seeing (briefly) whether there is evidence for
any abilities related to insight in animals that doesn’t require knowing more
about their representations. This would help avoid any accusations of evolu-
tionary saltation. In §3.5.2, I discussed results from Ansburg and Hill (2003)
showing that insight ability correlates with diffuse attention in humans, and I
quoted the authors as claiming that diffuse attention allows people to ‘cap-
ture unexpected cues and to generate remote associations than are those
whose cognitive resources are more narrowly focused’ (2003, 1142). One po-
tential pre-adaptation for insight, then, would be a hemispheric differences
between focal and diffuse attention, such that the RH is more successful at
diffuse attention and the LH at focal attention.
By exposing chicks to light while in the egg, Rogers et al. (2004) were
able to induce hemispheric lateralisation. Both lateralised and unlateralised
chicks pecked at grains of food mixed in with pebbles while, periodically,
a model resembling the silhouette of a predatory bird passed above them.
Pecking at food required focal attention; watching out for predators required
broad or diffuse attention. Lateralised chicks were better at distinguishing
grain from pebbles than unlateralised chicks, and were also more likely to
detect the predator stimulus. Indeed, lateralised chicks were able to do
both simultaneously. In lateralised chicks, it was the right eye (LH) that
performed best at the focal task and the left eye (RH) that performed best
at the diffuse task.
Reviewing lateralisation in vertebrates generally, McGilchrist concludes
that:
Lateralization brings evolutionary advantages, particularly in
carrying out dual-attention tasks. In general terms, the left
hemisphere yields narrow, focused attention, mainly for the pur-
pose of getting and feeding. The right hemisphere yields a broad,
vigilant attention, the purpose of which appears to be awareness
of signals from the surroundings, especially of other creatures,
who are potential predators or potential mates, foes, or friends;




In the previous chapter, I set out the inferential hierarchy, arguing that
contextual constraint is a major determiner of inferential complexity, and
that empiricist processes (such as spreading activation over coarse semantic
networks in the RH) underlie some contextually unconstrained inference,
especially in pragmatic interpretation.
In this chapter I’ve defined abduction as a type of inference that gener-
ates hypotheses. It is conjectural and can involve creative discoveries or the
selection of familiar hypotheses. The latter may seem similar to induction,
but the former is quite different, and it is the former that is relevant to un-
derstanding novel signs. Abduction is a matter of an empiricist psychology
in that it is non-normative and explicable by associative processes, while
induction is rationalist in that it is normative (or seeks to approximate nor-
mative computational-level functions) and often described in syntactic terms
at the computational level, though these may be implemented associatively
at the algorithmic level.
I showed that abduction cannot be reduced to induction because induc-
tion cannot cope with novelty or unconstrained hypothesis spaces, or the
question of how a relevant representation of the problem is arrived at. Ab-
duction is what provides hypothesis spaces for induction to evaluate, so it
is logically prior to induction and a necessary complement to it.
I briefly suggested a plausibility-based view of abduction, but looked
in more detail at how analogy and insight meet the requirements (being
empiricist, able to handle creativity or novelty, and able to decide relevance,
salience or context).
Importantly, I discussed ways of diagnosing whether insight problem
solving is applied to a given problem on a particular occasion, though now
I’ll spell this out in a little more detail. Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) showed
that subjective reporting of a feeling of insight correlates with objective
measurements of insight problem solving: the brains of people who reported
feeling a flash of insight when they solved a CRA problem showed increased
activation in the STG-RH, which I linked in the previous chapter to contex-
tually unconstrained pragmatic inference over coarse semantic networks. I
also provided a range of behavioural, physiological and neurological evidence
showing that insight problem solving is distinct from non-insight mechani-
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cal or analytic processes. Insight, then, is a distinct cognitive process and
subjective reporting is a reliable indicator of insight. Using subjective re-
porting in a word learning task can thus indicate whether or to what extent
the problem is solved insightfully.
In the next chapter, I fine-tune subjective reporting as a diagnostic tool:
insight has a number of features, and I show that it is the ‘Aha!’ experi-
ence that best distinguishes insight from analytic thinking. I then use this
diagnostic to show that abduction is more insightful than induction.
In the following three chapters, I isolate features of communication at
the symbolic threshold and test to what extent insight (and thus abduction)
are implicated in communicative tasks displaying those features.
The first is that communication at the symbolic threshold would have
involved large worlds rather than small worlds. The latter involve a small
set of possible answers; the former a vast set (much like charades). Induc-
tive accounts assume small worlds, but I predict that large worlds require
increased amount of insight (and thus abduction).
The second is that communication at the symbolic threshold would have
involved less contextual information: intended meanings would have been
less predictable from the environment than is the case in modern child word
learning. I predict that less predictable cases require increased insight.
The third is that signals at the symbolic threshold were novel, not con-
ventional, and I predict that more novel signals require more insight. I also
show that level of iconicity is not a predictor of insight levels, though much








4.1 Background and Aims
I have been arguing that crossing the symbolic threshold involved context-,
salience- and relevance-deciding inference about the ground of a sign. In the
previous chapter, I argued that abduction is just such a kind of inference,
and that it generates a focal set of hypotheses in novel situations which
induction can then evaluate. I also argued that abduction requires an em-
piricist (non-normative, associationist) psychology. I reviewed features of
insight suggesting that it meets these requirements and can thus potentially
play an abductive role. In this section, I show experimentally that abduc-
tion is in fact insightful, compared to non-insight or analytic problems (i.e.
induction and deduction).
Insight problem solving involves distinct cognitive mechanisms compared
to non-insight problem solving (§3.5.2). I reviewed behavioural, neurological
and physiological evidence, but focused on subjective reporting in Jung-
Beeman et al. (2004): an fMRI study found significantly more activation in
the Superior Temporal Gyrus of the right hemisphere (STG-RH) for subjects
who reported feeling a flash of insight while solving a Compound Remote
Associate (CRA) test than participants who didn’t. This result is consistent
with other evidence concerning the function of this area: it is implicated in
pragmatic inferences over broad semantic networks (§2.6). By analysing
the time-course of neural activation in an EEG study, Jung-Beeman et al.
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also excluded the possibility that subjective reporting of a flash of insight
is explainable as an emotional response, equivalent to a general notion of
surprise: activation peaked before the conscious ‘Aha!’ moment of surprise.
So subjective reporting is a reliable diagnostic for insight problem solving
as a distinct cognitive mechanism.
When explaining insight to their participants to prepare them for self-
reporting, Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) describe insight using a range of fea-
tures (cf. §3.5.2):
A feeling of insight is a kind of ‘Aha!’ characterized by sudden-
ness and obviousness. You may not be sure how you came up
with the answer, but are relatively confident that it is correct
without having to mentally check it. It is as though the answer
came into mind all at once — when you first thought of the word,
you simply knew it was the answer. This feeling does not have to
be overwhelming, but should resemble what was just described.
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, 507)
So although subjective reporting is diagnostic of insight problem solv-
ing, this reporting bundles together a number of potentially independent
features. It is not guaranteed that all features work equally well to dis-
tinguish insight from non-insight problem solving. One aim of the present
experiment is to evaluate each feature individually. Hence, I decomposed
this description into four criteria1, and allowed participants to report each
dimension separately. Here, each criterion contains two descriptors: the first
is the insight response; the second is the non-insight response. The word in
brackets after each gives the label that will identify that variable in analysis.
Criterion 1 The answer came to me all at once vs. I worked towards the
answer step-by-step (sudden)
Criterion 2 I wouldn’t be able to explain how I got the answer vs. I would
be able to explain how I got the answer (explain)
Criterion 3 I had an ‘Aha!’ moment, like a lighbulb flashing on vs. I had
no ‘Aha!’ moment (aha)
1I listed five criteria at the end of the previous chapter. One was a matter of
computational-level analysis rather than subjective experience, though, so it has been
dropped here.
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Criterion 4 I’m confident my answer is good without being told vs. I
think it’s possible my answer is bad (confidence)
Participants in Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) gave binary responses: they
reported solving a problem with insight or without it. But Hélie and Sun
(2010) stress that there is a continuum here: it could be that a response
just makes it over the threshold of awareness, and is thus not accompanied
by a strong ‘Aha!’ experience. A 100-point scale for self-reporting insight
was used in MacGregor and Cunningham (2008). I asked participants to
self-report their insight experience by moving on-screen sliders along four
independent 100-point scales (though the movement appeared continuous),
one for each of the four criteria. Each end of the scales was labelled with
one of the opposite-sense descriptors of the four criteria.
None of problem types (insight, abduction, analytic) forms a uniform
monolithic set. Hence, I sought to test a number of subtypes for each.
Insight problems are notoriously difficult to test in experimental con-
ditions (Bowden et al., 2005): they can take hours to solve (if solved at all,
due to impasse). Nonetheless, there are three subtypes of problem explicitly
called insightful in the literature that are generally solvable in comparable
timeframes to the other kinds of problems. CRA problems have already been
discussed (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). MacGregor and Cunningham (2008)
claim that rebus problems are similarly insightful. These are problems where
typographic and semantic features are manipulated to give common phrases.
For instance, SOMething reads as ‘the start of something big’ and exit
leg
reads
as ‘go out on a limb’. Finally, there are what might be called classic insight
problems, where fixation on the dominant (but irrelevant) interpretation of
an ambiguity leads to impasse. For instance, ‘A man in a small town mar-
ried 20 different women of the same town. All are still living and he never
divorced. Polygamy is unlawful but he has broken no law. How can this
be?’ (Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). The answer is that he’s a clergyman: he
married them in the sense of performing the marriage ceremony, not in the
sense of becoming their husband.
Abductive problems are most commonly researched in expert situ-
ations like medical diagnosis or scientific discovery (Johnson and Krems,
2001), but these expert situations are beyond the ability of non-expert ex-
perimental participants. Abduction is the generation of an hypothesis to
explain a surprising event, and this can be an event in daily life, so I cre-
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ated scenarios for five kinds of surprising event, four from daily life and one
comparatively unfamiliar, involving an alien world.
Two subtypes required participants to hypothesise a cause for an event;
two required hypotheses about the motivation for someone’s behaviour.
There was one descriptively simple and one descriptively complex causa-
tion subtype, as well as one simple and one complex motivation subtype.
An example of a simple motivation problem is this: ‘You see a woman shout-
ing at a sales assistant in a shop. Why is she shouting?’ A more complex
motivation problem: ‘Someone comes into the room and lights a candle.
Everyone who lives in that apartment is single. In the corner, someone else
is watching a DVD on their laptop, looking bored. Why did someone light a
candle?’ A simple causation problem: ‘You hear a loud noise. What caused
it?’ A complex causation problem: ‘It’s been quite a sunny July so far. You
see a tree with dead leaves all around it on the ground. The tree seems
free from mould and rot. There are no other trees around. Why are there
leaves on the ground?’ Each scenario was designed to be open-ended, with
multiple possible answers.
The complex questions included additional information, relative to sim-
ple questions, prompting inferences about relevance. The additional infor-
mation was derived from responses in a pilot study (not reported here) in
which volunteers came up with hypotheses for equivalent simple scenar-
ios. For instance, the simple equivalent of the above complex motivation
problem was ‘There is a lit candle in a room. Why did someone light a can-
dle?’ Many participants responded with the answers ‘it’s Valentines day,’
or ‘there’s been a power failure.’ Some of the additional information in the
complex scenarios was included to inhibit some of those earlier suggestions
(if everyone is single, a romantic candle-lit dinner for Valentine’s day is a
less likely explanation). Some additional information was included to be
suggestive, rather than directly inhibitory (if there’s been a power failure,
people are less likely in general to be watching DVDs, except that laptops
can operate without mains power). Finally, some additional information
was purposefully irrelevant (someone looking bored).
The fifth abductive subtype involved descriptions of an alien world pop-
ulated by fictitious Zorgs. The scenarios were based on easily recognisable
scenes (for instance, people singing ‘Happy Birthday’ while someone blows
out candles on a cake), except that the cultural signifiers that would help
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us recognise this event were either removed, or described in novel terms, or
described in related but atypical terms. These mutated cultural signifiers
were interspersed with irrelevant information. Hence: ‘A Zorg in a pur-
ple hat is surrounded by a ring of other Zorgs. They’re making a pleasing
sounding noise in harmony, and its face flushes a gentle orange. They give
it something covered in small blinking lights, which flash on and off in what
seems a random pattern. It takes out a blade and looks expectant. What’s
going on?’
Analytic problems included both deductive and inductive questions.
These were based on templates found in reviews of kinds of reasoning (Kurtz
et al., 1999; Kemp and Jern, 2014). One inductive subtype involved choosing
the more likely explanation for a scenario from two alternatives: ‘Which of
the following is the most likely explanation for a cough, given that the patient
is a smoker? a) Emphysema b) A Cold’. Another involved rating how likely
a particular explanation was on a percentage scale: ‘Of all possible reasons
for a train being cancelled, how likely is it that snow is the right one?’ The
third subtype involved novel property induction (again, with probability
rated on a percentage scale): ‘Cow guts contain the enzyme protylase. How
likely is it that all herbivores’ guts contain the enzyme protylase?’ The
final subtype involved evaluating deductive reasoning: ‘All men are mortals
and Cratylus is a mortal. Is Cratylus a man? a) Definitely b) Possibly
c) Definitely not.’ I included only one deductive subtype (compared to 3
inductive ones) since deduction isn’t ampliative, and there is thus less need
to show that it is distinct from abduction.
I predict that insight problems will be rated significantly differently from
analytic problems along most of the four criteria, in line with results in Jung-
Beeman et al. (2004). I also predict that ratings for abductive problems will
be different from analytic problems in the same direction as insight prob-
lems. This would indicate that abductive problems are insightful, compared
to deduction and induction. If correct, subjective reporting can be used as
diagnostic of abduction in the world-learning problems that make up the rest
of this dissertation, where features of the communicative context are manip-
ulated to simulate the symbolic threshold. These will show that abduction
was crucial at the symbolic threshold.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Design
A within-subjects design was used: participants attempted problems of all
three types (insight, abductive, analytic), then provided insight ratings along
the four criteria discussed above. The independent variable, then, is type,
and the dependent variables, as labelled above, are sudden, explain, aha
and confidence.
4.2.2 Participants
I recruited 37 participants, 19 via the University of Edinburgh’s (UE) job
website; 18 via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MT), a crowd-sourcing plat-
form2. Given the relatively anonymous nature of MT work and the fact
that workers are motivated to maximise their earning rate by preferring
tasks to be as quick as possible, biographical data was collected only for
the UE participants (5 male, 14 female; average age = 24.6, SD = 6.64).
All participants were paid £4.50 for their participation. UE participants
signed a consent form which explained the nature of the experiment; MT
participants were informed of the nature of the experiment via the MT on-
line interface and were told that clicking the link to the experiment applet
indicated consent.
4.2.3 Materials
The experiment was coded in Processing (www.processing.org), a java-based
open-source platform that exports an applet that can be accessed online.
UE participants used University of Edinburgh iMac computers. MT partic-
ipants participated online. For each problem type, there were a number of
subtypes, described above (3 insight, 5 abductive, 4 analytic). Each subtype
contained 4 problems, yielding 48 problems in all. The insight problems were
taken unchanged from sources (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; MacGregor and
2The main reason for having these two groups of participants was that part of this
methodology is comparatively new: studies cited above showed a correlation between
RH activation and subjective reporting, but here I will be using subjective reporting to
distinguish types of problem. I thus wanted a comparatively diverse group of participants,
and crowd-sourcing seemed a quick and efficient way of providing a more diverse group
than recruiting within the university alone. Mason and Suri (2011) provide evidence for
the validity of MT participants’ responses in behavioural experiments.
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Cunningham, 2008; Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). Abductive problems were
generated as described above. Analytic problems were based on templates
found in reviews of such problems (Kurtz et al., 1999; Kemp and Jern, 2014).
All problems are found in Appendix 1.
4.2.4 Procedure
Participants saw an on-screen welcome that gave detailed instructions, as
well as an explanation of insight problem solving like that from Jung-Beeman
et al. (2004) above. UE participants were able to ask questions to check un-
derstanding; MT participants were not, given that they participated online.
Participants pressed a key to begin the experiment when they were ready.
Participants then worked through all problem subtypes in a randomised
order: consecutive subtypes were not necessarily of the same type. Each
subtype was introduced by an explanation and an example, then the four
problems of that subtype followed in randomised order. Participants were
given 2 minutes to solve each problem. After 2 minutes, they were asked if
they wanted more time, or wanted to proceed to the next question. Selecting
more time reset the 2-minute counter. The option to skip was offered because
insight problem solving can lead to an impasse. After the four problems of
each subtype, the next subtype was introduced.
Depending on the problem subtype, participants either typed an answer
(for instance, when hypothesising or thinking of a word), selected from a set
of options (for instance, when choosing which was the most likely explana-
tion) or moved a slider along an on-screen scale (for instance, when rating
how likely an event is). Because the abductive tasks were open-ended, there
was no unique correct solution, so any answer counted as a solution. Even
though the other types had a unique correct solution, for the sake of uni-
formity across all three types, any answer was accepted as a solution. The
analysis below examines only insight ratings, not the solutions themselves.
Each time a problem was solved, a screen with four scales corresponding
to the four insight criteria was displayed. Each time, the criteria were pre-
sented in a different randomised order. The directionality of each scale was
also randomised independently of the other scales: providing a high insight
rating could involve moving the slider either to the right or the left, depend-
ing on the arrangement of the above descriptors on that particular occasion.
The sliders began in the center of the scale (halfway between an insight
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and a non-insight rating), and participants were not able to progress to the
next problem until all sliders had been moved. They were, however, able
to return the slider to its original central position if they so wished. This
was to prevent participants from progressing to the next question without
providing an insight rating.
4.3 Results
Results were analysed using R, an open-source statistics package (R Devel-
opment Core Team, 2011), and in particular the lme4 package (Bates et al.,
2011) for linear mixed-effects models (LMEMs). This is the most appropri-
ate analysis for this data set, given that it exhibited heteroskedasticity and
significant degrees of non-normality, and the design was unbalanced given
that there were fewer subtypes of insight problem than the others. None
of the above are problematic for LMEMs (Baayen et al., 2008; Barr et al.,
2013).
An LMEM analysis begins with the maximal model plausible given ex-
periment design (Barr et al., 2013), though if inspection of the random-
effects correlation matrix shows values close to 1 or −1, this indicates over-
parameterisation (Baayen et al., 2008), in which case those effects should be
removed from the model. For this reason, I removed random effect group
(MT or EU) and the random slope for item. The maximal model for this
data included type (insight, abductive, analytic) as the fixed effect, with
random intercepts and slopes for participant and random intercepts for
item nested in subtype.
The estimated parameters for all four models are summarised in table 4.1
and displayed graphically in fig. 4.1. For instance, the model estimates that,
for criterion sudden, ratings for abduction problems are 16.241 points higher
than for analytic problems, averaged across the population, while insight
problems are 8.620 points higher than analytic problems. Note that aha
shows the largest effect size, and that confidence ratings for insight and
abduction are actually lower than for analytic problems.
There are several ways to estimate p-values in an LMEM, though Barr
et al. (2013) note that there is not yet consensus within the field about























































Figure 4.1: Model estimates of mean for each criterion by problem type. Bars indicate
model estimates of standard error of the mean.
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Criterion Parameter estimate SE t
sudden
Abduction 16.241 4.997 3.263
Insight 8.620 5.787 1.490
explain
Abduction 5.224 3.068 1.702
Insight 8.462 2.987 2.833
aha
Abduction 12.886 3.235 3.984
Insight 25.496 4.258 5.988
confidence
Abduction −6.314 6.858 −1.037
Insight −10.246 7.417 −1.399
Table 4.1: Experiment 1 maximal model parameters for fixed effects (compared to base
level analytic), standard errors (SE) and t-values.
Barr et al. (2013) recommend comparing the log-likelihoods3 of two models
(the maximal model and a null model, precisely the same in every respect,
except with the fixed effect removed) using the anova function. However,
while this method shows whether type has a significant effect on insight
rating, it doesn’t show whether there is a significant difference between the
base level (analytic) and each of the other levels (abduction and insight).
Baayen et al. (2008) suggest that an informal way of deciding whether these
differences are significant is to look at the t-value (table 4.1): if its absolute
value is larger than 2, the effect is probably significant. Baayen (2008, 269)
derives p-values from t-values according to formula 4.1.
p = 2 ∗ (1 − pt(abs(t), Y −Z)) (4.1)
Here, pt is a function in R that accesses the probability distribution for
t. The function takes two arguments: the absolute value of t and an upper
bound for the degrees of freedom given by subtracting the number of fixed
effects parameters (Z) from the number of observations (Y).
Baayen (2008) recommend using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (mcmc)
simulation. However, this method is not implemented for models with ran-
dom slopes (Barr et al., 2013), so this method is not suitable for the above
maximal models. It is possible to use simplified models (i.e. excluding the
3One measure of how well a model fits the data.
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random slope for participant) in order to allow mcmc analysis.
The derived p-values are shown in table 4.2. Though the mcmc p-values
are generally less conservative than the values based on the maximal model,
they all agree that, for sudden, explain and aha, type is a significant effect.
For confidence, the anova p-value shows that type is not a significant ef-
fect; the mcmc p-values suggest that insight is significantly different, but that
abduction is not (though it lies in the predicted direction). So confidence
is not a reliable diagnostic for insight according to more conservative p2.
P-values based on the maximal model are higher than those based on the
reduced model, because the latter are anticonservative (Barr et al., 2013).
There are two cases where the mcmc-method finds significance where the
t-value method does not (excluding confidence): insight for sudden and
abduction for explain. In each case, though, the non-significant level lies
in the same direction as the significant level, relative to the analytic base
level. The results for aha show a consistently significant effect of type at
both levels (abduction and insight, compared to analytic problems).
p1 p2 p3
χ2 p abd. p ins. p abd. p ins. p
sudden 9.1731 0.0102 0.00112 0.136 0.0001 0.0170
explain 7.38 0.025 0.0889 0.00467 0.0136 0.0004
aha 23.801 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
confidence 2.142 0.343 0.299 0.162 0.0802 0.0098
Table 4.2: Experiment 1 p-values derived by three methods discussed above: anova (p1),
t-value by formula 4.1 (p2); mcmc (p3). Significant values are in bold. Both the anova
and t-value methods use the maximal model; the mcmc uses the reduced model. Both the
t-value and mcmc methods indicate whether the difference between abductive and analytic
problems (abd. p) and between insight and analytic problems (ins. p) is significant.
4.4 Discussion
This experiment sought to show that abduction is more insightful than in-
duction, an analytic problem. After attempting different types of problem
(abduction, insight and analytic), participants provided ratings used in in-
sight research to characterise insight problems. Ratings were provided in-
dependently along four specific criteria, rather than for a general sense of
‘insight’.
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The LMEM analysis shows that the confidence criterion fails to dis-
tinguish insight from analytic problems (table 4.2), so it cannot be used to
distinguish abduction from induction. This is not surprising: criterion 4 was
essentially a confidence rating. For many insight problems, the moment of
realising the answer is often accompanied by a realisation that the answer is
obviously correct (Bowden et al., 2005). However, high levels of confidence
are typical of a range of non-insight phenomena, including recall of familiar
facts and many analytic problems. Indeed, this is the only criterion where
ratings for insight problems (and abduction) were lower than for analytic
problems.
For the sudden, explain and aha criteria, a significant effect of type was
found in the anova analysis and in each case, abduction lay in the same di-
rection relative to analytic problems as insight did. The question remaining
is whether each difference is significant, because the anova analysis doesn’t
distinguish within the levels (abduction and insight) that are contrasted
with the base level (analytic). To check whether each criteria distinguishes
insight from analytic problems and whether abduction is significantly in-
sightful, we must rely either on the t-value method based on formula 4.1
or the mcmc method, which is based on non-maximal models since the mcmc
package in R cannot handle models with random slopes.
These alternatives offer contradictory advice for sudden and explain:
the non-maximal models find both levels significant for both criteria; the
maximal models find insight non-significant for sudden and abduction non-
significant for explain. They agree, however, that aha strongly and reliably
distinguishes insight from analytic problems and show that abduction is
significantly insightful.
If we prefer the t-value method, then sudden fails to distinguish insight
from non-insight problems, in which case criterion 1 is not diagnostic of
insight as a distinct cognitive process. On the other hand, explain does
distinguish insight from non-insight problems, in which case criterion 2 can
show whether abduction is insightful. But explain ratings for abduction are
not significantly different from ratings for analytic problems by the t-value
method, though the effect does lie in the same direction as insight. If, how-
ever, we prefer the p-values from the non-maximal model, then abduction is
significantly insightful according to both criteria.
So as things stand, the features of insight that are significantly different
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from analytic problems are either given by the set {sudden, explain, aha}
or the set {explain, aha}. The former is justified by the p-values of a non-
maximal model, in which case abduction is significantly more insightful than
induction across all three criteria. The latter is justified by the t-values of
the maximal model, in which case abduction is significantly more insightful
than induction according to criterion aha.
Both sets, however, contain explain and aha, so it is natural to look in a
little more detail at these. The results based on aha are clear, so the question
of whether the difference between abduction and induction is statistically
significant overall depends on how much weight we give explain compared
to aha.
There are theoretical and statistical reasons for lending more weight to
aha than explain here. Firstly, Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003a) claim
that the ‘Aha!’ experience is central to insight, as do Kaplan and Simon
(1990). Many cognitive processes, though, are ineffable, so explain is more
a matter of distinguishing inference from reasoning according to my defini-
tions of these terms. Secondly, both the parameter estimates and t-values
in table 4.1 are larger for aha than for explain, so the former is a stronger
diagnostic for insight.
It may simply be the case that abduction ratings by explain vary less
strongly compared to induction than they do by aha. Fig. 4.2 shows explain
ratings broken down by abduction subtype. Some problems score higher
than others, with the most novel (the Zorg questions) scoring the highest.
Further research could explore what effect novelty has on insight ratings by
manipulating how many features of the vignette correspond to something
recognisable, and how similar the descriptions of features are to conventional
cultural signifiers. That lies outside the scope of this thesis, though, since
it relates to manipulations of features in analogic bases (cf. §3.5.1).
The result of the experiment coheres well with claims in previous chap-
ters. I argued that pragmatic inference about the meaning of novel signs
involves context-, relevance- or salience-deciding processes (§1.5.2); that
induction is incapable of dealing with contextually unconstrained novelty
(§3.4); and that abduction generates novel hypotheses based on plausibility
(i.e. on representational structures, §3.3.6). Insight was shown to involve
activation over representational structures in the same brain areas that are
involved in contextually unconstrained or novel pragmatic inference (§2.6;
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Figure 4.2: Mean explain ratings broken down by abduction subtype: a1 = complex
causation; a2 = simple causation; a3 = simple motivation; a4 = complex motivation; a5
= Zorg world.
§3.5.2). Recall the Graded Salience Hypothesis (§2.6.4), for instance: the
less conventional (or more novel) the metaphor, the harder it is to generate
an relevance-deciding inference about the ground of the metaphor, and the
more activity in the RH temporal lobe. The results here should be anything
but surprising, therefore.
To summarise the main results, the experiment shows that abduction is,
on the whole, more insightful than induction. Diagnostics for insight can
thus be used to evaluate the extent to which abduction and induction each
shoulder the explanatory burden in word learning in different contexts, and
I will use the aha criterion as the diagnostic in remaining experiments. In
cases where only a small set of hypotheses are possible, where hypotheses
are highly predicable from the context, or signs are familiar, abduction will
not need to perform a very difficult job (which is not to say it will perform
no job at all) and the bulk of the work will be done by induction. In
such cases, there should be a comparatively low aha rating. But in cases
where there are many theoretically possible answers, or hypotheses are not
highly predictable from context, or signs are novel, abduction will play an
important role in generating a manageable hypothesis space for induction
to evaluate. In such cases there will be a comparatively high aha rating.
Finally, I turn to consider a couple of objections.
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If abduction is insightful, why are ratings for abduction not more sim-
ilar to those for insight? There are a number of plausible explanations.
Firstly, all insight problems involved comparatively short strings (CRAs in-
volved just three words, and some rebus problems even fewer) while abduc-
tive problems involved several sentences, and sometimes long paragraphs.
The effort involved in processing this extra linguistic stimuli would have
incorporated non-insight processes, and may have thus lowered insight rat-
ings. In fact, abductive problems involved more than just linguistic knowl-
edge: they involved integrating linguistic knowledge with world knowledge
(which involves frontal lobe processing, Menenti et al., 2009), while insight
problems involved mostly linguistic knowledge. Finally (and probably most
importantly), insight problems involved one correct answer, while abduc-
tive problems were more open-ended. The experience of finding the correct
solution may have increased the strength of the flash of realisation that ac-
companies insight problem solving. What matters, however, is that these
results consistently show a difference between abduction and induction.
Since Deacon (1997) claimed that insight is crucial at the symbolic thresh-
old, why add abduction to the mix? Why not just investigate the role of
insight in symbol origins? The answer has more to do with the state of
the field than it does with abduction itself. Induction has been the focus
of much word-learning research in language evolution. But insight and in-
duction don’t seem to have anything to do with each other. Introducing
abduction into the discussion is a crucial step in that it relates these dis-
parate processes: it is the input to induction, and it operates insightfully.
Further, the central question here is essentially semiotic, and abduction is
fundamental to Peircean semiotics.




5.1 Background and Aims
I have identified context-size as a major dimension along which the evolution
of inference should be explored and have argued that crossing the symbolic
threshold involved contextually unconstrained inference. My central claim,
though, is that abduction was necessary for crossing the symbolic threshold,
so I need to show that abduction is required for contextually unconstrained
inferences about the meaning of novel signs. Induction, on the other hand,
is a contextually constrained inference.
Complex tasks typically require both: hypotheses are generated and then
evaluated. But the burden shouldered by each differs according to task type:
at times it may be comparatively easy to generate a set of hypotheses while
choosing the best from that focal set is difficult; at other times, coming
up with any hypothesis at all is very difficult, but once the hypothesis is
generated, its posterior probability is immediately recognisable as being ex-
tremely high. Different word-learning tasks, then, may depend on different
levels of involvement by both forms of inference.
In this experiment, I manipulate context size (hereafter, ‘world size’ or
WS): in small-world problems, there is a highly limited set of possible an-
swers; in large-world problems, a vast set. Medina et al. (2011) contrasted
the small-world problems typical of inductive experiments with more realis-
tic large-world problems (see §2.5.2.2 for a discussion and illustration) and
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showed that WS has a significant effect on learning. In small-world prob-
lems, it is possible to inductively evaluate all possible hypotheses, whereas
in large-world problems, a focal set of hypotheses must be generated by ab-
duction before induction can proceed. Abduction, then, would play a small
role in small-world problems and a large role in large-world problems.
The previous chapter showed that subjective reporting of an insight ex-
perience (or Aha! moment) is diagnostic of increased levels of abduction,
compared to induction. I thus use subjective reporting as an indicator of
increased levels of abduction in the present experiment. Firstly, I predict
that insight ratings in unconstrained (or vast) worlds should be significantly
different from insight ratings when a focal set of hypotheses is given for
evaluation. Secondly, I predict that as WS increases, insight ratings should
increase, but because increases in WS can be gradual, increases in insight
ratings should be gradual, too. That is, I expect an upwards trend in insight,
not a series of significantly different values.
I investigate this question in a Pictionary-like game, where participants
must guess what cue the drawer had in mind while producing a simple
drawing. An alternative would have been to pair a novel word with video
footage (as in Medina et al., 2011), but manipulating world size in that
case would have been impractical. Further, there is precedent for the use of
Pictionary-like games in investigating symbol origins (Garrod et al., 2007;
Fay et al., 2010).
The experiments by Garrod, Fay and colleagues allowed feedback to
help the guessers get the right answer. However, participants would then
be processing feedback while processing novel signals, a possible confound
for insight ratings. Further, I wanted the stimuli for each guesser to be
identical, whereas feedback in the above experiments varied according to
the particulars of a given drawer+guesser interaction. All stimuli for this
experiment were thus prepared prior to the experiment, rather than created
by participants during the experiment.
A way of helping guessers discover the answer without feedback is sug-
gested by Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems, where participants
see three words and must find a fourth word that collocates with each. Each
word individually has multiple collocates, but the set narrows in on a unique
answer. Similarly, any drawing in a Pictionary-like game could prompt many
guesses, but a series of three pictures illustrating the same cue would help
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participants narrow in on one answer. Each word-guessing task here thus in-
volved simultaneous presentation of three independently produced drawings
to illustrate the same cue.
To distinguish contextually constrained and unconstrained problems, I
contrasted tasks where participants had to evaluate a set of hypotheses from
tasks where they had to generate their own. In the unconstrained tasks, par-
ticipants saw only the trio of drawings and had to guess the cue without any
further help; in the constrained tasks, they simultaneously saw a set of pos-
sible answers and merely had to decide which of those was the best answer
for the stimuli. Constrained and unconstrained tasks correspond to pre-
dominantly inductive and predominantly abductive problems, respectively.
Further, WS in constrained tasks could be manipulated: in a very small
world, there were only 2 possible answers to be evaluated; in a medium-size
world, there were 4; in a large-world, 8, while the unconstrained task al-
lowed a vast world. I took 8 to be the upper limit of constrained WS since
Smith et al. (2011) found this to be the upper limit on participants’ ability
to accurately track probabilities in a cross-situational word-learning task.
After guessing the answer, participants were asked to provide a subjec-
tive report of their insight experience in solving the problem. The previous
experiment decomposed various features of an insight experience into four
independent criteria and showed that experience of an Aha! moment was the
best predictor of problem type. Hence participants were asked to rate their
experience along this one dimension, though a fuller description of insight
problem solving was given in the instructions.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Design
Participants provided subjective reports of a feeling of insight after word-
guessing tasks. Each participant tried to solve tasks without any answers
given (open-context task), and tasks with possible answers given (closed-
context task). There were three subtypes of closed-context task: either
2, 4 or 8 possible answers were given for evaluation. Participants saw four
open-context problems and four problems for each subtype of closed-context
problem (hence 16 problems in total), yielding a within-subject repeated-
measures design with one independent variable (WS = 2, 4, 8, vast) and one
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dependent variable (self-reported insight rating).
5.2.2 Participants
21 participants were recruited via mailing lists for undergraduate linguistics
courses at the University of Edinburgh and through the university’s student
job website. They were paid £6 for their participation and signed a consent
form which explained the nature of the experiment.
5.2.3 Materials
Sixteen cue words were selected from randomly chosen Pictionary cards.
Three volunteers worked through the list of 16 cues, each time drawing a
simple picture that would prompt a partner (one of three other volunteers)
to guess the cue. Each drawer+guesser pair worked independently. This
process produced sixteen sets of three pictures. For instance, fig. 5.3 shows
three pictures drawn independently to represent ‘ripe’. All stimuli are given
in appendix 1.
To generate a list of possible answers for a trio of pictures, guesses for
each individual picture in that trio were collected separately via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk service (see previous chapter). The guesses for all three
individual pictures within a given trio were then collated and ranked from
most-commonly produced to least-commonly produced. The possible an-
swers for a context-constrained problem of WS = n consisted of the real
answer plus the top n − 1 other answers on that list.
The experiment was conducted on iMac computers in a University of
Edinburgh computer lab. Several participants were in the lab at a given
time, but they worked separately, were widely spaced, and were unable to
see each other’s screens, so were effectively isolated.
5.2.4 Procedure
After a welcome screen and instructions (which included practice CRA prob-
lems to illustrate insight), participants attempted to guess the cue repre-
sented by trios of pictures. The order of conditions (WS) was randomised,
and items were assigned randomly to conditions. For closed world condi-
tions, either 2, 4 or 8 possible answers were displayed beneath the trio of
pictures; for the open-world condition, no such answers were given.
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Answers were typed. If participants guessed incorrectly, they were told
that their answer was incorrect and were able to try again, repeatedly, until
they guessed the answer. After 10 incorrect guesses, they were asked if they
wanted to persevere with that problem or skip to the next problem. This
is because insight tasks can result in impasse. Inflected forms of the answer
were counted as correct (mile, miles); synonyms were not (purple, violet),
as is normal in a game of Pictionary.
If they guessed correctly, they were asked to move a slider along a 100-
point scale (though movement appeared continuous) to provide an insight
rating. Each end of the scale was labelled with an appropriate descrip-
tor: (I had an ‘Aha!’ moment, like a lightbulb suddenly flashing
on vs. I had no ‘Aha!’ moment. The left-to-right order of these descrip-
tors changed randomly for each problem. Participants were not able to
progress to the next problem until the slider had been moved, though they
were able to return it to its original position (central between the end points)
as an answer.
5.3 Results
Across the whole participant pool, there were 14 cases where participants
chose to skip the question after 10 incorrect guesses. Eleven of these were in
the open world condition; 3 in closed worlds. One participant in particular
seemed to have misunderstood the instructions: it seems they didn’t realise
(at least initially) that the words on screen were possible answers. Since
insight ratings were collected only for correct guesses, the participants who
skipped a question were not able to provide an insight rating for that ques-
tion. The average number of attempts needed to reach the correct solution
is given in table 5.1.
WS 2 4 8 vast
Attempts 1.0375 1.25 1.6375 2.3375
Table 5.1: Average number of attempts needed to reach the correct answer per world size
(WS).
Two main analyses were carried out. The first compares open or vast
worlds with closed or constrained worlds. The second analysis examined the
effects of increasing context size in constrained worlds.
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For the first comparison, a linear-mixed effects model (LMEM) was con-
structed and analysed using R, particularly package lme4 (Bates et al.,
2011). The dependent variable was insight rating (insight) and the fixed
effect was world (open or closed). Random effects included subject (ran-
dom intercept and slope) and item (random intercept only). A random
slope for item indicated overparameterisation (a value of 1 in the random
effects correlation matrix) and was thus excluded (Baayen et al., 2008).
P-values were derivable in 3 ways (described in the previous chapter):
via the anova function comparing the maximal model with a null model
(Barr et al., 2013); derived from the t-value according to the formula given
in the previous chapter (Baayen, 2008); and using an mcmc analysis on a
reduced model (removing the random slope).
Table 5.2 summarises the model parameters and derived p-values; the
parameters are displayed graphically in fig. 5.1. Though p1 is the most con-
servative, all show that insight ratings in open worlds are significantly higher
than those in closed worlds.
Insight SE t p1 p2 p3
Closed 44.359 4.471 9.922
Open 53.773 4.534 2.076 0.0438 0.0387 0.0057
Table 5.2: Maximal model estimated parameters for mean insight rating per condition,
standard errors (SE) and t-values, as well as p-values derived by the anova method (p1),
Baayen’s t-value method (p2); and the mcmc method (p3). The anova and t-value method
use the maximal model; the mcmc method uses the reduced model as described above.
The second main analysis investigated how insight ratings varied as con-
text size increased. Table 5.3 shows the estimates of an LMEM model that
replaces type (open/closed) with WS (2/4/8/vast), and these are displayed
graphically in fig. 5.2. For instance, the model estimates that insight rat-
ings for WS=4 were just 4.082 points higher than for WS=2. Apart from
WS=vast, the t-values are less than 2, suggesting the difference between up-
per levels and base level (WS = 2) is not significant.
However, I predicted an upwards trend, rather than significant differ-
ences between each level, since insight ratings should increase gradually
with context size. Page’s L is a non-parametric repeated-measure trend test
that compares ranked values to evaluate the extent to which observations
(here, insight) have a particular order (here, increasing with WS). We know













Figure 5.1: Model 1 estimates of mean for closed (WS=2, 4, 8) and open (WS=vast) worlds.
Bars indicate model estimates of standard error of the mean.
sight than closed worlds, so to provide a more conservative test of whether
insight increases with WS, data for vast worlds are excluded from analysis
here. The test gives L = 265, p < 0.001, so insight ratings tend to increase
with world size.
WS mean insight rating SE t
2 41.633 5.569 7.476
4 45.715 5.777 0.707
8 46.016 5.148 0.851
vast 54.140 5.449 2.295
Table 5.3: Model estimates for the mean insight ratings for different levels in world size
(WS), with standard errors of the mean (SE) and t-values.
5.4 Discussion
The experiment sought to show that inferring the meanings of new signs re-
quires abduction by comparing open worlds (with no hypotheses given) with
closed worlds (with a set of hypotheses give). Participants provided subjec-
tive reports of their experience of insight or ‘Aha!’ moment after guessing













2 4 8 vast
Figure 5.2: Model 2 estimates of insight by WS. Bars indicate model estimates of standard
error of the mean.
the intended meanings of novel pictures in open and closed worlds. These
insight ratings are diagnostic of increased levels of abduction, compared to
induction.
The LMEM analysis shows that insight ratings for open worlds were
significantly higher than those for closed worlds. Insight thus plays an ab-
ductive role by generating hypotheses in the former case; but has less of a
role to play in the latter case since hypotheses are given. It still has some
role to play, however, because the given hypotheses concern the pictures as
a whole, but participants would still have generated hypotheses about what
elements of the pictures mean. For instance, fig. 5.3 shows the trio of pic-
tures representing the cue ‘ripe’. Complex inferences are needed to recognise
that the face in the central figure is meant to represent an old woman and
that a person’s being old is analogous to fruit being ripe; or that gravity is
irrelevant for understanding the falling apple in the right-hand figure. These
hypotheses were not given, and would thus have to be generated, requiring
insight.
Induction alone cannot account for how this hypothesis is reached. Prior
probabilities are not derivable for all English words in response to these
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Figure 5.3: Pictures representing cue ‘ripe’.
pictures given that the pictures are novel (§3.3.6, §3.4.2). Some probabilistic
information is easily derivable from the pictures, but that information is
misleading: an apple appears in all three pictures, but assigning apple a
high prior here does not explain how the answer ripe is arrived at. It requires
insight to make the creative leap connecting representations of time, age,
fruit, fall or colour to yield ripe.
Further, I predicted that insight ratings would increase with context
size, given that I argued that context-size is a major predictor of inference
type (§2.5). Page’s L showed that insight tended to increase with context.
So abduction plays a larger role as context expands. Inductive accounts of
word learning typically deal with contextually-constrained contexts (§3.4.1);
Medina et al. (2011) argued that this is problematically unrealistic. The
results here show that there there is a significant cognitive difference as
contexts become less constrained.
While it is easy for Bayesian accounts to overlook the complexities of
hypothesis generation in the sorts of constrained contexts typical of exper-
iments in symbol evolution, the communicative context would have been
comparatively unconstrained at the symbolic threshold. Gesture may have
played a dual role at the symbolic threshold by directing attention or by
providing iconic or indexical information. Inferences about the meaning of
novel icons or indexes would have been just like inferences needed to under-
stand the pictures above (that is, context-, salience- and relevance-deciding
hypotheses, and thus abduction. I demonstrate this in ch. 7), whereas the
attention-directing role may have helped constrain context.
Even in comparatively small contexts, though, one would still have to
infer the speaker’s or gesturer’s communicative intentions, which would have
required abduction. Even for very small contexts here (WS = 2), average
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insight ratings were quite a bit higher than for purely inductive problems
in the previous experiment (41.633 vs. 27.378, respectively) for reasons I
set out above regarding the cue ‘ripe’. In vast worlds here, insight ratings
ranged as high as pure insight problems in the previous experiment (54.14
vs. 52.874, respectively).
The range of insight ratings here supports my claim in the previous
chapter that there isn’t necessarily a sharp contrast between abductive and
inductive problems: both types are needed, and the balance between them
shifts in a graded fashion. The next experiment provides more detailed
support for these claims in that it involves a more graded manipulation
of context size, investigating how predictable an intended word is given
contextual information.
A potential extension of this experiment would involve measuring laten-
cies while increasing WS more gradually than I have done here. If hypothesis
generation were simply a matter of searching an hypothesis space (as some
inductive accounts would have it), then latencies might increase linearly with
context size. If, on the other hand, insight plays an increasingly large role
as context size increases, then latencies would begin to plateau as abduction
comes to play the dominant role.
A second extension (which could be combined with the previous one)
would be to conduct an individual differences study. Participants would
undertake a number of classic insight problems and receive a score based on
their success, indicating how insightful they are. In constrained contexts,
there wouldn’t be a huge difference between insightful and less-insightful
participants, since most of the work involves hypothesis evaluation. As con-
text size increases, though, and hypothesis generation becomes important,
insightful participants should gradually become advantaged over less insight-





6.1 Background and Aims
The previous experiment investigated context size by manipulating the num-
ber of possible answers to a word-guessing problem. But even within a given
context size, levels of predictability may vary: a novel sign with the rele-
vant features made salient would be easier to understand than one with the
relevant features obscured. So in addition to context size, an important
feature of inferring meaning is the degree of predictability from context or
environment. In this experiment, I manipulate levels of predictability in a
word-guessing task. The less predictable the answer, the larger the role of
abduction, so the higher the predicted insight ratings.
This requires a task that offers accurate measures of predictability. A
Pictionary-like problem might provide indirect measures based on rates of
success across a large sample group, but predictability would be difficult to
manipulate in that case. However, a compound remote associate (CRA) task
can provide direct, accurate measures of predictability: the probability of a
particular word following a particular cue can be derived from a large corpus
such as the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA, Davies,
2008). Limiting the discussion to noun+noun collocates, if one is trying to
think of a noun that can follow the word ‘gym’, COCA shows that the most
likely answer is ‘bag’: it follows 16.4% of the time. On the other hand, ‘bag’
follows ‘book’ only 4.01% of the time. So ‘bag’ is more predictable from
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‘gym’ than from ‘book’.
In §2.6.4, I reviewed evidence showing that classical language areas in
the left hemisphere (LH) are active when a word is highly predictable from
context, while right hemisphere (RH) insight areas are more active when a
word is less predictable from context. Similarly, a conventional metaphor
such as ‘bright student’ involves LH dominance, while a novel metaphor such
as ‘conscience storm’ involves more RH activation (Mashal et al., 2007): ‘stu-
dent’ is highly predictable given ‘bright’ while ‘storm’ is not very predictable
given ‘conscience’. In addition, Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) showed that sub-
jective reporting of an ‘Aha!’ moment of insight is diagnostic of increased
activation in the relevant areas. As with previous experiments, then, I use
subjective insight ratings as the dependent measure. Of the following two




Using COCA, I constructed six lists of noun+noun collocates. I limited
all collocates to one syntactic class, in case syntactic class provided a con-
found. While Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003b) use CRA problems where
the collocate could precede or follow individual cues, and where the collo-
cate could be separated by a space or not, I limited my stimuli to collocates
that follow the cues, separated by a space, again to avoid confounds. Each
list consisted of five cues that collocate with the same answer: the following
list, for instance, cues ‘bag’. Lists were ranked in order of how predictable
the answer was given each cue: ‘bag’ is more likely to follow ‘shoulder’ than
it is to follow ‘grocery’. To provide three levels of predictability in CRA
problems, triads of cues were grouped into three conditions (high, medium,
and low predictability) as marked. I predict that insight ratings will increase
as predictability decreases.
gym ⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭Condition 2: medium predictability
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
paper Condition 1: high predictability
shoulder ⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭





Participants provided subjective reports of a feeling of insight after guess-
ing the collocate that could follow all three cues in a CRA problem. There
were 6 problems in total. For each participant, each of the six problems
was assigned randomly to one of three conditions (high, medium or low pre-
dictability), resulting in 2 problems per condition, yielding a within-subject
repeated-measures design with one independent variable (predictability =
high, medium, low) and one dependent variable (self-reported insight rat-
ing).
6.2.2 Participants
40 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowd-sourcing
platform (see ch. 4). Given that predictability values were derived from an
American corpus, the experiment was only made available to American par-
ticipants. Given the relatively anonymous nature of MT work and the fact
that workers are motivated to maximise their earning rate by preferring
tasks to be as quick as possible, biographical data was not collected. They
were paid £2 for their participation. After the nature of the experiment was
explained, participants were then told that clicking the link to the applet
constituted consent.
6.2.3 Materials
Table 6.1 shows the 5 possible cues for each answer. These were grouped
into triads as described above, and one triad for each list was assigned
to one of the three conditions. Rank values for each collocation were de-
rived from COCA. For instance, ‘bag(s)’ is ranked 1st among all noun col-
locates of ‘gym’. In all cases, inflected forms such as plurals were grouped
together. Cloze probabilities for each collocation were also derived from
COCA. COCA gives values for how many times in the corpus the answer
follows each cue, as well as a total for the top 100 noun collocates of that
cue. Dividing the first by the second gives an estimate value for how pre-
dictable the answer is given the cue. For instance, ‘bag(s)’ follows ‘gym’ 260
times in the corpus, and the top noun 100 collocates of ‘gym’ occur with it
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1585 times in the data, so ‘bag’ follows ‘gym’ with an estimated probability
of 0.16403. Again, inflected forms were included.
The cloze probability is merely an estimate since only the top 100 collo-
cates are given in the COCA search results, but the estimate is serviceable
since other collocates are rare and would thus have a small effect on the total.
The 100th collocate of ‘gym’, for instance, follows it on only 2 occasions in
the corpus. The 101st collocate would thus increase the total by a maximum
of 2. Assuming this maximum value, the probability of ‘bag’ following ‘gym’
would then be 0.16383, a difference of just 0.0002. The smallest probability
in the data set (0.0213) is still a couple of orders of magnitude larger than
this difference.
Answer sign bag lamp list button paper
neon gym kerosene wish snooze wrapping
exit paper bedside waiting panic rice
Cues dollar shoulder desk hit mouse morning
road grocery floor guest elevator construction
plus book lava shopping call Sunday
Table 6.1: Ranked collocation lists for each answer word. For instance, sign is ranked
higher among collocations of neon than it is among collocations of exit.
It turns out that the variance in cloze probability is lower in condition 3
than it is in condition 1. This is an unavoidable artefact of the distribution of
collocates: fig. 6.1 shows the relative proportion of the top 20 collocates for
cues floor, guest and grocery (adjusted so that the top collocate for each
has the same height, for ease of comparison). The proportion drops very
steeply at first, then levels off. High ranking collocates each account for a
larger percentage of all collocates, and differences between them are compar-
atively large; low ranking collocates each account for a smaller percentage of
all collocates, and differences between them are thus comparatively small.
This simply means that values for the independent variable will tend to
cluster at the lower end of the x-axis.
6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were introduced to CRA problems and given the chance to
practice on 4 examples from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003a). Insight
was explained in terms comparing the ‘Aha!’ experience to a light bulb





















Figure 6.1: Relative distribution of the top 20 collocates for three cues.
pants were shown the 6 CRA problems in a randomised order. If they hadn’t
solved a problem within 90 seconds, they were asked if they wanted to skip
to the next problem or persevere. This is because insight tasks often lead
to impasse, and long periods of impasse would discourage participants from
completing the experiment. After typing the correct answer (inflected forms
were accepted as correct), participants provided an insight rating by moving
an on-screen slider along a 100-point scale (though motion appeared con-
tinuous). The scale was labelled with insight descriptors (‘I had an “Aha!”
moment, like a lightbulb suddenly flashing on’ vs. ‘I had no “Aha!” mo-
ment’). The left-to-right order of these descriptors was randomised for each
problem. Participants were unable to proceed until they had moved the
slider from its initial position midway along the scale, though they could
then return it to that position if they wished.
6.3 Results
Participants averaged 78.05% correctness across all problems (sd = 19.16269).
Broken down by condition, average values for correctness were: high =
82.23%; medium = 75.95%; low = 79.49%.
Results were analysed in R using package lme4 (Bates et al., 2011) to
create linear mixed-effects models (LMEMs). The maximal model treats
condition as the fixed effect, with random intercepts for subject and item.
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Random slopes were not included since doing so produced a value of 1 in the
random-effects correlation matrix, indicating overparameterisation (Baayen
et al., 2008). Comparison with a null model using the anova function (see
ch. 4) showed no significant effect of condition (χ2 = 3.3016, p = 0.1919).
However, condition was a very coarse measure of predictability, given
that items within each of the three conditions could vary in predictability
values. For a more detailed analysis, an LMEM was constructed with rank
values for each cue derived from COCA. For instance, panic and exit are
both the first cue in the CRA problem in the medium condition, but COCA
shows that the answer ‘button’ is ranked 3rd among all the noun collocates
of cue ‘panic’ and answer ‘sign’ is ranked 7th among all the noun collocates
of cue ‘exit’. The second LMEM thus replaced fixed effect condition with
three fixed effects rank1, rank2, rank3 (rank1 referring to the 1st cue in
each CRA problem, and so on).
The model found a t-value greater than 2 for rank1 (t = 2.535), but not
for rank2 (t = −1.040) or rank3 (t = −1.174). Only the first cue in the CRA
is thus likely to have a significant effect on insight, given the rule of thumb
in Baayen (2008) that t-values lower than 2 are likely to be insignificant.
Anova comparison with null model showed a significant effect of the rank
value of the first cue of the triad (χ2 = 6.36, p = 0.01167). The mcmc method
yielded p = 0.0163. It is unsurprising that the first cue in each triad has a
larger effect than the others, given that this is the one participants would
have read first, so it may have constrained the context of the remaining cues.
For instance, in condition 1, reading ‘snooze’ first makes ‘button’ likely, but
makes ‘attack’ (the top collocate of second cue ‘panic’) less likely.
An even more finely grained analysis was possible, using corpus-derived
estimates of cloze probabilities (described above). A final LMEM, then,
treats the probability value of the first cue (cloze) as the fixed factor, since
the rank analysis above showed that only the first cue had a significant
effect on insight rating. Again, no random slopes were included since they
resulted in overparameterisation. Model estimates and p-values derived by
anova and mcmc methods are given in table 6.2 and displayed graphically in
fig. 6.2. Both methods show that cloze has a significant effect on insight.
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β SE t p1 p2
intercept 49.859 4.404 11.322
cloze -23.530 11.080 -2.124 0.03665 0.035
Table 6.2: Parameters from the model based on cloze probability with p-values derived by
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Figure 6.2: Mean insight ratings by cloze value of the first cue in each CRA problem,
with standard errors and model estimate of the slope.
6.4 Discussion
Humans are easily able to make context-based inferences about the meaning
of a word. I argued that context is one of the main dimensions along which
inferential complexity depends (ch. 2) and that abduction is contextually
unconstrained, unlike induction (ch. 3). The previous experiment explored
context size, while this one explored levels of predictability from context.
Participants solved CRA problems with varying degrees of predictability. An
LMEM analysis found a significant effect of predictability on insight rating
for the first cue in each problem, but not for the others. This, I argued,
is unsurprising given that reading the first cue may reduce probabilities of
collocates of the following cue.
The less predictable meaning is from context, the larger the role that
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abduction plays in generating hypotheses about meaning. People do some-
times solve CRA problems mechanically, but these results show that the less
predictable the answer, the less likely it is that a mechanical (and thus in-
ductive) account is sufficient. If insight ratings in fig. 6.2 are compared with
those for inductive and insight problems in ch. 4, it is clear that only high
cloze values are found with anything like the insight rating of inductive
problems there (which averaged 27.378). To reiterate, a given problem is
not either purely abductive or purely inductive, but rather places different
burdens on each, according to features of context. The present experiment
demonstrates that predictability from context is one such feature.
In §2.6.4 I reviewed experiments investigating hemispheric differences
between fine- and narrow-coding in semantic networks. For instance, Faust
and Chiarello (1998) tested priming effects of ambiguous words on dominant
or subordinate associates. The ambiguous words were situated in a sentence
context that prompted either a dominant or subordinate reading. RH facil-
itation was found for both dominant and subordinate associates, regardless
whether the context of the prime prompted a dominant or subordinate read-
ing. LH facilitation was found only for associates of whichever meaning was
prompted by sentence context.
Faust and Kahana (2002) constructed CRA-like triads made up of am-
biguous words as primes for a target that was an associate of all the words.
The triads were grouped into 5 conditions depending on whether the target
was related to the dominant (D) or subordinate (S) meaning of each word in
the triad: the triad could consist of DDD, DDS, DSS or SSS words (or unre-
lated words, to provide a base-line for comparison of the facilitation effect).
At a low SOA (800ms), LH facilitation increased with the number of Ds in
the triad, while RH facilitation was found for divergent (DDS or SSD) but
not convergent (DDD or SSS) primes. At a high SOA (2500ms), statistically
significant LH facilitation was found only for convergent dominant primes
(DDD), while significant RH facilitation was found for all conditions.
Kircher et al. (2001) conducted an fMRI study of participants respond-
ing to sentences in three conditions: in one, participants read a completed
sentence; in another, they chose between two possible endings; in the third,
they generated a plausible ending. All sentences provided medium, low or
very low constraint. The results show significantly more activation for the
generation task in the RH temporal lobe. While the experiments by Faust
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and colleagues show that the brain hemispheres respond differentially to
varying levels of constraint, this shows the particular importance of the RH
temporal lobe in hypothesising a meaning to fill a gap.
However, Kircher et al. (2001) refer to ‘inference’ in general terms, and
don’t mention insight at all, though Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) show that
insight involves activation in the same RH temporal lobe areas investigated
by Kircher et al. What my results add, then, is two-fold. Firstly, I show
that the relevant kind of inference is insightful (and thus abductive). Sec-
ondly, I show a graded relation: lower constraint or predictability involves
more abduction, while Kircher et al. (2001) do not compare different levels
of predictability. They mention that the RH ability to deal with divergent
primes might be related to creativity, but the present experiment offers more
specific claims: the RH processes in question are related to creativity in that
they provide abductive hypotheses through insight. Naturally, a lot remains
to be done to understand just how this works. But the results so far sup-
port a central theme in this dissertation: induction must be complemented
by abduction to understand open-ended word learning, though there is a
tendency in the field of language evolution to suppose that induction on its
own is sufficient.
In open-ended contexts, Bayesian induction is intractable (Kwisthout
et al., 2011). A typical Bayesian response (e.g. Griffiths et al., 2010) is that
their accounts concern the computational level, and that something at the
algorithmic level probably approximates Bayesian calculations. Kwisthout
et al. (2011) argue that this fails to solve the problem (and I agree), but
the results here offer something positive by clarifying what happens at the
algorithmic level. Contextually unconstrained processes are handled differ-
ently from contextually constrained processes, so rather than trying to work
out how an algorithmic-level process approximates Bayesian induction, we
must admit that there are (at least) two algorithmic-level processes that play
a parallel role, and that one of them (the contextually unconstrained RH
process) is not an approximation of Bayesian induction (§3.4, §3.5). The
question of whether the other, contextually constrained LH process is an
approximation of Bayesian induction does not concern me here.
These results also have implications for human evolution. Most of the
focus in terms of inference has been on our understanding higher-order re-
lations, and most of the focus in terms of language has been on classic
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LH perisylvian regions or, in the case of Deacon (1997), the frontal lobe.
However, given that crossing the symbolic threshold required contextually
unconstrained inferences, and given that RH insight areas in the tempo-
ral lobe excel at these, the traditional foci must be broadened if we are to
understand how humans communicate the way we do.
Chapter 7
Iconicity and Precedence in
Word Learning
7.1 Background and Aims
So far, I’ve shown that hypothesis generation about meanings in uncon-
strained contexts requires insight and thus abduction. The results have thus
supported my claim that abduction was essential at the symbolic threshold,
since our ancestors at that point would have lacked conventional forms of
directing attention or constraining context in other ways. But these claims
are based on the context of the sign, not on the sign itself. Both aspects are
important. In this chapter, I thus turn to examine the process of symboli-
sation: how a motivated sign becomes conventional over time.
A number of researchers in language evolution highlight the role of iconic-
ity in language evolution, or language generally. Cuskley and Kirby (2013)
and Kita et al. (2010) argue for the existence of an iconic or sound-symbolic
protolanguage. Zlatev (2008) argues that iconic gestures played a domi-
nant role before we developed conventional, normative signs. Perniss et al.
(2010) argues that iconicity is still a general feature of language today. My
focus here, though, is on how iconic signs can become symbolic through a
process of symbolisation: the motivated elements of the signs are gradually
reduced or lost. Garrod et al. (2007) and Fay et al. (2010) investigate the
role of communicative interaction in symbolisation by having participants
play repeated Pictionary-like games with the same cues. They found that, if
feedback was allowed between drawer and guesser, initially elaborate iconic
231
232 CHAPTER 7. ICONICITY AND PRECEDENCE
representations would gradually become simpler and more abstract, until
they no longer resembled their referents. That is, they became symbolic in
the sense of ‘non-iconic’. For an illustration (from the present experiment),
see fig. 7.1 below.
This sense of the word ‘symbol’ is different from mine (cf. ch. 1), but
my definition still applies to this scenario, even though my definition cuts
across the distinction between icon and this sense of ‘symbol’. I defined
a symbol as a sign whose ground requires relevance-, context- or salience-
deciding inference when it is first learned. Each stage in fig. 7.1 below is
thus symbolic in my terms because the first stage requires such inference:
relevance-deciding inference is needed to see the first picture as a character
wearing a hat and carrying a whip and to see Harrison Ford as an actor
who played a character who wore a hat and carried a whip. By the time the
iconic picture has become more abstract, the guesser no longer has to make
this inference about the ground. So though I consider all stages in fig. 7.1
symbolic, the latter stages are conventional symbols with a severely reduced
iconic element. I argued that conventionality is not the central criterion for
something being symbolic, so though most symbols are conventional, this
doesn’t preclude some from also being iconic.
My argument here, then, is that abduction is needed for the first stage in
the above process, and that if such a process explains where symbols come
from, then abduction was necessary at the symbolic threshold. Abduction
is gradually required less and less by participants in the above process, until
the final stages become a matter of straightforward recall: recognising a sign
seen recently with precisely the same meaning.
If someone joined this toy ‘speech community’ at a late stage in the
process, they would still have to infer the meaning of a non-iconic sign (while
those participants present since the start would simply recognise it). If the
inference of the late joiner is based on contextual information, and if that
context is unconstrained by the environment or interlocutor, it would still
require abduction. If, on the other hand, the context is highly constrained
(as it often is in inductive experiments), the late joiner would only need
to place a light burden on abduction. The previous experiment has already
demonstrated the need for abduction in unconstrained contexts, so the focus
in this chapter is on the process of symbolisation, not on late joiners.
My claims about abduction at the symbolic threshold are compatible
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with, but do not require an iconic stage. My overall point is that, iconic
origin or not, inferences about meaning at the symbolic threshold would
have been context-, salience- or relevance-deciding (§1.5), and that a purely
inductive account of the symbolic threshold is thus incomplete.
Here, I investigate the change in insight ratings over the course of a
Pictionary-like experiment based on Garrod et al. (2007); Fay et al. (2010).
Though the details of their methodology vary, the basic process is that pairs
of participants play a communicative game. One, the drawer, reads a cue and
begins drawing a picture to help their partner guess the cue. The guesser
has a list of possible answers to aid them. Depending on experimental
condition, interaction between the drawer and guesser may be allowed. In
some conditions, interaction might involve the guesser being allowed to add
to the drawing with a different colour pen; in other conditions, minimally
informative interaction was limited to the guesser indicating when they had
guessed the answer. After working through a list of cues, drawer and guesser
switch roles. The process is repeated over a number of rounds with the same
cues. Without any interaction, the pictures remain iconic across rounds;
with some interaction, the pictures grew simpler and more abstract as in
fig. 7.1.
The main addition I make to this methodology is that I required whichever
participant was the guesser on a given round to provide an insight rating
for each guess according to the ‘Aha!’ criterion discussed in previous ex-
periments. Since this communication game was played on paper, not on a
computer, the 100-point on-screen slider was replaced with a 7-point scale.
I predict that insight ratings would be high in response to novel signs, but
would drop as the participants become familiar with the signs. To control
against the possibility that fatigue or boredom might cause a decrease in
insight ratings, one item on the drawer’s list of cues was replaced every
second round. This meant that even in late rounds there were some novel
pictures, and I predict that these would initially show high insight ratings
which would then drop like the other, familiar signs.
In the above experiments, guessers have a list of possible answers. This
constrains the context somewhat. In order to provide a less constrained
context without departing from the established methodology entirely, I ex-
panded the 20-item list of Garrod et al. (2007) to a 25-item list of possible
answers. The guessers were given this list in a 5×5 grid to guess the cue.
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However, a short-list of 10 items randomly selected from this long-list con-
stituted the drawer’s list for round 1. As described above, one item from
the short-list was replaced from the long-list every two rounds, so by the
8th round, the guesser would only have seen signs for 13 of the 25 possible
items. While the guessers knew what the possible answers were, they didn’t
know just which cues they would be seeing in a given round. The context
here, then, was comparatively unconstrained, firstly due to the larger set of
possible answers, and secondly due to uncertainty about which items from
the long-list would appear in the game.
To avoid confounds arising from communication between drawer and
guesser, interaction was limited to the word ‘stop’, which the guesser said
when they thought they had the answer. No feedback was provided, so the
guesser wouldn’t know whether their guess was right.
According to my definition of ‘symbol’, and given that abduction plays an
important role in generating novel hypotheses, the prediction is that insight
will be higher for novel signs and lower for more familiar signs. A sign’s
degree of iconicity should not play a large role in determining insight ratings,
except that signs tend to grow less iconic as they become familiar. But
then iconicity and insight ratings are both dependent on degree of novelty
or precedence, but are independent of each other: it is not the case that
iconicity intermediates between novelty and insight ratings.
To test this, a second study was conducted. An independent group
of participants (who had not participated in the Pictionary game) rated
pictures produced in the Pictionary game for precedence (the degree to
which it resembles the picture drawn in the previous round for the same cue)
and iconicity (the degree to which it resembles its referent). The more novel
the sign, the lower the expected ratings for precedence, while familiar signs
would be very similar to the corresponding picture in the previous round and
thus receive high precedence ratings. I predict that precedence should have
a statistically significant effect on insight rating but that iconicity would
not.
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7.2 Study 1: insight in graphical communication
7.2.1 Methodology
7.2.1.1 Design
A within-subjects design was used. Pairs of participants played 8 rounds of
a Pictionary-like game, alternating drawer and guesser role after each round.
Each participant thus had 4 turns at each role. After making each guess, the
guesser recorded an insight rating (insight), the dependent variable. The
fixed effect, then, is turn; plausible random effects include subject (nested
inside pair) and item.
7.2.1.2 Participants
22 University of Edinburgh students were recruited via the university’s jobs
website (5 male, 17 female; mean age = 20.08, SD = 1.86). All participants
gave informed consent and were paid £6 for their participation. One pair
was excluded from analysis because one participant wrote English words on
her drawings, despite instructions to the contrary.
7.2.1.3 Materials
Garrod et al. (2007) and Fay et al. (2010) used a list of 20 items divided
into 5 categories (places, people, entertainment, objects, abstract), either
with 4 easily confusable items each, or with 3 easily confusable items and
1 distractor. I removed distractors and expanded each category to include
5 items. The original list of places, for instance, included art gallery,
parliament, museum and theatre. To this, I added university. The
original list of people included Arnold Schwarzenegger, Brad Pitt, Hugh
Grant and Russell Crowe. Hugh Grant was the distractor, presumably
because of the genres he appears in (this is not made clear in Garrod et al.).
Instead, I used a list of 5 actors who are all potentially confusable in that
they typically do not appear in romantic roles. Otherwise, the distractor in
each list would have been salient and the others non-salient along a fairly
obvious dimension, and salience would have been a likely confound. The list
of ‘Abstract’ concepts in Garrod et al. was loud, homesick, poverty; in Fay
et al. (2010), it was: loud, homesick, poverty, sadness. To avoid making
any of these more salient than the rest, I used a list of nouns, rather than
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a combination of nouns and adjectives. Since their lists contained many
words of negative valence, I used only nouns of negative valence for the
same reason. Since their ‘Entertainment’ category was just a list of genres,
I expanded it to 5 items by adding horror. Their list of objects was rather
disparate, but one thing many of the objects had in common was that they
were dominated, visually, by a glass-like rectangle. I thus included iPad and
window to maintain this visual uniformity.
The cues are given in table 7.1.
Places Actors Entertainment Objects Abstract
theatre Robert De Niro drama television noise
art gallery Arnold Schwarzenegger soap opera computer monitor depression
museum Clint Eastwood cartoon microwave poverty
parliament Chuck Norris horror window nausea
university Harrison Ford sci-fi iPad violence
Table 7.1: Items grouped by category.
Each participant in a pair had a response booklet. Each page in the
booklet corresponded to one round, and the page for that round indicated
which role (drawer or guesser) each participant was to take.
A shortlist of 10 items was randomly generated for each pair from the
longlist of 25 items. These, in a randomised order, constituted the list of cues
for the drawer for round 1. The list order was randomised again between
each round. Every second round (rounds 3, 5 and 7) one item from the
shortlist was replaced by another from the longlist, so by the end of the
experiment, 7 items would have been present for all 8 rounds; 1 item for 6
rounds; 1 item for 4 rounds and 1 item for 2 rounds.
For each round, the guesser’s response form had spaces for them to record
their guess for each picture, in addition to a 7-point scale along which they
had to provide an insight rating (by circling the relevant number on the
scale) indicating the extent to which they had an ‘Aha!’ moment for that
picture. The scale increased from left to right, such that circling 7 indicated
a strong feeling of insight.
7.2.1.4 Procedure
The participants read instructions which described insight in terms of an
‘Aha!’ experience, comparing it to a light bulb suddenly flashing on in the
head. They then had the chance to practice 4 Compound Remote Associate
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(CRA, see ch. 4) problems from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003b) and were
told that insight is a common (but not certain) experience when solving such
problems. Participants were instructed not to include any English words in
their drawings, or numbers, letters or other conventional signals. They were
able to ask questions if unclear about any aspects of the experiment. When
both participants indicated they were ready to proceed, they were given the
list of possible answers and allowed a minute to familiarise themselves with
the items on the list.
The drawer then read the first cue on the shortlist of 10 cues, and be-
gan drawing a picture to help the guesser infer the cue. The drawer was
required to continue drawing until the guesser said ‘stop’, indicating that
they had guessed the cue. The correctness of the guess was not confirmed.
At that point, the guesser recorded their guess on their response sheet and
recorded an insight rating indicating to what extent they had experienced
an ‘Aha!’ moment. The drawer then proceeded to the next item on the
list. This process repeated until all 10 items on the list for that round had
been guessed. At that point, both participants turned to a new page, which
indicated that they should swap roles. The procedure for each round was
identical, apart from the role played by each participant. Two such rounds
constitute a turn, since each participant played each role once per turn.
7.2.2 Results
Fig. 7.1 shows the series of pictures produced by one pair of participants
for cue Harrison Ford, exemplifying the process of symbolisation found in
Garrod et al. (2007).
On average, participants guessed correctly on 83.875% of problems. Since
new problems were introduced throughout, but no feedback apart from the
word ‘stop’ was allowed, they were unable to be perfectly accurate. Table
7.2 breaks these values down by turn. The experiment sought to mea-
sure participants’ subjective experience of guessing, not guessing correctly
(given that hypothesis generation is non-demonstrative), so insight ratings
provided for guesses that turned out to be wrong were not excluded from
analysis1.
I first analyse the subset of the data for those items present across all 4
1It turns out that excluding incorrect guesses strengthens the statistical significance of
the predicted effect, so this is a conservative move.
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Figure 7.1: Pictures representing cue Harrison Ford across eight rounds for one pair
of participants. Rounds increase left-to-right and top-to-bottom, in which case the left
column shows pictures by one participant (the drawer in rounds 1, 3, 5, 7) and the right
one shows pictures by the other participant (the drawer in rounds 2, 4, 6, 8). Each row
thus constitutes one turn.





Table 7.2: Percentage guesses correct per turn, with standard deviation.
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β SE t p1 p2
intercept 3.22689 0.24920 12.949
turn -0.27257 0.09295 -2.932 0.006208 0.001
Table 7.3: Model parameters and p-values derived by the anova method (p1) and mcmc
method (p2, using a reduced model without random slopes).
turns to investigate the effect of turn on insight. Then I include items in-
troduced during turns 2, 3 and 4. For the first analysis, a linear mixed-effects
model (LMEM) was constructed using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2011)
in R. The model included turn as the fixed effect, with random intercepts
and slopes for subject and random intercepts for item. Random slopes for
item and the inclusion of word category and participant pairs as random
factors led to overparameterisation since the relevant correlation matrices
included values of 1 or −1 (Baayen et al., 2008). The model parameters
are given in table 7.3 and displayed graphically in fig. 7.2. These show that
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Figure 7.2: Mean insight ratings by turn with standard error. Slope from the LMEM in
table 7.3.
Fig. 7.3 adds insight ratings for those items that were introduced as re-
placements in turns 2, 3 and 4. The graph indicates that, when new items
were introduced, they initially received high insight ratings, before those
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β SE t p1 p2
intercept 3.0202 0.2430 12.427
time -0.3136 0.0913 -3.436 0.00182 0.0001
Table 7.4: Model parameters and p-values derived by the anova method (p1) and mcmc
method (p2, using a reduced model without random slopes).
ratings dropped as for the original items. Since turn 4 was the final turn,
the data for items introduced in that turn are represented by a point, not a
line. To analyse this larger data set, instead of using turn as the fixed effect,
the time the item had been in the game was calculated (time). By the end
of turn 3, for instance, an item that had been present since the start of the
game would have been around for 3 turns, but an item introduced in turn
2 would have been around for just 2 turns, and an item introduced during
turn 3 would have been around for 1 turn. An LMEM of this expanded data
set was constructed replacing turn with time. The parameters and derived
p-values are summarised in table 7.4. These show that insight decreases
significantly as time increases and, indeed, the effect has been strengthened
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Figure 7.3: Mean insight ratings by turn, grouped by the number of the turn in which
the items first appeared. Error bars indicate SE from the LMEM in table 7.4.
If it was the case that a decrease in insight over turn was explained by
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boredom or fatigue, we would expect new additions in later turns to receive
lower insight ratings than new additions in earlier turns, and similar insight
ratings to familiar signs in the same later turn. If, on the other hand, the
decrease in insight ratings is explained by novel signs becoming familiar,
then newer additions in later turns should receive similar insight ratings to
new additions in earlier turns, and higher insight ratings than familiar signs
in the same later turn. The matter thus boils down to whether turn or time
are better predictors for the full data set. An anova comparison between the
two models of the full data set (one with turn and one with time as fixed
effects, random effects as for models described above) shows that the one
with time is a significantly better fit (χ2 = 57.562, df = 0, p < 0.001). The
graph suggests just the opposite of a fatigue effect, in fact. It’s plausible
that in later turns, a novel cue was salient compared to cues that had been
present for a few turns already.
7.3 Study 2: iconicity and precedence
7.3.1 Methodology
7.3.1.1 Participants
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MT) crowd-
sourcing platform to provide ratings of pictures from the previous study.
Given the nature of MT, participants were able to provide ratings for one
picture or for several pictures as they wished. In other words, this particular
crowd-sourcing task was based on number of items, not number of partici-
pants, and it is usual on MT for workers to try to perform as many tasks of
the same type as they can. It turns out that the work was completed by a
total of 84 participants, so most completed a large number of items (mean
52.2). Participants were assigned by MT to whichever was the next avail-
able item, so while many would have rated unrelated pictures, some would
probably have rated different pictures produced for the same cue, and some
would probably have rated different pictures produced by the same partic-
ipant in the previous study. None of them were able, though, to respond
repeatedly to the same exact task.
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7.3.1.2 Design
The present study sought to test my prediction that a picture’s degree of
precedence (or its converse, novelty) should be a better predictor than its
degree of iconicity for the insight rating provided for that picture in the
previous study.
Given the limitations imposed by the nature of MT (described in the pre-
vious subsection, ‘Participants’), this study cannot accurately be described
as between- or a within-subjects. The focus here is on items, not par-
ticipants, since I will be testing which property of a picture best predicts
insight, and rather than investigating how different subjects rate precedence
or iconicity.
Each picture present from round 2 through to round 8 in the previous
study was rated for precedence by 10 MT participants and rated for iconicity
by 10 MT participants, as described below. In the analysis, precedence
and iconicity were both fixed effects, with insight produced during the
previous study as the dependent variable.
7.3.1.3 Materials
Pictures produced during the previous study were scanned and scaled to
yield jpg files (480×262 pixels).
7.3.1.4 Procedure
MT participants were presented either with a pair of pictures (for a prece-
dence rating) or a picture and a cue word (for an iconicity rating). For a pair
of pictures, participants provided a rating along a 7-point scale indicating to
what extent the one picture resembled the other picture (its precedent: the
drawing for that cue in the previous round). For a picture and a cue word,
participants rated the picture on a 7-point scale indicating to what extent
it resembled the referent of the cue. All participants were told that the pic-
tures had been drawn in a Pictionary-like game, and were thus not supposed
to be perfect representations — they were just meant to help someone guess
the cue, and they should rate overall resemblance (to precedent or referent)
with this in mind.
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7.3.2 Results
To analyse the effects of precedence and iconicity, an LMEM similar to the
previous ones was constructed, including iconicity and precedence along
with turn as fixed effects. Since this study was limited to items present
from rounds 2 through to 8, there was no distinction between time and
turn. Random slopes for subject2 and item relative to these fixed effects
indicated overparameterisation, so the model included random intercepts
only. The results are summarised in table 7.5. While precedence has a
significant effect on insight, iconicity does not.
Fixed effect β SE t p1 p2
intercept 2.97146 0.23287 12.760
iconicity 0.04572 0.03765 1.215 0.2467 0.228
precedence -0.16372 0.03609 −4.537 <0.0001 <0.0001
turn -0.29075 0.05538 −5.250 <0.0001 <0.0001
Table 7.5: Model estimates of fixed effects on insight with standard error (SE), t-values,
and p-values derived by the anova (p1) and mcmc (p2) methods. Significant p-values are
given in bold.
7.4 Discussion
Symbolisation, the process whereby an iconic signs becomes increasingly
arbitrary, is one proposed route to symbolic communication. The focus in
much research in this area has been on features of the sign itself (iconicity or
arbitrariness) or on its use in social contexts (such as the role of feedback).
However, an account of how our species evolved the cognitive skills to inter-
pret signs at various stages along this process (whether iconic or symbolic)
first needs an examination of what those skills were.
I have been arguing that abduction was crucial at the symbolic threshold
because the threshold required pragmatic inference, and that abduction,
unlike induction, is suitable for this contextually unconstrained process since
it can operate insightfully. That is, my arguments thus far have been about
cognitive differences across communicative contexts, not about cognitive
differences across changes in the sign itself. In this experiment, I turned
2subject here refers to the participant in the previous study who provided the insight
rating for the picture. Since the 10 ratings per picture were averaged, the MT participants
in this study could not be included as random effects.
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to examine the relationship between the nature of inference and the nature
of the sign. The results show that abduction plays a crucial role in early
stages of symbolisation, given that these had significantly higher insight
ratings, and that such ratings are diagnostic of increased involvement by
abduction, compared to induction. Abduction thus helped us across the
symbolic threshold.
I predicted that signs at the initial stages of the process of symbolisation
would require abduction, not because they are iconic, but because they are
novel, and thus require inferences about relevance. The LMEM analysis
shows that precedence has a significant effect on insight rating, but that
iconicity does not. Signs with high levels of precedence are not novel; novel
signs have low levels of precedence. This doesn’t mean that iconicity plays no
explanatory role in the evolution from a non-symbolic species to a symbolic
species. Rather, it means that iconicity isn’t what determines what kind of
inference is needed for that to happen.
Fig. 7.4 shows seven participants’ drawings for cue Harrison Ford for
whichever turn that cue was introduced in. Many of them represent Harrison
Ford as Indiana Jones (and Indiana Jones as a man with a whip and a hat).
Some, however, represented him as a man whose last name is also that
of a car. Similarly, fig. 7.5 shows representations of Clint Eastwood as a
person who uses guns, and the first picture represents him as a man who
is associated with places that have cactuses. Understanding each requires
hypotheses about the ground of the sign. These are relevance-deciding and
thus abductive.
Once that inference is made, however, relevance is established for fu-
ture interactions. In the terms of Garrod et al. (2007), the symbols are
‘grounded’ in interaction: later pictures refer, not just to their referents,
but also to earlier pictures. Once one realises that one’s partner has repre-
sented Harrison Ford as the man with the whip, one no longer needs to infer
the relevance of the whip in later rounds. In later stages in fig. 7.1, then, the
relevance of the whip is recognised or recalled, rather than inferred. If, for
whatever reason, symbolisation hadn’t occurred and drawings had remained
iconic throughout, insight ratings should nonetheless decrease across rounds
as the icons become familiar.
As the picture becomes simplified (in fig. 7.1, being reduced to a minimal
representation of the whip), interpreting the picture reduces to recognition
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Figure 7.4: Representations of cue Harrison Ford drawn independently by seven partici-
pants in seven different pairs.
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Figure 7.5: Representations of cue Clint Eastwood drawn independently by participants
in two different pairs.
of the whip. That is, the whip either is a salient associate of Harrison
Ford, or becomes a salient associate (or both). The difference lies in how
we explain the whip’s presence. If whip is a strong associate of Harrison
Ford in people’s representational structures prior to the experiment, then
that may explain why it appeared in so many groups’ drawings in round 1
(fig. 7.4), and why simplified pictures in later rounds often focused on the
whip (fig. 7.1). Call this the internal explanation. An alternative, external
explanation is that dynamics of interaction are what explain why the whip
became salient: perhaps if, in earlier rounds, participants (for whatever
reason) said ‘stop’ more often as the whip was drawn than as other features
were drawn, then that interaction might make the whip a salient feature of
the picture.
The research by Garrod et al. (2007) and Fay et al. (2010) focuses on ex-
ternal processes, as does much research in language evolution (such as Kirby
et al., 2008). But since abduction plays a role in symbol origins, and since
it rests on plausibility, a matter of accessibility in representational struc-
tures (§3.5), this means that the process of symbolisation must be driven
as much by representational structures as by social dynamics. How internal
and external processes interact in sign development is a question for future
research, which could, for instance, investigate correlations between word
associations and judgements of salience in pictorial representations.
Another way in which representational structures play a role is in the
matter of priors. In §3.4.1 I highlighted an issue with Bayesian accounts
of such tasks: they require well defined hypotheses spaces, as well as prior
probabilities and likelihoods for all hypotheses in those spaces, relative to
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the data. Unlike in more realistic word-learning tasks, the hypothesis space
here is given (though quite large). But having a constrained hypothesis
space won’t help one solve the problem if one cannot make the connection
between the whip and Harrison Ford. The basic Bayesian response is to posit
a high prior for the hypothesis that the whip indicates Harrison Ford, but
if that is how we are to explain how people solve such problems in general,
then we would have to allow stored priors for all possible representations of
all possible concepts, which would require astronomical amounts of storage
and indefinitely prolonged searches through that stored information.
Alternatively, hierarchical Bayesian models allow priors to be derived
from representational structures instead of being directly represented (Grif-
fiths et al., 2008, though I stressed in §3.4.5 that these structures are not
themselves always explicable in Bayesian terms). If these representational
structures mean that Indiana Jones is highly accessible from whip3 (or ac-
cessible from both whip and fedora), and if the same structures are what
explain generation of the hypothesis that the picture refers to Harrison Ford
(which is what an abductive account suggests), then induction simply has to
evaluate this particular hypothesis, avoiding the need for storage of count-
less priors and lengthy searches through such priors. While Fay et al. (2010)
explicitly allow inductive inference a role in symbolisation, these consider-
ations show that inductive inference alone is insufficient: abduction would
have been required too, especially in early stages of the process. Similarly,
Garrod et al. (2007) highlight a few similarities and differences between their
experiment and the description of the symbolic threshold in Deacon (1997).
The results here suggest that insight should also be numbered among the
similarities.
These results also offer an informative distinction between symbolisation
and an easily confused term, ontogenetic ritualisation, which is sometimes
seen in animal communication:
Here, the learned action, and the reaction of another animal to
it, both become stereotyped. A classical example is the ‘nursing
poke’ where a baby chimpanzee starts by pushing his mother’s
arm aside to get at the nipple; after a while, the mother learns to
raise her arm when he goes to move it, and the baby learns that
3Or that whip is highly accessible from Indiana Jones, an independent question, given
that the drawer first saw the cue and then decided what picture to draw.
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he only has to touch her side to get the required effect. (Hurford,
2007, 199-200)
Interaction and imitation are features of the symbolisation process. In-
teraction is also found in ontogenetic ritualisation4, and chimpanzees are
capable of imitation to a limited extent (Whiten et al., 2009). It is unclear,
then, why a species capable of ontogenetic ritualisation should not be ca-
pable of symbolic communication, if symbolisation is a source of symbols.
Clearly, something else is needed.
Hurford (2007) suggests that this something else is partly a matter of
empathy, trust and motivation, and while I agree that those are part of the
picture, an additional important difference involves salience or relevance.
Food is a biologically salient category, so it is unsurprising if processes of
ontogenetic ritualisation apply to feeding behaviours. While animal imita-
tion often thus relies on biologically salient categories, we are able to make
complex inferences to discover what is salient or relevant in a complex in-
teraction such as this experiment. We can insightfully infer relevance or
salience in novel cases not constrained by biological categories, and I high-
lighted the role of salience in Lewis conventions and relevance in Millikan
conventions (§1.4). Similarly, I’ve already discussed how some animals are
capable of insight when it comes to food retrieval, while we are capable
of insight domain generally (§3.5.2). Our ability to infer salience or rele-
vance, then, underlies the difference between open-ended symbolisation and
contextually constrained ontogenetic ritualisation.
In sum, abduction plays an important role in interpreting novel signs
that require inferences about relevance or salience, and is thus required at
earlier stages of the symbolisation process. If this process plays a role in
explaining the origins of symbolic communication, these results mean that
abduction was essential for crossing the symbolic threshold.
4Though Hurford (2007) stresses that a difference between this and human communi-
cation is that our interactions are reciprocal (either person in an interaction can be sender
or receiver), while the chimpanzee mother’s and baby’s roles are asymmetric in the above








The primary argument of this dissertation has been that abduction was one
of the cognitive faculties necessary for our ancestors to cross the symbolic
threshold. I argued that symbolic communication requires pragmatic infer-
ence; that the requisite inference must have been salience-, relevance-, and
context-deciding hypothesis about the ground of a sign; that such inference
is comparatively complex in evolutionary terms; and that induction on its
own is unable to account for word learning in novel unconstrained cases, as
at the symbolic threshold. I tested Peirce’s claim that abduction is insight-
ful and found subjective reporting of an ‘Aha!’ moment to be diagnostic of
increased levels of abduction, compared to induction. I then showed that
meaning-guessing tasks require more insight (and thus abduction) when hy-
potheses are not given, when context size increases, when predictability
from context decreases, or when signs are lacking in precedent. These were,
I argued, features of the symbolic threshold that necessitated abduction.
8.2 Secondary arguments
Secondary to this main thread, I provided a detailed account of iconicity
and convention as they relate to language evolution, and highlighted how
an over-reliance on either description risks introducing explanatory gaps
into an evolutionary account if one focuses unduly on perception or on
the co-ordination or imitation of behaviour alone (as opposed to behaviour
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and belief or intention). I acknowledged useful elements of each, though:
direct iconicity provides analogical information that abduction can use in
connecting representamens and objects, while indirect iconicity highlights
the open-endedness of human interpretive processes compared to that of an-
imals. Theories of convention explain how we manage to settle on anything
at all, given this open-endedness.
I flagged up an incongruity in Relevance Theory: it is non-normative
and places a large explanatory burden on accessibility (both features of an
empiricist psychology), yet proposes that deduction is the mechanism of in-
terpretation. Deduction is syntactic and normative and thus prototypically
rationalist, which engages the Frame Problem (specifically the version of
the Frame Problem that Fodor calls Hamlet’s Problem). Replacing nor-
mative, syntactic deduction with non-normative, associationist abduction
avoids this, and I reviewed a number of experiments that characterise prag-
matic inference in empiricist terms.
The proposed inferential hierarchy, supported by behavioural and neu-
rological evidence, gives contextual constraint a foundational role in de-
termining inferential complexity. The hierarchy coheres with evidence of
similarities and differences between human and animal cognition: many an-
imals are capable of inference when the context is constrained by biology or
experiment design. Some animals are sporadically capable of contextually
unconstrained inference in domain-specific cases, particularly food retrieval.
They are not generally capable of contextually unconstrained inference, how-
ever. The proposed definition of ‘inference’ also suggested a way to identify
transitive inference cognition in animals.
I reviewed evidence supporting differences in hemispheric processing
such that the LH involves fine, narrow spreading of activation while the
RH involves coarse, broad spreading of activation. The LH dominates in
circumstances where a word or meaning is predictable from context, or a
constrained context is likely to provide coherence; the RH dominates when
meaning is less predictable or a larger context is needed for coherence. Novel
metaphors are more of a RH process which, given that understanding a
metaphor involves inferring the ground, suggests interesting parallels with
novel symbols. The discussion also showed that the RH temporal lobe (im-
plicated in insight and creativity) is worthy of further attention in language
evolution, though the frontal lobe has occupied much of the attention in this
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field over the last couple of decades.
Novel, unconstrained problems were shown to represent both a practi-
cal and a principled limit on induction, since inductive attempts to deal
with novelty run into problems with relevance, psychologically unrealistic
hyper-theories, or innate theories. Innate theories of meaning can’t ex-
plain how we evolved to cross the symbolic threshold; hyper-theories about
meaning would have been unrealistic in a pre-symbolic species lacking any
theory of meaning; relevance is needed to explain just which structures are
extracted from semantic memory for placement in working memory; and
in novel cases, there are no theories to constrain relevance. Analogy and
insight, on the other hand, are well suited for dealing with novelty and un-
constrained problems. Indeed, I reviewed evidence showing that analogy
can determine salience and insight can determine relevance, and that both
involve connections between representations or representational structures.
8.3 Directions for future work
8.3.1 Experimental
This dissertation focused on insight rather than analogy, but there is room
for exploration of the role that analogy plays in hypothesis generation in
iconic gesture and imitation, and of how analogy processes salience or rel-
evance in these situations. I outlined how plausibility underlies hypothesis
generation, and if plausibility is a matter of accessibility in representational
structures, then it would be interesting to investigate interactions between
salience in iconic signs and accessibility (for instance, in word associations).
If a whip is central to most people’s representation of Harrison Ford, and
if representational structures determine salience and accessibility, then we
might expect signallers’ choices in producing a novel sign to correspond to
people’s word associations, and expect signs produced in accordance with
accessibility to be more easily interpretable than those not. Conversely,
I mentioned that ‘dog’ is the most common associate of ‘pet’, and if this
was explicable by dogs being more prototypical pets, then it would be un-
surprising if novel iconic gestures for ‘pet’ were more often dog-like than
cat-like. On the other hand, dogs and cats are equally frequent, and an ap-
ple appeared in all three pictures for cue ‘ripe’ in ch. 5, so the study might
investigate the extent to which there is a disjunction between salience and
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accessibility on one hand and probability on the other.
I mentioned that the degree of similarity between George Clooney and
Chuck Norris is context dependent. If a drawer or gesturer had to produce
a novel sign for ‘George Clooney’, his decisions about salience or relevance
would be quite different depending on whether the context included Toni
Morrison and Alice Walker or Stephen Seagal and Jean Claude Van Damme.
So manipulations of context would probably have an effect on the production
of novel signs, which might in turn have an effect on interpretation.
A further study could research how salience, plausibility and probability
interact across dyads as the task is iterated over time, or within dyads in
cross-situational contexts. If, of two meanings, one is more salient and the
other more probable cross-situationally, is it ever the case that the salient,
less probable meaning would be hypothesised by participants? In an iterated
learning task, would the most probable or the most salient sign (if different)
be more likely to be transmitted over time?
My main measure of insight here has been self reporting, but there are a
number of ways in which this could be extended. An individual differences
study could measure how insightful participants are, and investigate whether
insightful participants solve abductive problems more quickly or success-
fully than less insightful participants. I would expect that, in closed worlds,
the difference between insightful and non-insightful participants would be
smaller than in open worlds. A split-visual-field study could manipulate
levels of novelty or predictability in a hypothesis-generating problem to
see whether recognition of target words is facilitated more in the LVF/RH
as novelty increases or predictability decreases. Going in the other direc-
tion, another split-visual-field study could investigate whether primes in the
LVF/RH are more likely to affect hypothesis generation than those to the
RVF/LH. Neuroimaging is a further possible direction: deduction, induction
and insight have all been studied using various neuroimaging methods, but
abduction has not.
8.3.2 Theoretical
While the above focus on the experimental side of cognitive semiotics, there
is also much to explore on the theoretical side. I mentioned, for instance,
how there seem to be various possibilities for points of contact between my
inferential hierarchy and the mimesis hierarchy in Zlatev (2008). Research
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might turn up further similarities, differences and disconnects, or overlap-
ping or differing predictions about communication in phylogeny or ontogeny.
I explored Peirce’s notion of plausibility here, but this is a very unde-
veloped area of cognition, and I think it merits further attention. While
dual-process models (for instance, distinguishing associative from syntactic
processes) are commonplace in cognitive science, it is less common to align
these with two-step models (where the first step is non-normative conjecture
and the second is rational evaluation of those conjectures). A further area
for theoretical work, then, is the degree of overlap between syntactic and
normative processes on one side and associationist and non-normative pro-
cesses on the other, or the scope of non-normative processes more generally.
One particular topic in this area concerns the difference between com-
positionality and creative combination. If a compositional process puts fa-
miliar elements together, one expects the meaning of the composite to be
predicable given the meaning of each element: if one understands ‘John
loves Mary’, then one should understand ‘Mary loves John’. On the other
hand, functional flexibility rather than predictability is a hallmark of cre-
ative combination. One can know what a pole is and what a tin can is, but
that doesn’t mean one can predict the function of a can on a pole: one has
to invent or discover that function. In one experiment reviewed in ch. 3, a
participant intended this combination to be a bird nest. As the word ‘intend’
there suggests, this is more pragmatic than the compositional example, and
it is also conjectural, plausible, or non-normative.
I think it would be quite straightforward to make the case that creative
combination is what underlies novel metaphor as opposed to conventional
metaphor and syntax. ‘Bright student’ is processed in classical LH language
areas, as is syntax; ‘pearl tears’ is processed in creative RH language areas
which are not sensitive to syntactic constraints, but which are responsible
for functional flexibility. If there is a continuum between novel and con-
ventional metaphor, then it is plausible that there is a continuum between
compositionality and creative combination based on degree of predictability.
But two questions then raised are (1) whether any other aspects of lan-
guage involve creative combination rather than compositionality and (2)
what the evolutionary trajectory here was. I think it at least plausible that,
both early on in child development and shortly after the symbolic thresh-
old, the meanings of simple combinations of symbols needn’t have been
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mechanically predictable. If they weren’t predictable (or not entirely pre-
dictable) this suggests we cannot assume they were entirely compositional
(at least, the matter needs consideration). Conversely, if one were to argue
that our species’ earliest two-sign combinations were entirely compositional,
this might commit one to the claim that hemispheric differences were al-
ready well developed by that point, which is quite a strong claim, one which
requires evidence.
Finally, both the inferential hierarchy and the two-step dual-process
model offer a framework for understanding non-experimental evidence, such
as the archaeological record. ‘Symbol’ in archaeology often refers to artistic
expression and is sometimes partly iconic. Such symbols are often used as
evidence of cognition about abstract meaning, but they are also evidence of
open-ended conjectural processes. My framework offers a clear account of
how iconicity and open-ended creativity or conjecture are related to cogni-
tion about meaning. Conversely, I wouldn’t expect the producers of Oldowan
tools, which remained relatively unchanged over hundreds of thousands of
years, to have been skilled in abductive inference.
Though these proposals are speculative (though anchored in points I have
made in the body of the text), I hope they suggest that the introduction of
abductive inference into the debate about human evolution has the potential
to open up a range of avenues of research, reframe current pieces of evidence,




Sources or preparation of stimuli are described in the ‘Materials’ section
of the relevant chapter.
Stimuli for Experiment 1 (ch. 4)
Abductive problems
Complex causation
1. You’re walking down a road. Up ahead the whole road is wet. A
tumbleweed blows across it, before coming to rest in a pile of garbage
beside the road. It is mid afternoon. Why is the road wet?
2. You see a bald teenage boy. He seems to have a healthy complexion,
and is wearing a smart suit. The suit is grey pinstripe. Why is he
bald?
3. It’s been quite a sunny July so far. You see a tree with dead leaves
all around it on the ground. The tree seems free from mould and rot.
There are no other trees around. Why are there dead leaves on the
ground?
4. You see birds circling in the blazing heat, but you can’t see any dead
animals in the grass below. Why are they circling?
Simple causation
1. You read about a plane crash. Why did it crash?
2. You see a building collapse. Why did it collapse?
3. You hear a loud noise. What caused it?
4. Your car isn’t where you left it. Why is it gone?
Complex motivation
1. Someone comes into the room and lights a candle. Everyone who lives
in that apartment is single. In the corner, someone else is watching a
DVD on their laptop, looking bored. Why did someone light a candle?
2. Your teenage son is acting even more weirdly than usual. The school’s
mandatory drugs test came back negative, and he seems happy with
his girlfriend. He did well in last week’s math test. Why is he acting
weirder than usual?
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3. A colleague said she couldn’t come to your party because she’s busy,
but then you hear from a mutual friend that your colleague mentioned
not having any plans that night. You’re pretty sure she doesn’t dislike
you. Why did the colleague say she couldn’t come?
4. A friend of yours usually drinks quite a bit, but not enough to be
considered an alchoholic. One day, you offer them a drink, and they
refuse. They refuse the next day, too. You’ve known them a long
time, and they haven’t mentioned any bad news recently. Why are
they refusing drinks all of a sudden?
Simple motivation
1. You see a woman shouting at a sales assistant in a shop. Why is she
shouting?
2. A colleague arrives for a very formal business meeting in a T-shirt and
shorts.
3. Your neighbour walks out his front door, but immediately turns to go
back in. Why did he turn back?
4. A friend calls you to suggest going to the zoo today. Why did they
decide to go to the zoo today?
Alien world
1. You arrive at an open space in a Zorg town. Lots of Zorgs are milling
about. One Zorg is coming through the crowd, which opens up to let
it pass. Its clothes are in rags and it is quite tall. The other aliens
pour water in its path, and bow as it goes past. Who do you think
this Zorg is?
2. You’re in the middle of a crowd of Zorgs, all talking quietly to each
other. A Zorg with a black shirt arrives, and the others become quiet
as it passes. It takes something you can’t see out of its pocket and
puts its hand on someone’s shoulder. The crowd starts talking again,
nervously. Who is the Zorg in black?
3. You see a Zorg lying twitching on the floor. Another Zorg with a red
stripe on its arm kneels down beside it and holds a strange device to
the first one’s head. It also attaches a small wriggly thing to its leg.
The Zorg on the floor seems to sag. The wriggly thing turns blue.
What’s going on?
4. A Zorg in a purple hat is surrounded by a ring of other Zorgs. They’re
making a pleasing sounding noise in harmony, and its face flushes a
260 APPENDIX
gentle orange. They give it something covered in small blinking lights,
which flash on and off in what seems a random pattern. It takes out
a blade and looks expectant. What’s going on?
Insight problems
Classic insight problems
1. How much earth is there in a hole 1m long, 1m wide and 1m deep?
2. Marsha and Marjorie were born on the same day of the same month
of the same year to the same mother and the same father, yet they are
not twins. How is that possible? Type your answer, then press enter.
3. You just have a candle, some matches, and a box of tacks. How can
you support the candle on the wall?
4. A man in a small town married 20 different women of the same town.
All are still living and he never divorced. Polygamy is unlawful, but


























1. Which of the following is the most likely explanation for someone look-
ing tanned, given that they’re from Alaska?
a) They’ve been on holiday b) They’ve been to a tanning salon
2. Which of the following is the most likely explanation for a man giving
his wife flowers, given that they’ve been married for 40 years?
a) He’s apologising for infidelity b) It’s her birthday
3. Which of the following is the most likely explanation for a cough, given
that the patient is a smoker?
a) Emphysema b) A cold
4. Which of the following is the most likely explanation for someone being
arrested, given that they have a master’s degree?
a) They’ve committed fraud b) They’ve committed murder
Induction type 2
1. Of all possible reasons a friend might be late to meet you, how likely
is it that missing their bus is the right explanation?
2. Of all possible reasons for a car crash, how likely is it that running a
red light is the right one?
3. Of all possible reasons for a train being cancelled, how likely is it that
snow is the right one?
4. Of all possible reasons for a woman collapsing in the street, how likely
is it that being drunk is the right one?
Induction type 3
1. Sparrows have procampsial arches; eagles have procampsial arches;
penguins have procampsial arches. How likely is it that all birds have
procampsial arches?
2. Lions have decuspid molars; tigers have decuspid molars; leopards
have decuspid molars. How likely is it that house cats have decuspid
molars?
3. Cow guts contain the enzyme protylase. How likely is it that all her-
bivores’ guts contain the enzyme protylase?
4. Bats’ ears have protympanic membranes. How likely is it that all
mammals’ ears have protympanic membranes?
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Deduction
1. If Zeno is Cretan and most Cretans are liars, is Zeno a liar?
a) Definitely b) Possibly c) Definitely not.
2. If Achilles isn’t faster than a tortoise, and a tortoise isn’t faster than
an arrow, is Achilles faster than an arrow?
a) Definitely b) Possibly c) Definitely not.
3. All philosophers are wise men and Parmenides is a philosopher. Is
Parmenides a wise man?
a) Definitely b) Possibly c) Definitely not.
4. All men are mortals and Cratylus is a mortal. Is Cratylus a man?
a) Definitely b) Possibly c) Definitely not.
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